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The dissertation examines how Ronald Reagan made use of fiction in developing 
his world view and grand strategy.  It argues his use of narrative played an essential role in 
shaping his vision and in how he communicated with the American public.  In particular, 
the works of Tom Clancy, westerns, and science-fiction novels provided synthetic 
experiences and creative space that helped Reagan contextualize information and imagine 
the near-future.  Fiction also helped Reagan develop empathy for peoples behind the Iron 
Curtain leading to a nuanced policy that clearly distinguished the people from their 
government.  The creativity and imagination of Reagan’s vision caused him to break with 
orthodox conservative positions and hastened the end of the Cold War.  The dissertation 
will also examine how Reagan’s use of fiction proved damaging in the developing world 
as his narrow reading reinforced tropes and stereotypes leading to ineffective policies that 
contributed to great suffering in Latin America, South Africa, and the Middle East.  The 
dissertation argues that policy makers read a broad amount of fiction from diverse sources 
and actively seek to incorporate it into their strategies. 
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Introduction: Strategic Culture 
 
 Americans watching Saturday Night Live on December 6, 1986, saw rookie cast 
member Phil Hartman portray Ronald Reagan for the first time.  The sketch opens with 
an apparently senile president discussing the unfolding Iran-Contra scandal with a 
reporter.  The reporter noted she was unsure what was worse, Reagan knowing or not 
knowing about the crisis.  Hartman gradually ushers her from the oval office, saying he 
hopes he was informative “given the very little that I know.”1  When the reporter leaves, 
Hartman’s Reagan transforms.  The president no longer shakes and stands straighter, and 
an expression of angry calculation replaces the previous grandfatherly confusion.  He 
assembled his staff and described a master plan to continue supporting the Contras.  
When Caspar Weinberger, played by Jon Lovitz, asked Reagan to slow down since 
“there’s still a lot about the Iran-Contra affair” he did not understand the president berates 
him.  Hartman shouted, “You don’t need to understand!  I am the President, only I need 
to understand and later quotes Montesquieu on the danger of sharing knowledge.2  Over 
the remainder of the skit, Reagan does complex financial calculations without the aid of a 
calculator, concludes a weapons deal with Iraqis while speaking Arabic, and talks with 
bankers in German.  His staff looks on befuddled before eventually falling asleep as the 
president works through the night. 
                                                 




 Hartman played Reagan again in a 1987 sketch centering on Gorbachev’s visit to 
Washington DC for the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.  The Reagan 
of the sketch was clueless and rather than describe the historical significance of 
landmarks in the capital, discussed their use in movies.  At one point, Hartman’s Reagan 
offered to take Danny DeVito’s Gorbachev into the war room of the Pentagon, before the 
Marine driver tells the president that the Soviet leader would not be allowed.  Reagan 
noted that he had never been in the war room, but if there was a war someone would 
“evidently” take him there.3  The final site on the tour was the UFO landing site from the 
1951 movie The Day the Earth Stood Still.  Reagan points to the location where the alien 
robot Gort stood, prompting Gorbachev to respond with “Klaatu barada nikto,” a famous 
line from the climax of the movie.4  Although included in the skit as a joke, the movie 
was one that Reagan was both fond of and one that shaped his world view.  Historian 
Sean Willentz notes in The Age of Reagan the president often spoke of the movie and it 
contributed to the “global humanitarian vision” of Reaganism.5 
 The two sketches touched on central questions about the Reagan administration.  
Though personally popular, Reagan and his White House remained enigmatic to many 
Americans.  Hartman’s first outing asked who was in charge of the administration.  
Bureaucratic chaos and personal rivalries played out publicly throughout Reagan’s time 
in office lending the impression that the administration lacked a strong leader.  Tell-all 
                                                 
3 “President Reagan Gives Gorbachev a Tour of Washington D.C.” Saturday Night Live, 5 December 1987. 
4 Ibid 
5 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008, (New York: Harper Books, 2008), 138. 
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books by disgruntled former aides and administration officials contributed to the public 
image of the president as an amiable figurehead that was out of his depth on policy 
issues.  David Stockman, Reagan’s first director of the Office of Management and 
Budget and architect of the administration’s early budget cuts, released the first of these, 
entitled The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed, in 1986.  He 
describes how those around Reagan “made him stumble into the wrong camp,” and how 
the president “had no business trying to make a revolution” as he lacked the will to lead 
one.6  The book debuted in the top spot on The New York Times non-fiction bestseller’s 
list and Stockman played a prominent role in a media blitz promoting the book and the 
failure of Reagan’s leadership.7 
 In its review of the book, The New York Times highlighted what it viewed as 
evidence that Reagan was not mentally capable of directing his administration.  It noted 
that Stockman’s “Reagan stories are priceless.”8  The book repeatedly demonstrates the 
president sitting silently in meetings until the mention of a magic word, like ‘welfare’ or 
‘Medicare,’ caused him to launch into an anecdote.  For Stockdale and The New York 
Times these stories and jokes showed how the president “totally misunderstood the 
preceding conversation.”9  The memoir showed cabinet members who “take skillful 
advantage of the president’s capacity for befuddlement,” as they pursue their agendas by 
                                                 
6 David Stockman, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1986), 5. 
7 Bob Greene, “Triumph of Politics is a Triumph of Hype,” Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1986. 




using misdirection, movies, and comic strips to sway the leader of the free world.10  
Stockman and The New York Times view Reagan’s preference for spinning yarns as a 
sign of his intellectual incapacity, and proof that he did not provide the ideology and 
policy ideas his administration pursued. 
 George Shultz, who served as Reagan’s Secretary of State from 1982 to 1989, 
views the use anecdotes differently.  He acknowledges that many of Stockman’s 
criticisms were in fact accurate.  Reagan “could allow himself to be deceived, sometimes 
almost knowingly.”11  He would rearrange facts to make stories better, and at times 
simply ignore the facts entirely.  However, Shultz did not view this as a sign of 
intellectual incapacity or even dishonesty on the part of Reagan.  Instead, he views the 
president’s use of stories in a positive light, noting, “he used a story to impart a larger 
message --- and sometimes the message was simply more important than the facts.12  
Reagan recognized the “stories create meaning” and that “facts are the unassembled 
parts” of a story waiting for a master to piece them together into something greater than 
its parts. 
 Caspar Weinberger, Reagan’s Secretary of Defense from 1981-1987, agrees with 
Shultz on the issue of Reagan’s use of anecdote, one of the few areas where Shultz and 
Weinberger concurred.  He argues that Reagan’s use of stories and jokes were important 
factors in giving the president “such high standing and deserved popularity” with the 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 




public.13 The stories and jokes created “an atmosphere” that produced “vital agreements 
that neither logic, nor table pounding, nor cajoling could bring about.”14  Weinberger 
viewed Reagan’s seemingly unorthodox method of communication as essential to the 
success of the administration and the accomplishment of Reagan’s agenda.  Both 
Weinberger and Shultz vehemently deny that anyone other than Reagan acted as the 
driving force of the administration, and years after Reagan’s term in office ended wrote 
their memoirs in part to combat the continuing perception that others defined Reagan’s 
policies and goals. 
 The “President Reagan: Mastermind” and “President Reagan Gives Gorbachev a 
Tour of Washington” skits showed the role of popular culture in shaping perceptions of 
leaders and policies.  They played on and reinforced the public’s false understanding that 
Reagan was a figurehead, or as former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford termed him, 
“an amiable dunce.”15  Edmund Morris, Reagan’s official biographer, took a similarly 
dim view of his subject.  Morris frequently found himself asking “how much does Dutch 
really know” and expressed doubt that scholars would find much of value in Reagan’s 
diaries.16  In a 2011 op-ed he sought to counter the “sentimental colossus [Reagan’s] 
acolytes are trying to erect,” arguing the Reagan he knew was a “person of no ego and 
                                                 
13 Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner 
Books, 1990), 33. 
14 Ibid 
15 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 132. 
16 Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan, (New York: Random House, 1999), xxiii, xxv 
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little charisma.”17  History’s first draft on Reagan largely portrayed an intellectual 
lightweight, blandly mouthing others words and ideas. 
 More recent scholarship views Reagan with greater nuance.  John Patrick Diggins 
admits to initially following the “lightweight” line of thought, but felt the president’s 
reputation “improved considerably” with publication of Reagan’s letters, speeches, and 
radio transcripts, all revealing an intelligent, sensitive mind, with passionate 
convictions.”18  Diggins came to a “belated respect” for the “boldness” Reagan used to  
Sean Wilentz’s Age of Reagan though “sharply critical of Reagan’s leadership,” argues 
that Reagan created a “new fusion of deeply conservative politics with some of the 
rhetoric and even the spirit of Franklin D Roosevelt’s New Deal and of John F Kennedy’s 
New Frontier.”19  Stephen Hayward’s work, also titled The Age of Reagan, finds a similar 
link between Reagan and Roosevelt.  Hayward posits that Reagan’s divergences from 
conservative orthodoxy demonstrate an active political mind seeking to remake his party.  
Rick Perlstein believes Reagan to simultaneously be a rescuer and a divider.  He argues 
the president’s ability “to reimagine the morass in front of him as a tableau of moral 
clarity” explains this.20  For Perlstein, Reagan’s supporters wanted “crystalline black-or-
                                                 
17 Edmund Morris, “Five Myths About Ronald Reagan,” The Washington Post, 4 February 2011 
18 John Patrick Diggins, Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2007), xvii.  
19 Wilentz, 3, 1. 
20 Rick Perlstein, The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan, (New York: Simon and 
Shuster, 2014), xv-xvi. 
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white melodramas” while others recognized his words as those of a “phony or a 
hustler.”21 
 Each of these histories portray Reagan differently and range from hagiography to 
indictment.  However, reflect a nuanced political ideology that challenged the orthodoxy 
of both liberals and conservatives.  Perlstein’s observation about Reagan’s distillation of 
complex situation is cogent, but the implication of blanket oversimplification is unfair.  
The president’s ability to portray moral certitude enabled the bold actions Diggins 
praised.  It provided for a clear national vision and simple slogans like “Peace through 
Strength” belied complicated, well-reasoned, and effective strategies.  Reagan’s approach 
to the Soviet Union defies the oft-applied characterization of first term hostility followed 
by second term rapprochement.  The rhetoric could produce misunderstanding and 
Wilentz rightly criticizes Reagan’s indirect approach to decision-making.  Iran-Contra 
offers the most glaring failure.  Perlstein’s depiction of Reagan as divisive is also fair, as 
many audiences had difficulty finding themselves in Reagan’s simplified vision. 
 The question of the extent to which Reagan and his administration had a Cold 
War strategy remains a contested one.  In The Triumph of Improvisation, James Graham 
Wilson argues that “no master plan explains either the developments in Eastern Europe 
and East Germany or the response to those developments in the west.”22  Instead, 
“individuals in power ended the Cold War through unscripted actions” and “in the last 
                                                 
21 Ibid, xvi 
22 James Graham Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s 
Engagement, and the end of the Cold War, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2014) 
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years of the conflict improvisation mattered more than any market plan.”23  Melvyn 
Leffler in For the Soul of Mankind that Reagan recognized that “strength tempered the 
adversary’s ambitions and tamped down its expectations” but that the “main purpose of 
strength is to negotiate.”24  However, like Wilson, Leffler argues that Gorbachev’s 
actions proved more decisive in ending the Cold War.  He argues that the Soviet leader’s 
belief that “Soviet security was not threatened by capitalist adversaries” was the key to 
peaceful resolution.25  The work of both historians suggests the response of Reagan to a 
new Soviet leader was more important than any strategic program. 
 Hal Brands sees a more successful strategy in What Good is Grand Strategy?  He 
admits Reagan “was hardly the prototypical strategic savant,” but finds that his “shrewd 
geopolitical instincts” led to a winning strategy.26  The President’s recognition that the 
Soviet Union “was military strong, but economically, politically, and ideologically 
weak,” meant the blending of strength and outreach yielded an “immensely productive” 
strategic approach.27  Improvisation and relationships were important, however, they are 
a core part of any successful strategy.  Reagan established a clear vision on engaging with 
the Soviet Union and demonstrated the ability to wield hard and soft power in a variety of 
ways to support his vision.  Brands joins critics of Reagan’s management style and also 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 464. 
25 Ibid, 461. 
26 Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. 
Truman to George W. Bush, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2014), 142. 
27 Ibid, 142-43. 
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notes that the single-minded focus on the Soviet Union was detrimental to US initiatives 
in the developing world.28  The criticism is both fair and accurate.  Reagan’s failure to 
transcend the zero-sum mentality of the Cold War globally harmed not only US interests 
and his administration, but also contributed to significant amounts of bloodshed, 
particularly in Latin America. 
 In his survey of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis argues that Reagan, 
Gorbachev, and Pope John Paul II recognized the Cold War as a theater and “like all 
good actors, they brought the play  at last to an end.”29  Gaddis speculates that it took 
“dramatizations” by all three men to “remove the mental blinders” of their 
constituencies.30  While the characterization risks oversimplifying the motivations behind 
Reagan’s “Peace through Strength,” Pope John Paul II’s World Youth Day, and 
Gorbachev’s Perestroika, it accurately represents the importance of performance and 
stagecraft in politics and international relations.  Reagan’s background as an actor and 
story teller undoubtedly played a critical role in his ability to achieve his largest policy 
objectives.  His Hollywood past also provided critics an easy way to malign his intellect, 
agency, and capability. 
The ways Reagan communicated and developed ideas are part of why scholars question 
both the existence of a Reagan grand strategy and the extent of his involvement with his 
own administration.  He relied heavily on non-traditional sources, often preferring to use 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, (New York: Penguin, 2005), 197. 
30 Ibid, 196. 
10 
 
fiction to both create and articulate policy.  Reagan also drew primarily from middlebrow 
sources rather than high literature or academic works and arguments.  The focus on 
popular culture and simple parables led many to dismiss the nuance and merit contained 
within Reagan’s message. 
In Cold War Orientalism, historian Christina Klein examines how popular culture 
influenced American attitudes towards east Asia in the post-war period.  She argues that 
books, plays, and movies were a particularly powerful way to shape opinion and policy 
on the region.  Creators of middlebrow culture “often presented the Cold War as 
something that ordinary Americans could take part in.”31  Popular culture translated 
important strategic partnerships and alliances of the US “into personal terms and imbuing 
them with sentiment” creating a meaningful and individual connection with previously 
abstract ideas.32  Klein argues these connections took on particular importance because 
“the exercise of political, economic, and military power always depend on the mechanism 
of culture.”33  Popular culture helped build national will to fight the Cold War in the 
Pacific. 
Literary scholar Edward Said argues that culture provides “a sort of theater where 
various political and ideological causes engage one another.”34  In Culture and 
Imperialism, he asserts that the novel and imperialism are “unthinkable without one 
                                                 
31 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 6. 
32 Ibid, 8. 
33 Ibid, 6. 
34 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), xiii. 
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another.”35  This is because novels either explicitly or implicitly reinforce the existing 
structures of the state.  They depend on the existing “authority and power” of society and 
established institutions to create legibility across a broad audience which adds to the 
legitimacy of the existing structure of the state.  Said could easily include other mediums 
of popular culture into his framework.  Movies, plays, and music, as well the novel, 
depend on their audience instantly contextualizing it within their own lives, and use 
prevailing societal norms as a common language.  Even elements of culture intended as 
subversive rely on this common language. They often shock consumer’s sensibilities 
through the absence of a familiar frame of reference or create a sense of alienation 
through the juxtaposition of existing norms.   
Melani McAlister expands on this notion in Epic Encounters.  She looks at 
depictions of and references to the Middle East in American culture to show that culture 
actively assists the construction of “narratives that help policy make sense in a given 
moment.”36  She notes that cultural fields constantly interact with and respond to “other 
fields in the larger social system.”37  The relationship is a complex one, and often results 
in a cultural object that is a fun house vision of policy rather than a direct reflection.  Said 
and McAlister are correct to identify the absence of cultural examination from the study 
of policy.  However, their focus on the idea of culture as a clarifying agent of policy and 
strategy describes only a part of the relationship.   
                                                 
35 Ibid, 71 
36 Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, & U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945, 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2001), 6. 
37 Ibid, 7 
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Culture also influences decision makers.  In Grand Strategies, Charles Hill 
argues, “literature shows it relationship with statecraft to be reciprocal.”38  Although he 
then goes on to lament how “popular cultures of entertainment” evicted literature “from 
its place in the pantheon of arts,” his argument still applies to the cultural realms he 
disdains.39  Hill recognizes that literature informed the actions of leaders, which then in 
turn informed the actions of future works of literature.  Popular culture accelerates this 
cycle and can directly influence policy makers in several ways.  It provides feedback on 
popular attitudes and opinions across a larger scale than other measures such as polls.  
Culture can also model the outcomes of policies in an accessible and visible manner, 
potentially providing a sense of the feasibility of particular course.  This is particularly 
useful in defense planning, as culture can serve as informal war games allowing for 
visualization of concepts without an actual war or large-scale exercises.  Positive cultural 
portrayals will serve to reinforce a leader’s confidence in a given initiative, while the 
opposite can highlight the need for a new course. 
 Political scientists Paul Musgrave and J Daniel Furman argue that popular culture 
can provide its audience with “synthetic experiences” which are “impression, ideas, and 
pseudo-recollections about the world derived from exposure to narrative texts.”40  The 
new experience of the audience can “reinforce, induce, and even replace identities and 
                                                 
38 Charles Hill, Grand Strategies: Literature Statecraft and World Order (Cambridge: Yale University 
Press, 2010), 8. 
39 Ibid, 5. 
40 Paul Musgrave and J Furman Daniel, “Synthetic Experiences: How Popular Culture Matters for Images 
of International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, Volume 61, Issue 3, September 2017. 
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beliefs” related to how individuals interpret and act in the real world.41  Policy makers 
use their new expertise and perspective, regardless of those view actual validity, to design 
strategies and accomplish national objectives. 
 Fictional accounts and synthetic experience can also build empathy towards 
populations previously seen as foreign or hostile.  The “personal terms” and “sentiment” 
Klein identifies as the product of middlebrow narratives stem from individuals relating 
with narratives in a manner that is intimate and unique to each reader.  The close 
identification with the subjects of a story can translate into increased sympathy for and 
curiosity about different people and societies.  Effective and well-constructed narratives 
can counter the dehumanizing effect of prolonged conflict be it war or geo-political 
rivalry.  Policy stemming from this nuanced and complex view is more likely to be 
imaginative and successful. 
 It is important to note that a reaction to narrative is not determinative of how an 
individual will act in the future.  Synthetic experiences and emotional connections are 
part of a broad array of inputs, ideas, and skills that an individual can draw on.  In 
addition, it is possible that fiction could have a detrimental effect through use of 
stereotypes, one-dimensional portrayals, or in actively seeking to elicit a hostile response.  
Less maliciously, but still damaging, unrealistic or inaccurate narratives can lead a reader 
to incorrectly believe they understand a situation.  In addition, each consumer reacts to 
and interprets fiction in a uniquely personal manner, leading to the risk of 




misinterpretation if a leader employs it as a common language with advisors.  Used 
incorrectly in policy making, narratives can exacerbate tensions and destroy well-
intentioned initiatives. 
 Reagan’s administration showcases both the potential for gain and incredible risk 
that come from creating policy strongly influenced by fictional narratives. Reagan was 
exceptionally cognizant of the representations of American policy and strength in popular 
culture, and actively sought to shape them to support his agenda.  On the eve of his 
election to the presidency, he perceived the prevailing trends as hostile to his agenda.  
Popular movies, books, and music portrayed the United States as weak and morally 
compromised, and Reagan had a particular revulsion for movies such as Apocalypse Now 
and The Deer Hunter.  They were, Reagan asserted, examples of the “reprehensible 
pandering” of Hollywood to the forces of “anti-militarism and anti-Americanism.”42  If 
themes of moral equivalency and impotent American military might remained dominant 
in cultural discourse, it would be difficult for Reagan to accomplish the reinvigoration of 
the defense establishment and pursue a hawkish course with regard to the Cold War. 
 Fortunately for Reagan, the majority of the American public was ready for a 
change in the discussion.  They felt battered by the previous decade.  Military 
embarrassments in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Iran raised difficult questions about the 
capacity of the United States to exert its will on minor powers, much less the Soviet 
                                                 
42 Draft of Reagan’s Commencement at West Point, Folder: “West Point Speech and Back Up File (1)”, 
Box 8 Speechwriting, White House Office Of: Research Office, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library. 
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Union.  Communism seemed on the march as well, as in addition to the emergence of 
new communist state in Southeast Asia, military action led to communist states in 
Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.  Americans began to doubt their chances for a 
victory in the Cold War.  Additionally, the fall out of the OPEC oil embargo 
demonstrated the ability for small states to drastically affect the lives of everyday 
Americans and inflict lasting harm on the economy.  The diminishment of American 
prestige and power in the 1970s created an enthusiastic audience for Reagan’s message of 
optimism and rebirth.    
 Throughout Reagan’s time in office a large segment of popular culture reflected 
the resurgent American nationalism his administration encouraged.  Movies like Rocky 
IV, Rambo II, and Top Gun reflected a desire to move beyond the questioning of the 
previous decade towards an embrace of exceptionalism.  Even the toy industry embraced 
Reagan’s optimistic language about American power.  Hasbro rebooted the G.I. Joe 
action figure in 1983, after previously suspending the line due to the unpopularity of the 
military during Vietnam.  No one captured the sentiment and content of Reagan’s 
presidency as well as Tom Clancy.  The author’s first book, The Hunt for Red October, 
debuted in 1984 and after receiving an endorsement from Reagan catapulted up the 
bestseller lists.  Every year from 1986 through the end of the decade, Clancy would 
release a new novel that finished in the top two on end of year bestseller charts and would 
later spawn a movie franchise.  Clancy’s books certainly support McAlister’s sense that 
popular culture makes policy legible to the public.  Each of his early novels highlights the 
16 
 
superior morality and quality of those in the American military, the need for advanced 
technology to fight and win modern wars, and the rightness of the American cause in the 
Cold War.  Clancy’s novels also demonstrate the ability of popular culture to affect 
policy makers.  In addition to gaining a wide readership within the Pentagon and 
Congress, the novels became of favorite of Reagan.  He read them both as entertainment 
and as research.43  The realistic and successful portrayal of administration initiatives 
reinforced Reagan’s sense that he was pursuing the correct course.  Clancy’s books 
became evidence to Reagan that not only were his policies popular, but that they were 
working as intended and could achieve their goal of winning the Cold War.  
This study argues that the complex relationship between culture and policy remains under 
examined, to the detriment of historical inquiry.  Closer examination can help answer 
questions about how policy origins and sustainability.  The study will also argue that 
fiction is a potentially valuable and constructive tool in developing effective, nuanced 
approaches to complex problems.  Narratives provide for creative space to explore 
unconventional and imaginative solutions.  The use of imagination and creativity in 
policy development can allow for consideration of a broader range of options and lead to 
evaluation of unexpected contingencies.   
Narratives also support the development of empathy.  Effective strategy requires 
acknowledgement and respect for the basic humanity of groups perceived as hostile.  The 
ability to understand and seriously consider the desires and objectives of a variety of 
                                                 
43 Cannon, Role of a Lifetime, 294. 
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actors help create nuanced, effective, and lasting strategy.  Empathy remains a vastly 
underrated leadership trait and requires active and persistent cultivation.  Fiction also 
makes policy relatable.  The ability to force personal identification with otherwise 
obscure ideas enhances support and increases the sense among target audiences that they 
have agency in events beyond their immediate circumstances.  Further, narratives can 
compellingly show that non-elites can play an important role in the success or failure of a 
given strategy. 
Reagan used fiction in three broad ways.  He sought out stories that spoke to his 
life experiences or that he otherwise related to.  These narratives largely ended happily 
for the protagonist.  They helped form the basis of his value system and a sense of how 
the broader world operated.  Fiction reinforced his own experience, and convinced 
Reagan of the basic correctness of his views on subjects like freedom, religion, and the 
military.    His reading allowed him to identify common desires and goals with disparate 
groups.   
Stories also provided Reagan with a creative space to develop and test policy.  
They offered a way to visualize information presented in more conventional formats.  
Fiction often served as an opportunity to wargame ideas and think about policy in a less 
abstract way.  The ability to insert himself into a narrative humanized policy for Reagan 
and led him to seek more creative solutions.  Through stories, Reagan gained the 
confidence in his policies and as a result challenged orthodox political views. 
18 
 
Finally, Reagan sought to use popular culture to mobilize broad support for his 
administrations objectives.  He and others in his administration promoted narratives that 
portrayed their policy goals favorably while attacking elements of popular culture they 
deemed as hostile.  Reagan viewed these activities as essential to restoring national will 
and sustaining his policies.  He spoke frequently about the state of television and movies, 
and consistently advocated for them to embrace his definitions of patriotism and liberty. 
This study is divided into two parts, each consisting of three chapters.  It is primarily 
concerned with how Reagan used and reacted to middlebrow books and will argue his 
reading played a significant role in both the development of his world view and his 
actions throughout his life.  Part one will examine the period from his adolescence 
through the 1950s.  It will primarily focus on themes relating to the development of 
Reagan’s views on religion, freedom, anti-communism, and military service. 
The first chapter, “Vagrant Martians,” looks at Reagan from his early boyhood 
through the end of the Second World War.  During this period, the future president 
demonstrated a predilection for stories which allowed him to view himself as both heroic 
and destined for greatness.  He established a lifelong pattern of seeking out comforting 
stories that ended happily and reaffirmed his self-worth and world view.  The chapter will 
examine Reagan’s relationship with the works of Harold Bell Wright and Edgar Rice 
Burroughs.  Each author helped an adolescent Reagan identify the sort of man he wanted 
to be.  Wright’s stories about the nature of Christianity provided Reagan with a religious 
framework he would follow for the remainder of his life.  It offered a path to salvation 
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that centered on practical deeds rather than public prayer and church attendance.  
Burrough’s John Carter of Mars novels kindled a life-long love of science fiction. The 
stories inspired a fascination with technology and Carter became the archetype for 
Reagan’s ideal protagonist.  The wayward Virginian’s strong moral code, courage, and 
martial prowess would shape Reagan’s view of the military and of the importance of 
sacrifice. 
Chapter two, “Friendly Witness,” will examine the development of Reagan’s anti-
communism.  Following the Second World War, Reagan came to identify communism 
and the Soviet Union as an existential threat to individual liberty.  Reagan’s increased 
political activism during the period from 1945 to 1953 led to personal and starkly 
negative encounters with communist.  His reading of the non-fictional Witness by 
Whitaker Chambers and the fictional Darkness at Noon by Arthur Koestler demonstrated 
to Reagan that his personal experiences were not aberrations, but rather indicative of how 
communists operated throughout the globe.  Reagan became convinced communists 
would employ any means to achieve their ends, which in his view necessitated the 
extermination of individual agency. 
In Chapter three, “Cowboy Values,” the study will look at how westerns and 
similar genres offered Reagan a model for how to counter communism.  His reading of 
Louis L’Amour’s westerns, James Michener’s accounts of the Korean War, and 
reflection on childhood reading of Rudyard Kipling led him to see resisting communism 
as a moral imperative and to define the Cold War as a simple struggle between white and 
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black hats.  He wanted the US to pursue policy that would see the US do the morally 
right thing without seeking reward or long-term influence.  Imagery from the movie High 
Noon would come to serve as policy shorthand in his administration.  The chapter will 
also explore the negative consequences of the narrowness of Reagan’s reading.  His 
efforts to apply the morality of westerns and single-minded focus on the Soviet Union 
would lead to policy that ranged from tone-deaf to disastrous in Africa and Latin 
America. 
Part two will examine the Reagan administration in detail, using the works of 
Tom Clancy to identify how Reagan and his advisors developed and built support for 
their initiatives.  It also explores the complicated relationship between leaders, authors 
and the public.  Each influences the others, making it difficult to determine both the 
origins of ideas and assign responsibility for their success or failure.  Clancy’s open 
embrace of Reagan’s ideology, Reagan’s public declarations of support, and the 
significant popularity of the author make Clancy’s work particularly useful in tracing 
how fiction both influences and is influenced by the broader geo-political environment. 
Chapter four, “Up from the Depths,” uses Clancy’s first novel The Hunt for Red 
October to look at how Reagan both inspired and used fiction.  As he wrote the book, 
Clancy consciously adopted the themes of Reagan’s first term.  The work highlights 
Reagan’s first-term efforts to shift how Americans perceived their military and to draw 
attention to the importance of technology in a potential Cold War struggle.  Reagan’s 
fulsome praise of the novel helped propel it the top of the best seller’s list and helped 
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launch Clancy’s career.  He also viewed the book as validation of the success of his first 
term and a sign that the will of Americans to fight the Cold War had returned. 
Clancy influenced Reagan more directly with his second book, Red Storm Rising.  
 Chapter five, “Techno-thriller Rising,” shows how Reagan used the book to think 
about a potential conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  Clancy’s 
portrayal of the emerging doctrine of AirLand Battle and the dominant US advantage in 
technology convinced Reagan of the ability of NATO to conventionally defeat the Soviet 
Union and its allies.  The realization spurred his efforts to seek nuclear abolition, a 
lifetime ambition.  Red Storm Rising provided Reagan with a critical creative space and 
allowed him to reach a wildly different, and optimistic, conclusion about US power.  
Reagan’s conclusions in turn spurred diplomatic efforts and directly influenced the 
peaceful ending of the Cold War. 
The final chapter, “Pebbles from Space,” explores how popular culture shaped the 
debate over Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.  Reagan’s missile defense proposal led 
to a public split and vocal argument in the science fiction community.  Politicians and 
journalists sought out the opinion of genre writers, treating Robert Heinlein, Arthur C 
Clarke, and Isaac Asimov as credible and important voices in the debate over space 
policy.  Defense hawks also seized Clancy’s fourth book, The Cardinal of the Kremlin, 
lauding it for its positive portrayal of SDI.  Supporters in the military and government, 
actively worked to enhance Clancy’s credibility and believed his mass market appeal 
could build durable support not only for SDI but for persistent high levels of defense 
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spending.  Caspar Weinberger tried to emulate Clancy’s success by writing a novel with a 
collection of fictional vignettes which were thinly veiled policy proposals.  The debate 
over SDI demonstrates the ability of policy makers to inspire works of popular culture 
and the ability of those works to shift public opinion. 
This dissertation concludes with a brief examination of the legacy and 
consequences of Reagan’s relationship with popular culture.  It will examine the evolving 
way Americans engage with their military and the creeping militarization of US foreign 
policy.  The conclusion will also argue Reagan’s use of fiction positively contributed to 
the peaceful end of the Cold War and helped restore American’s belief in their nation’s 
global mission.  It also created precedent for the over-simplification of policy discussion 
and led many to disengage with in-depth discussion about foreign intervention.  Finally, 
the conclusion will argue popular culture should be a source of inspiration for policy.  
Employed deliberately and in conjunction with more conventional influences, it can 
challenge assumptions and increase understanding of impacted groups.  The result is a 









Chapter 1 Vagrant Martians: Reagan and the Power of Narrative 
 
 
In January of 1989, a valedictory President Reagan addressed the nation from the Oval 
Office for a thirty-fourth and final time.  Typical of a farewell address, the speech fondly 
recounted the successes of the administration and offered the nation advice on how to 
sustain and build on the president’s achievements in the future.  Typical of Reagan, the 
speech began with a series of stories.  More than any other president, Reagan relied on 
stories to convey his message to the American people.  Stories, both real and fictional, 
were the foundation upon which Reagan built his policy.   
During his farewell address, Reagan first told “a small story about a big ship, and 
a refugee, and a sailor.”44  The story centered on a sailor patrolling the South China Sea 
aboard the aircraft carrier USS Midway during the early 1980s.  Reagan recalled the 
period as “the height of the boat people,” and describes a Vietnamese refugee yearning 
for America.45  The refugee is aboard “a leaky little boat” tossed about by “choppy 
seas.”46  Fortunately, a “young, smart, fiercely observant” sailor is part of the crew that 
sees the boat, and the Navy is able to rescue the refugees.47  Upon boarding the Midway 
                                                 






and seeing the sailor, the refugee greets him, yelling “Hello, American sailor.  Hello, 
freedom man.”48  This was, Reagan concluded, a “small moment, with a big meaning.”49 
Reagan felt this “small moment” effectively summed up “what it was to be an American 
in the 1980s,” that it showed the United States “stood, again, for freedom.”50  He saw the 
story as tailor-made to demonstrate the success of his administration.  The contrast 
between the aircraft carrier and refugee ship demonstrates an advanced, technologically 
superior American military. The name of the carrier, the USS Midway, recalls the Second 
World War and the last unequivocal military triumph of the US in Asia.  Reagan’s 
description of the sailor as “young, smart and fiercely observant,” traits that Reagan notes 
“most American servicemen” share, reflects upon the vast improvement in the morale 
and readiness of the military during Reagan’s time in office.51  
The refugee is loaded with symbolism for Reagan as well.  That a Vietnamese 
refugee declares an American sailor to be a “freedom man” showed the president two 
things.52  First, it represented the defeat of the Vietnam Syndrome.  The anecdote showed 
the United States once again using its military in Southeast Asia, helping the people most 
impacted by its failure a decade before. For Reagan, the sailor’s tale also showed the 
banishment of the sense of moral equivalency that defined how many Americans began 
to see the Cold War during the 1960s and 70s.  That people would flee it in a “leaky little 








boat” demonstrated the moral superiority of the west.  One would not brave the choppy 
waters of the South China Sea in a barely seaworthy vessel without the hope of freedom.  
Reagan argued the story showed that during the 1980s the world and, more importantly, 
Americans “rediscovered” that the US “stood, again, for freedom.”53  A brief encounter 
between an American sailor and a Vietnamese refugee memorably communicated 
Reagan’s success in several areas in just eight short lines.  It was a parable in paragraph 
form. 
Small moments with big meanings were the sort of stories that Reagan sought, 
and upon discovering one, the president would latch on to it.  Throughout his presidency, 
Reagan kept small boxes full of index cards that he had written his favorite anecdotes, 
quotes, and jokes on.54  Stories like the one of the sailor and the boat people were 
important to Reagan.  He used them not just to communicate his ideas with the American 
people, but also to see how his policies were working and to imagine how his actions or 
those of his administration would work in the near-future.  Facts were not the most 
important aspect of a good Reagan story, and he would often change key details of his 
stories to increase their impact.  Throughout his administration, the media and political 
opponents chastised the president for repeatedly, and knowingly, telling stories with little 
to no basis in reality.  Reagan’s tendency to include apocryphal quotes, jokes, and 
anecdotes in his speeches frustrated aides and speechwriters.  Some advisors even took 
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the tendency to be reflective of an uninterested and unintelligent mind. David Stockman, 
Reagan’s first director of the Office of Management and Budget, expressed frustration 
with how Reagan made decisions in his memoir The Triumph of Politics.  Stockman 
argued that the President “had no business trying to make a revolution” as he was those 
around him easily “made him stumble into the wrong camp.”55  Reagan’s reliance on 
anecdotes was a major point of criticism in Stockman’s work.  The New York Times 
review of the memoir noted that Stockman’s “Reagan stories are priceless” because they 
show that Reagan’s employment of anecdotes reflected how Reagan had “totally 
misunderstood” the information presented to him by aides.56 
Foreign leaders took note of the tendency as well.  Anatoly Dobrynin, the long-
time Soviet Ambassador to the US noted that the president made a “habit of borrowing 
dubious quotations” to illustrate points.57  British officials limited the dissemination of 
the transcript of Reagan’s post-Reykjavik phone call with Margaret Thatcher.  The 
conversation was “particularly sensitive,” as Reagan had recommended that the Prime 
Minister read a Tom Clancy novel to better understand NATO’s conventional capabilities 
in Europe.58  Thatcher and Charles Powell, her private secretary, feared that others in the 
                                                 
55 David Stockman, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1986), 5. 
56 Michael Kinsley, “In the Land of the Magic Asterisk,” The New York Times, May 11, 1986. 
57 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents, (New 
York: Times Books, 1995), 519. 




government would believe that Reagan’s “grasp of strategy must be pretty limited” if he 
resorted to imagined narratives to understand the world.59 
Despite the complaints Reagan persisted because he recognized the power of 
narratives.  Secretary of State George Shultz explained the favoring of stories in his 
memoir Turmoil and Triumph.  He argues that Reagan “used a story to impart a larger 
message.”60  Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger offered a similar defense in his 
own memoir, Fighting for Peace.  He believed that Reagan’s use of narrative was critical 
to the “high standing and deserved popularity” Regan enjoyed with the public.61  He also 
viewed it as useful internal to the administration, arguing that they helped provide a 
vision which produced “vital agreements that neither logic, nor table pounding, nor 
cajoling could bring about.”62   In the view of his most important cabinet members, 
Reagan acted as a modern-day Aesop, and constructed fables to “create meaning” that 
left a permanent imprint on his audience.63 
Reagan returned to the importance of narrative near the end of his farewell 
address.  He lamented that for many “younger parents… an unambivalent appreciation of 
America” was no longer “the right thing to teach modern children.”64  Similarly, the 
president fretted that “for those who create the popular culture, well-grounded patriotism 
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[was] no longer the style.”65  He felt that these trends in culture and parenting threatened 
the successes reflected in the story of the sailor and the refugee.  America’s “spirit was 
back” but not “reinstitutionalized.”66  Reagan advocated for a return to a time when 
“movies celebrated democratic values and implicitly reinforced the idea that America 
was special.”67  Television also needed to reembrace these ideas in order to protect the 
hard-won gains of the 1980s.  That the president devoted time in his final address from 
the Oval Office to the subject of popular culture showed the importance he placed on the 
topic.  He respected the power of movies, television, and books to shape opinion and 
instill values, in no small part because of the decisive role such media played in shaping 
his own personal and political identity.  The consumption and creation of stories defined 
Reagan. 
 
Identity in Narrative 
 
Jack and Nelle Reagan instilled an appreciation for stories and jokes in their son.  
Reagan recalled that his father “was the best raconteur [he] ever heard,” who employed 
his “wry, mordant humor” when selling shoes.68  Reading was a critical part of Reagan’s 
development as a child, and began a lifelong passion for books.  In his first 
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autobiography, Where’s the Rest of Me, Reagan fondly recalls that one of his earliest 
triumphs came at the age of five “one evening when all the funny black marks on the 
paper clicked into place.”69  Jack Reagan also taught his son about the ability of culture to 
influence its audience.  Reagan and his brother Neil were “the only kids not to see” The 
Birth of Nation when it came to theaters in town because their father stated that he would 
be “damned if anyone in the family” would see a movie that portrayed the Ku Klux Klan 
favorably.70  His mother, Nelle, “was proud enough to canvass the neighbors and get 
them to come in,” making the young Reagan’s first public performance a dramatic 
reading of an article about the July 22, 1916 Preparedness Day Bombing in San 
Francisco.71  The happiness that Reagan felt in making Nelle proud is evident fifty years 
later. 
Nelle was the stabilizing influence in Reagan’s life.  Jack Reagan found little 
success as a salesman and the family took on a peripatetic lifestyle.  Jack’s alcoholism in 
the time of prohibition also created trouble, making him an often-absent figure in the 
young president’s life and one whose behavior threatened to uproot the family or leave 
them in even direr financial straits.  Reagan took his love of culture from Nelle.  He 
recalled his mother as “the dean of dramatic recitals for the country,” and saw the 
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performances and reading as her “sole relaxation from her family and charitable 
duties.”72  She also told her son “he would never be lonely… if you enjoy reading.”73     
Nelle’s emphasis on the value of reading was particularly useful advice for an introverted 
boy faced with the prospect of being the perpetual outsider as his family moved from 
town to town.  Reagan took the advice seriously and relayed it to those close to him.  
When serving as governor of California he told Nancy Reynolds, then his assistant for 
electronic media and a close friend and confident of Nancy Reagan, that “if you have a 
book around you never lack for friends.”74  In a letter 1981, the president mentioned that 
he “could think of no greater torture than being isolated” in a room “without something to 
read.”75  Lou Cannon, a newspaper reporter and Reagan biographer, noted that Reagan 
had a special relationship with books.  The president seemed not to care if “anyone else 
knew he was a reader” and in many ways actively hid his bibliophilic tendencies from the 
public because he had a “reader’s conceit that books were secret personal treasures.”76  
Reagan had an intimate relationship with the written word, books in many ways served as 
his closest friends and advisors.  He told as much to the children of Troy, Michigan in a 
letter celebrating the 1971 opening of the city’s library, Reagan echoed his comments to 
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Reynolds and told the children that “books are often our best friends,” and without them 
the world would be “without light.”77 
Only a certain kind of story could lay claim to Reagan’s friendship.  A book 
needed to meet two primary criteria.  First, Reagan had to be able to identify with the 
central figure and imagine himself in the narrative.  When he first started reading as a 
boy, books were a form of escape from an alcoholic father, poverty, and his own shyness.  
The protagonists of books that Reagan enjoyed were traditional; they were universally 
strong, intelligent, and morally upright. The second key requirement was that the story 
needed to end happily.  Reagan’s heroes were not tragic; they enjoyed the full rewards of 
their righteous struggles at story’s end.  He admitted in a 1977 letter to the director of the 
Public Library in Mobile, Alabama, that he remained a “sucker for hero worship.”78  
Reading as a child gave the future president “an abiding belief in the triumph of good 
over evil” and an understanding that heroes lived by “standards of morality and fair 
play.”79   
However, Reagan’s reluctance to broaden his reading led to definition of culture 
that was narrow.  While understandable in a child, the inability to consistently broaden 
the type of literature he read as an adult contributed to the tone-deafness he displayed on 
issues of race, sexuality, and class as President.  Additionally, the lack of nuance in easy 
morality of his preferred stories contributed to Reagan understanding conflict in Latin 
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America, the Middle East, and Africa through a simplistic and inaccurate intellectual 
framework. 
Reagan’s “hero worship” did provide him with an alternate model of behavior to 
follow than the drunken path of his father.  Though he generally spoke well of his father 
in later years, this stemmed more from his aversion to negativity than true affection.  One 
of the formative moments of Reagan’s youth was the discovery of Jack Reagan drunk, 
“dead to the world” and “flat on his back on the front porch” of the family’s home in 
Dixon, Illinois.80  After dragging his father to the warmth of bed, Reagan began to realize 
what his father’s previous absences and the “loud voices in the night meant.”81  He felt 
“grief for [his] father” and for himself, and the incident marks his rejection of his father 
as a role model.82  Longtime Reagan advisor, and former Secretary of the Air Force, Tom 
Reed believed that being the child of an alcoholic contributed to the difficulty Reagan 
had making deep and lasting friendships.83   
Instead of using his father as a model, Reagan began to look towards the 
protagonist of books to guide his transition from a shy, introverted child to an outwardly 
focused young man.  The process of defining himself through narrative began in earnest 
in his “house of magic,” the Dixon Public Library.84  When Dallas Baillio, the director of 
Mobile’s public library, sought the books that influenced one hundred prominent 
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Americans, Reagan provided an interesting response.  He noted that his first reaction was 
“to think of examples of classic literature” to list as his favorite, he admitted, “none were 
forthcoming” and opted to come clean about his youthful reading habits.85  Lillian Carter, 
mother to President Jimmy Carter, took a different tact, disingenuously writing that the 
president’s favorite as a young boy was Tolstoy’s epic War and Peace.86  Reagan 
identified books that a 10-year old would seem likely to read in the 1920s, stories of King 
Arthur, the adventures of Sherlock Holmes, and the works of Mark Twain.  Edgar Rice 
Burroughs made a particularly strong impression.   
 
Boyhood on Barsoom 
 
Reagan took care to note in his letter to Baillo while he enjoyed the Tarzan 
stories, he actually favored Burroughs’ “science fiction, ‘John Carter Warlord of Mars’ 
and all the other John Carter books.”87  As president, he reiterated this preference in 
response to a letter from Dixon resident Helen Miller.  Fondly recalling “frequent trips to 
the strange kingdoms” of Mars, Reagan expressed amazement that more people did not 
realize the introduction Burroughs provided to science fiction and the letter is tinged with 
some regret that John Carter fell from the public memory.88  The recognition of 
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Burroughs’ role as a science fiction pioneer spoke to Reagan’s lifelong engagement with 
the genre.  The Barsoom series exerted significant influence on the field and better-
known writers like Isaac Asimov and Robert Heinlein cite his influence on their work.  
That Reagan sought refuge on the plains of Mars over the jungles of Africa is perhaps 
unsurprising given the young boy’s need to escape.  It was difficult for a 1920s youth to 
travel further away from poverty and a broken home than to the red planet.  
 Speaking with the Paris Review in 2010, famed science fiction writer Ray 
Bradbury termed Burroughs “the most influential writer in the entire history of the 
world.”89  He justified his answer by arguing that ten years olds “fell in love with John 
Carter and Tarzan and decided to become something romantic.”90  Burroughs inspired not 
only the writing efforts of Bradbury, but also the scientific endeavors of astronomers, 
engineers and biochemists.  Burroughs, in effect, “put us on the moon.”91  Bradbury knew 
that his answer was hyperbolic.  He gave it in part because ranking the pulp of Burroughs 
over classics by Shakespeare or Tolstoy “upsets everyone terribly.”92  However, there 
was also a message behind Bradbury’s iconoclasm. Princess of Mars did not rank with 
the classics in terms of literary accomplishment, but in Bradbury’s view, it outstripped 
other works for one reason.  It gave “romance and adventure to a whole generation of 
boys,” inspiring them to “become special.”93  This was certainly true for Reagan, as much 
                                                 







like Bradbury, he read Burroughs and took inspiration from the adventures of John Carter 
on Mars. 
 Burroughs did not begin writing professionally until the age of thirty-five.  He 
originally intended to embark upon a career in the military.  He attended high school at 
the Michigan Military Academy and upon graduation earned a conditional appointment 
to the United States Military Academy in 1895.  Unfortunately, Burroughs failed the 
entrance exams, which significantly derailed his plans to become an officer in the 
Army.94  Still viewing the military and the Army as his best option, Burroughs enlisted 
into the cavalry and joined the Seventh Cavalry in Arizona.   
However, the reality of service in the desert canyons of the southwest failed to 
match the romantic vision of Burroughs’s imagination.  He spent much of his time at Fort 
Grant ill and saw little direct action against the Apache bands still active in the area.  
Disillusioned, Burroughs sought and received a medical discharge in 1897, and reentered 
civilian life.95  Despite his experience, the romantic image of military life he constructed 
persisted.  The news that Theodore Roosevelt was recruiting a cavalry regiment for 
service in Cuba led Burroughs to write the future president offering to enlist in the Rough 
Riders.  Roosevelt wrote back declining the offer due to fears of over-enlistment in the 
regiment, effectively ending Burroughs’ flirtation with the military.96 
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Over the next decade and a half, Burroughs was unable to settle into consistent 
work.  He took jobs with his father’s battery company, as a prospector, a railroad 
policeman, and salesman.  Unable to find success and facing financial ruin, he turned to 
writing fiction and began work on what would become A Princess of Mars.  In 1911, he 
submitted the first draft of the story to All-Story Magazine, which paid him four hundred 
dollars for the serialization rights.97  Burroughs also sought to publish it as a book; 
however, Houghton Mifflin rejected the manuscript noting that it was “not at all 
probable” that they could “make use of the story of a Virginia soldier of fortune 
miraculously transported to Mars.”98  The publishers did not see a market as they 
believed the story was simply too fantastical to find an audience.  After the serialization 
led to a significant increase of sales for All-Story Magazine, Burroughs was able to find a 
publisher for both his John Carter and Tarzan stories, with the first editions appearing in 
1917. 
Princess of Mars centers on the adventures of John Carter.  The book begins with 
Burroughs talking about Carter as a favored uncle who wills his estate to Burroughs upon 
his death.  Among the effects is a manuscript, which Carter instructs Burroughs to keep 
sealed for a period of eleven years, and not publish until twenty-one years after Carter’s 
death.  The manuscript reveals that Carter, through mystical means, travels to Mars.  
Upon arrival, he discovers that he has superior strength and speed due to the lower 
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gravity of the red planet.  This allows him to perform seemingly miraculous feats, 
impressing the natives and earning a place as a chieftain in their society.  He then rescues 
and woos Dejah Thoris, the titular princess, becoming a respected member of one of the 
planet’s leading city-states.  The book ends on a cliffhanger, as Carter races to restore the 
planets oxygen generators, blacking out and awaking on Earth unsure if he succeeds in 
saving Dejah Thoris, their child, and the red planet.  
In the foreword of the sequel, Gods of Mars, Burroughs describes another meeting 
with Carter, this time after his supposed death.  Again, his uncle provides a manuscript of 
adventures on Mars.  He tells Burroughs that he knows “that you are interested and that 
you believe,” and that Burroughs would know when to publish it, as “Earth men have not 
yet progressed to a point where they can comprehend” Carter’s experience.99  Carter also 
tells his nephew “not to feel aggrieved if they laugh at you,” a nod to the difficulties 
Burroughs initially experienced in finding a book publisher.100  The new text reveals that 
Carter returned to Barsoom ten years after waking up back on Earth, and that he 
succeeded in restoring breathable air to the planet.  The Gods of Mars and its sequel 
Warlord of Mars see Carter debunking the religion of the planet and then dismantling the 
power of those who worship Issus. Warlord ends with Carter receiving the universal 
acclaim of the noble class of Mars, who proclaim him “Warlord of Barsoom” and his 
                                                 




wife, “a world’s most beautiful woman,” queen.  The trilogy ends with Carter standing in 
front of his rapturous people, kissing Dejah Thoris.101 
Burroughs drew heavily on his own experiences in writing Princess of Mars, 
which makes the novel a mix of the science fiction and western genres.  Carter, like 
Burroughs, was a cavalryman, though for the Confederacy rather than the US Army.  Of 
note, Reagan, inspired by Carter and westerns, would also choose to serve as an officer in 
the cavalry when he joined the Army while working at an Iowa radio startion.102  Much 
like with Burroughs, his time in service leaves Carter in dire financial straits.  All he has 
at the end of the war is “several hundred thousand” confederate dollars and “a captain’s 
commission in…an army which no longer existed.”103  Seeking a reversal in fortune, he 
travels to Arizona and begins prospecting.  Carter’s actions roughly parallel Burroughs’, 
as the author spent time prospecting in Oregon on the Snake River.  His protagonist finds 
considerably more luck though, finding “the most remarkable gold-bearing quartz 
vein.”104  Apaches set upon Carter and his partner just as they are returning to town, 
killing his partner and chasing Carter to the cave that will transport him to Mars.  The 
action on Mars bears many of the hallmarks of a western as well.  Carter first falls in with 
the Tharks, who despite being eight feet tall, with four arms and a greenish hue stand in 
for Native Americans.  Tars Tarkas, the Thark chief who takes Carter in, plays the role of 
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“noble savage,” who teaches the hero the tribe’s way and is in turn civilized by the 
protagonist.  The use of familiar narratives and stories in unfamiliar settings likely made 
the book easier for its target audience to accept. 
 John Carter was the exact sort of hero that Reagan would worship.  The 
cavalryman was “a splendid specimen of manhood,” whose steel gray eyes reflected a 
“strong and loyal character” and displayed “fire and initiative.”105  Brave to the point of 
recklessness, he believes that “cowardice is of a surety its own punishment,” Carter 
consistently risks himself for his companions.  Intolerant of violence against women, he 
risks his place with the Tharks in order to protect Dejah Thoris from assault.  Carter also 
battles giant apes in order to save his pet Martian hound and on several occasions places 
himself at greater risk to save Tars Tarkas and other brothers in arms.  He displays 
fidelity in his relationship with Dejah, spurning the advances of numerous women despite 
their beauty.  People of all races on Mars come to admire Carter’s code and he ultimately 
transforms a system based on violence and strength to one that rests on honor and justice.  
In effect, as Reagan noted to the Mobile Public Library, the novels provided the basis for 
his “abiding belief in the triumph of good over evil.”106 
 The way Burroughs presents notions of maternal and paternal love also gave the 
novels a special appeal to Reagan.  Carter reflects with horror that in the Thark society 
the “commonest amusement is to inflict death on their prisoners of war” and as a result 
                                                 




“the Martian laugh is a thing to cause strong men to blanch in horror.”107  As a race, they 
are “devoid of all the finer sentiments of friendship, love, or affection.”108  This absence 
stems from how Tharks raise their young.  After hatching from eggs, adult Tharks claim 
the children at random, meaning that there is no direct biological link and children 
receive no affection from their adoptive parents.   
Only one shows Carter “characteristics of sympathy, kindliness, and affection,” 
the Thark woman Sola.109  She is unique among her people, because she is the product of 
a forbidden love, and her biological mother raised and loved her after she emerged from 
the egg.  Sola recalls her mother hiding her and “lavishing upon [her] the love the 
community life” denied most children.110  Upon discovery of the act, Sola’s mother hides 
her daughter and then undergoes torture and execution at the hands of Taj Hajus, the 
Tarks’ primary chieftain.  She willingly sacrifices herself to protect her husband and 
child.  In Burroughs’ world, maternal love is defined by sacrifice and responsible for 
instilling basic virtue. 
 In the Barsoom series, paternal love plays a different role, as the heroes of the 
stories often have absent fathers.  Sola is the daughter of Tars Tarkas, who is initially 
unaware of her identity, as he was participating in a prolonged military campaign at the 
time of her birth and returns only after his wife’s execution.  Sola is aware of her father’s 
                                                 






identity and sees “his great love is as strong in his breast” for his lost wife and child as it 
was upon his first departure.  She recognizes that love for her mother drives her father to 
greater heights and a desire to transfigure his entire society stems from her death.  For 
her, Tarkas is an untouchable figure, but still a model to copy.  Carter later reveals Sola’s 
secret to Tarkas and the knowledge that his child still lives, spurs the Thark leader to 
challenge Tal Hajus, who he kills in single combat, and ascend to overall leadership of 
his people. 
 John Carter and Dejah Thoris’ son, Cathoris, has a similarly distant father figure 
to Sola.  Carter saves Mars by restoring its oxygen generators, but in the act blacks out 
waking up on Earth.  He is unable to return for over ten years, missing the hatching of his 
son, which takes place the same night as his return to Earth.  Since Martian children 
mature at a rate significantly faster than their ones from Earth, when Carter first 
encounters his son, Cathoris is a young man.  Unaware each other’s identity initially, the 
two together escape from prison and only when another companion mention’s Carter’s 
name does Cathoris realize he is with his father.   
After leaping into his father’s arms with “a cry of pleasure,” the boy reveals over 
the past decade his mother “described to [him] a thousand times” Carter’s stature, 
manner, and fighting ability.  This provided the youth a model to follow.  While the 
experience of fighting next to his father proves the truth of his mother’s words, these 
skills are not what most impresses Cathoris.  Instead, it is that Carter’s “first words to 
[him]… were of [his] mother” and only someone who loved her as she told him his father 
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did “would have thought first of her.”111  Just as with Sola, Cathoris’ admires his father 
due to his mother’s descriptions, the father’s virtuous example, and the father’s love for 
the mother, rather than feeling resentment for his father’s absence.   
The different way that Burroughs depicts maternal and paternal relationships 
resonated with Reagan, as he likely identified with the author’s sense that values instilled 
by the mothers would define their children.  Cathoris and Sola become heroic thanks to 
their mothers, and in many ways despite the absence of their fathers.  Though Jack 
Reagan was not absent in the strictest sense, his alcoholism created periods of literal and 
emotional absence from his family.  Just as with Burroughs’ characters, it fell to the 
mother to explain the paternal absence and assure the children of the prospect of return.  
Throughout his childhood, Nelle told Reagan that his father was absent because of 
“something that was beyond his control.”112  It was his “occasional bouts with the dark 
demon in the bottle,” that held him aloof from his sons, much like the void of space and 
absence of knowledge held Carter and Tarkas from theirs.113  It created hope for a 
permanent return of “the bluff and hearty man [Reagan] knew and loved.”114 
In reading the John Carter series, Reagan also took in the militarism of 
Burroughs.  The author was an ardent supporter of the late-19th century imperialist turn in 
American Foreign Policy, even unsuccessfully volunteering to join Roosevelt’s Rough 
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Riders.115  The racial politics of the era suffuse the John Carter books, and they embrace 
the notion of the “White Man’s Burden.”  Martian society is exotic and savage.  It falls to 
John Carter, a white Virginian, to transform it to something more resembling his 
homeland.  Carter is intellectually, physically, and morally superior to the Martians.  
Over the course of the first three books, he remakes their social, political, and religious 
structures. 
Carter succeeds despite his foes possessing vastly superior and unfamiliar 
technology.  Burroughs fills Barsoom with the seemingly impossible.  Battleships fly 
through the air, rifles shoot bolts of energy, and cities walk across the desert and possess 
shields to protect from bombing attacks.  Thanks to his superior intelligence Carter 
quickly understands and employs new technologies.  It is often a combination of his 
superior character and advanced technology that allows him to overcome impossible 
odds.  He also frequently relies on instigating rebellions from oppressed populations to 
win the day. 
The tactics and strategies employed by Carter helped to create the creative space 
Reagan used when thinking about policy.  In Role of a Lifetime, Lou Cannon notes that 
the president’s love of science fiction exhibited a clear influence on his policy decisions.  
Reagan resisted fiscal arguments to cut NASA’s budget “because spaceflight appealed to 
his own imagination.”116  Writing in response to a letter criticizing the agency’s funding 
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Reagan argued, “Man’s great yearning to explore the great unknown should not be 
curbed because he can’t tell in detail what he hopes to find.”117  The president imagined a 
universe full of mysteries to explore, an image strongly influenced by his love of the 
genre.   
Science fiction also influenced some discussions during his first summit meeting 
with Gorbachev at Geneva in 1985.  At dinner on the first night, Reagan spoke 
Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze about what the nations 
would do if aliens appeared poised to invade and destroy life on Earth.  Reagan expressed 
confidence that the “knowledge would unite all the peoples of the world,” something to 
which his Soviet counterparts readily assented to.118 
His imagination and ability to view problems in an unconventional manner 
proved to be one of the greatest assets of his presidency.  John Carter and his adventures 
on Barsoom primed the pump for how Reagan approached problems of strategy and war.  
The self-proclaimed “sucker for hero worship” learned from his boyhood idol.  Just as a 
generation of scientists and writers used Burroughs to shape their craft, Reagan allowed 
the books to influence his approach to politics and strategy.  The stories appealed to 
Reagan at the time because they allowed him to escape Illinois and imagine himself as a 
heroic figure.  They also offered Reagan the first evidence of what the union of individual 
freedom and technology could accomplish.  Carter’s devotion to liberty allows him to 
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build powerful alliances among formerly subjugated people.  The newly-freed often 
display creativity and ingenuity, which paired with the advanced technology of Barsoom 
allow Carter to bring down oppressive empires and remake Martian society on American 
values. 
 Reagan viewed the Cold War in similar terms.  He expected the US to prevail 
because of its free society and advanced technology.  Speaking to graduating cadets at the 
Air Force Academy, he argued that “technology plus freedom equals opportunity and 
progress.”119  The new officers were limited only by their “own courage and 
imagination,” and Reagan believed that as a society Americans had both in ample 
supply.120  In The Impossible Presidency, historian Jeremi Suri argues that one of the 
strengths of Reagan was that he “married traditional values of self-sufficiency and 
individual freedom with modern technologies of science and war.”121  This lead to an 
executive focus on vision and creativity rather than bureaucratic detail and served Reagan 
particularly well in his approach to the Soviet Union.  While Edgar Rice Burroughs’ tales 
of a Virginian on Mars were not the sole reason for this approach, they did mark the 
beginning of how Reagan thought about societal virtue and potential. 
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 Other books from Reagan’s childhood exerted a lifelong influence on the 
president.  The most prominent was Harold Bell Wright’s 1903 book That Printer of 
Udell’s.  Around the same time that Reagan found his escape on Barsoom, his mother 
gave him Wright’s book to read.  Writing in 1984 to Wright’s daughter-in-law, the 
president noted that it “had an impact [he] would always remember.”122  He found a “role 
model” in Dick Falkner and through him embraced religion.123  Shortly after reading the 
book, Reagan told his mother he wanted to “declare [his] faith and be baptized,” and 
forsook his father’s Catholicism to join his mother’s church, the Disciples of Christ.124  
As evidenced by the embrace of Christianity, the books of Wright “played a definite part” 
in how Reagan grew into an adult.125 
 Reagan and his mother were among the many who read Wright’s work and found 
their faith deepened.  The itinerant preacher was the first American to write a novel that 
sold over a million copies.126  Though largely forgotten, Wright was among the most 
popular writers in the US during the first quarter of the twentieth century.  The son of a 
Civil War veteran who married above his station, Wright emerged from a broken home.  
His father was an alcoholic and his mother died of disease when Wright was eleven.127  
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Following his mother’s death, Wright lived with a series of friends and relations and 
worked odd jobs.  Appalled at the abuse he faced and the exploitation of his labor, Wright 
sought an escape.  Eventually, he found himself working in a printing shop, when after 
performing pro-bono work for a church event he decided to pursue a career in the 
ministry.128 
 Arriving in Pittsburg, Kansas, as the pastor of the town’s church, Wright found 
himself unsatisfied with the effectiveness of his sermons.  Seeking to make his words 
more relevant to his parishioners, Wright began embracing about how to apply Christian 
tenants to everyday life.  As part of this shift, he began work on a series of sermons in the 
form of a fictional story.  Wright submitted the thinly masked autobiography for serial 
publication in The Christian Century but, unsatisfied with the edits made in the published 
version, sought to publish it as a book as well.  The Book Supply Company of Chicago 
purchased the rights, restored Wright’s original version, and published the sermons under 
the title That Printer of Udell’s.129 
 Dick Falkner, the protagonist of Udell’s, is the fictional avatar of Wright.  The 
book opens with a scene that mirrors the preacher’s experience.  Dying of consumption, 
his mother beseeches “God, take ker’ o Dick.”130  Expiring mid-prayer, Dick mourns 
briefly in the cabin with his mother’s body, as his drunken father lay passed out across 
the room.  Noting to his dog that the father could not “hurt maw anymore” and believing 
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he and his pet could “rustle fer ourselves,” Dick leaves his home and sets off on his 
own.131 
 The narrative then advances sixteen years to reveal a bitter young man seeking 
out his father.  Conversing with a transient who knew his father, Dick quickly becomes 
violent when the other man insults his mother’s memory.  He threatens to kill the 
transient with his “bare hands” if he ever dared take Dick’s “mother’s name in [his] foul 
mouth again.”132  The transient cowers and reveals that Dick’s father is now dead as well, 
causing Dick to reflect on the previous decade and a half and the hard life he led.  Dick 
thinks of all the times, “inspired by his mother,” he nearly broke free from evil only to be 
“dragged back by the training and memory of his father.”133  The death of his father frees 
him from the path of his history, and Dick resolves to lead a different life. 
 Reagan readily identified with the opening chapter of That Printer of Udell’s.  
Reading the book at the same age as Dick is when the novel opens, Reagan found many 
commonalities in the family situations.  The key difference between the two was that 
Nelle Reagan still lived, though his mother’s narrow escape from the Spanish Flu likely 
remained a vivid memory for the young boy.134  Wright, like Burroughs, presents 
maternal love as a redemptive, essential power.  However, unlike Sola and Cathoris, Dick 
does not receive the full benefit.  As a result, he becomes morally and spiritually lost, and 
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in need of redemption.  As a result of the obvious parallels to Reagan’s own life, Dick’s 
path to salvation became a narrative that the future president could imagine himself 
following, causing it to become a model for the boy as he thought about what he would 
become as an adult. 
 Dick arrives in the town of Boyd and first seeks work from churchgoers.  
Attending a mass featuring a sermon about the need to help the poorest of the 
community, he expects the parishioners to assist.  However, they offer sympathetic 
statements about his situation rather than work or shelter.135  It is George Udell, a printer 
who “ain’t much of a church man,” that provides Dick with employment and a path to 
salvation.136  Many in the town regard Udell as an “infidel” as he did not join the church 
and often denounced the sermons.137  However, it is the “practical working of 
Christianity” that Udell employs that saves Dick.138  Under Udell’s patient guidance, 
Dick slowly integrates into the community and becomes a leader in a church youth group 
that seeks to do charitable work throughout the town.  Over time, he becomes a respected 
leader in the community, and begins to court Amy, the daughter of a wealthy merchant in 
the town. 
 Amy’s father rejects Dick, prompting Amy to run away to Cleveland.  Unable to 
make her own way, she eventually finds herself in a brothel.  Dick, after a long search, 
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finds her there and seeks to bring her home.  He convinces the reluctant Amy by telling 
her that “we have each fallen,” but they could be “forgiven and accepted” by their future 
actions.139  They return together and confront her father, who despite being a regular 
attendee at church, still cares more about “his pride” than “his daughter’s salvation from 
a life of sin.”140  Due to this he threatens to disown Amy for seeking to marry a man who 
“came to this town as a common tramp,” but Dick is eventually able to force acceptance 
of their marriage.141  The novel ends with Dick and Amy happily married and setting off 
to Washington DC, where Dick will serve as a member of Congress.  Before, departing 
for the capitol, the couple return to the site of Dick’s childhood and visit the graves of his 
parents, completing Dick’s reconciliation with his past.142  
 The book exerted influence on Reagan because of his ability to imagine himself 
as the protagonist of Wright’s narrative.  The echo between the book and Reagan’s life 
concerns Reagan’s religious views.  Reagan credits the book with making him a 
“practical Christian.”143  Shortly after reading it, he joined the Disciples of Christ, the 
same denomination that Dick joins and in which Wright ministered.144  Dick’s 
redemption and success is part of how reading gave the president “an abiding belief in the 
triumph of good over evil.”145  More important, the book showed Reagan how good 
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would triumph over evil.  Victory required action.  Townspeople like Amy’s father who 
went to Church but did not engage in Wright’s version of practical Christianity, were no 
better than the drunks, con men, and murderers of Dick’s youth. 
 The belief that virtue alone would not ensure triumph over evil is a message 
Reagan repeated throughout his political career.  While advocating for Barry Goldwater 
in the 1964 presidential election, Reagan gave a speech that launched his political career.  
Entitled “A Time for Choosing,” but known more commonly amongst his inner circle as 
“The Speech,” Reagan laid out two options for the US in the Cold War.  Using 
apocalyptic language, he argued that “well-meaning liberal” politicians employed a 
“policy of accommodation” that sought a “peace at any price” which would ensure the 
US fell into “a thousand years of darkness.”146  He then rhetorically asks if Moses should 
have told the Israelites to endure slavery or if Christ should have refused the cross, before 
calling on his fellow Americans to take action and make their “rendezvous with 
destiny.”147 
 Reagan employs similar language in his 1983 address to the National Association 
of Evangelicals, in which he famously termed the Soviet Union and “Evil Empire.”  
Referencing C.S. Lewis’ “unforgettable Screwtape Letters,” he noted that evil does not 
triumph because of “sordid dens of crime,” but rather by “quiet men in white collars” 
who speak in “soothing tones of brotherhood.”148  He urged the evangelicals to “beware 
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the temptation of pride,” the same deadly sin that doomed Amy’s father in That Printer 
from Udell’s, and “blithely declare [themselves] above it all.”149 Instead, those assembled 
needed to “speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of 
military and moral inferiority.”150  It would take concerted action for good to triumph 
over evil. 
 Religion was a driving force in how Reagan viewed the Cold War and shaped the 
strategy his administration implemented.  The spark for his faith did not come while 
listening to a minister from the pews of a church.  Rather, it came from Reagan imagining 
himself in place of Dick Falkner.  While there would be other works to shape Reagan’s 
religious views, Witness by Whitaker Chambers is particularly prominent; That Printer of 
Udell’s started Reagan’s religious awakening and, combined with the other books he read 
as a boy, provided an immersive and creative space through which Reagan viewed the 
world.  
Historian John Patrick Diggins described Reagan’s religious beliefs as “baffling,” 
as in his view Reagan seemed to “offer a Christianity without Christ and the 
crucifixion.”151  Diggins goes further, arguing that Reagan’s religion was “without 
reference to sin, evil, suffering, or sacrifice.”152  While Reagan’s religious beliefs were 
unconventional, he rarely went to church and was not prone to proselytizing, notions of 
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evil and sacrifice were essential to his faith.  His optimism led him to believe in the 
general goodness of humanity, making anything that threatened or suppressed individual 
liberty a prime sin and evil.  This notion underpinned his hatred of communism and of 
nuclear weapons.  Throughout his public career he would denounce both in strong 
language and frequently invoke religious justification for his opposition. 
Wright’s novel provided a foundation for this belief.  Dick and Amy are only able 
to achieve happiness when provided the opportunity to live free of oppression.  Dick 
became a leader in the community after rejecting the inaction of the town’s church and 
choosing to engage in direct acts of charity.  Amy is freed only after Dick helps her 
confront her hypocritical and controlling father.  Once free, both achieve their full 
potential as people and Christians.  Reagan believed the book made him a “practical 
Christian,” because it focused his faith on taking moral actions, rather than prayer and 
reflection.  His reference to Lewis’ “quiet men in in white collars” speaking “soothing 
tones of brotherhood” is further evidence of this approach.153  Reagan’s religious belief 
rested on the need to both identify oppression and take action against it.  At its best, this 
religious belief led him to reestablish the moral high ground of the US in Cold War and 
inspire oppressed people in Eastern Europe.  At its worse, it led him to favor action over 
understanding and support morally repugnant regimes and groups in the name of 
resistance to his prime evil.  
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Learning to Tell the Story 
 
 Personalized narratives did not only give Reagan the means to interpret the world 
and imagine policy, but they also provided him a powerful tool to communicate his ideas.  
He believed that stories created a personal connection with his audience that would be 
otherwise impossible to achieve.154  Reagan’s belief stemmed from both his own 
experience with books and from his professional life.  Every professional experience 
from the time he graduated Eureka College in 1932 until he became the governor of 
California in 1967 reinforced Reagan’s faith in the power of a well-told story. 
 Soon after his graduation, Reagan sought work as a broadcaster at WOC radio in 
Davenport, Iowa.   He embellished his experiences playing football at Eureka, implying 
to the station manager that he was a consistent starter, and earned an invitation to audition 
as a play-by-play announcer on the spot.155  Receiving instructions from the station 
manager to “tell us about a game and make [him] see it,” Reagan entered the studio.156  
Realizing that he had a limited opportunity to make a strong impression, he decided to 
create a “dream game” with the “kind of climax” that would “permit a little excitement to 
creep in.”157 
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 He used a game from the previous season between Eureka College and Western 
State University as the inspiration for his audition and began his broadcast with the game 
entering the fourth quarter.  Describing “a chill wind” blowing through the stadium, 
Reagan spun a story of a tightly contested game with two teams separated by a 
touchdown.158  He then set up his alma mater for a dramatic “college-try finish” as time 
expired.159  The play succeeds, and Eureka College leaves the field triumphant.  Reagan 
did embellish one portion of the play from the real game.  He chose to have himself level 
a linebacker “with a block that could be felt in the press box,” rather than mention that in 
reality he had missed it jeopardizing the play’s success.160 
 Duly impressed by Reagan’s flair for the dramatic, the station manager offered 
him an assignment the next week covering a game for the University of Iowa.  He also 
promised Reagan that if he did well, then the station would assign him the remaining 
three games of the season.  Reagan began that first broadcast seeking to “be hopefully 
adequate.”161  Over the first quarter of the game, he “played it straight,” avoiding any 
dramatic flourishes and only relaying the simple facts of the game.162  Trading off with 
another broadcaster for the second quarter, he realized the need to ad-lib and tell a story.  
Changing his approach as the second half began, Reagan threw himself into the broadcast 
telling a compelling narrative that led the station manager to write a note telling him to 
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call the remainder of the game.163  After the game ended, Reagan received the job and a 
pay raise. 
 In shifting his broadcasting and winning the job, Reagan realized several 
important things about how to tell a story on radio.  It “was the theater of the mind,” 
which meant that at times it was necessary to take dramatic liberties to hold the 
audience’s attention.164 He needed to make the audience “see the game through his eyes,” 
which by necessity would include the inclusion of personal interpretations and 
feelings.165  The result is that audience members would feel like they were at the game, 
they would see it, though differently than people in the stands.  Reagan also sought to fill 
his broadcasts with outside stories and anecdotes cribbed from the Chicago sports 
pages.166  These would add extra color and make the broadcasts a more immersive 
experience for his audience by creating the illusion that they were insiders and a part of 
the team.  The inclusive nature of the broadcast and the ability of the audience to place 
themselves in the narrative ensured they would return to listen again the next week. 
 Reagan still had a difficult lesson to learn about broadcasting.  Shortly after the 
football season ended, he received an offer to be a station announcer.  The job consisted 
largely of playing records and reading advertisements on the air.  This proved challenging 
for Reagan, as he found himself unable to make his “reading sound like talking.”167  
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Unable to achieve the tone needed to make “the easy conversational persuasive sell,” 
Reagan soon found his career as a broadcaster in jeopardy.168  The stilted delivery broke 
the immersion of the radio listener, shattering the illusion of intimacy and friendship 
between broadcaster and audience.  Reagan improved his approach, demonstrating a 
remarkable ability to include a sales pitch into a broader narrative.  Soon after, he 
received a promotion and moved to WHO and the larger market of Des Moines, Iowa. 
 Reagan’s primary duty while working for WHO was as their primary sports 
broadcaster.  From 1933-1936 he called play-by-play for Chicago Cubs home games.  He 
did not call the games live from Wrigley but rather from the studio in Des Moines.  The 
only knowledge of the game Reagan would receive came in from a telegraph feed.  The 
telegraph operator would pass three letter codes to Reagan, which he would have to turn 
into a compelling radio experience.  Simply translating the code “SC1” to “curve ball 
strike one,” would not create the immersive broadcast required to maintain an audience in 
the face of competing stations that also called the games.169  Instead, Reagan had to 
imagine a plausible way to expand on the simple code and relay it to his audience.  A 
Cubs fan listening to “Dutch” Reagan on WHO would be able to recreate a box score 
from the broadcast but would have a completely different understanding of the action on 
the field from someone who attended the game at Wrigley Field. 
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 One example of this disconnect comes from one of Reagan’s favorite stories from 
his broadcasting days.  In his autobiography, Where’s the Rest of Me?, he writes about 
being in the middle of a broadcast when the telegraph feed failed.170  He also tells a 
similar story in a 1985 letter to Buzzy Sisco.171  Reagan, knowing that if he stopped 
calling the game he would lose his audience, tells his listeners that the batter kept hitting 
foul balls for over six minutes.172  In order to maintain their interest, he colored his 
descriptions.  One foul ball was nearly a homerun, another landed in the stands and 
Reagan “described in detail the redheaded kid who had scrambled” for it.173  When the 
feed from Wrigley returned, Reagan learned the batter had hit a fly ball for an out on the 
first pitch.174   
 In the letter to Sisco, he recalls the game was a scoreless tie going into the ninth 
inning.175  This is inaccurate, as there is no instance of the Cubs and Cardinals entering 
the final frame scoreless between 1933 and 1936.176  However, the version of the story in 
Reagan’s autobiography holds up.  He describes a tie-game in the ninth with Cardinals 
pitcher Dizzy Dean facing Cubs outfielder Auggie Galan.177  Galan did lead off the ninth 
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inning against Dean on April 24, 1935, in a tie game.  On the first pitch, he flew out to 
left field just as Reagan recalled.178   
It is unusual that this game was the one Reagan spoke about most often.  He used 
it in his autobiography, while answering letters as president, and even recounted it to 
Harry Carrey during a 1988 Cubs-Pirates game.179  The game in question took place in 
the beginning of April and was unimportant.  Numerous games from that season were 
more significant and dramatic.  In 1935, the Cubs set a record by winning twenty-one 
consecutive games in September to overtake the Cardinals in the standings and win the 
National League pennant.180  They would then play in the World Series, losing to the 
Detroit Tigers in six games.  
The April game against the Cardinals stands out in Reagan’s memory because it 
was the one that most affected him personally.  There were games that were more 
important that year for the Cubs and their fans, but Reagan did not experience them 
personally.  If he did his broadcasts directly from Wrigley, it is likely he would favor a 
different game, as he would be a direct part of the narrative.  Instead, he broadcast from 
Des Moines and the moment of greatest tension and drama in 1935 was when he needed 
to buy time by creating a plausible story of action in the game.  Reagan learned best when 
personally impacted by events.  This experience as a broadcaster also taught him how to 
create compelling stories and that everything in a story needed to serve a higher truth.  In 
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the case of Cubs games, the higher truth was the result of the play and the game, 
everything else had to make the result as memorable as possible.  Reagan would use these 
lessons to hone his approach and its influence on how he communicated with the 
American people as president is evident. 
Pursuit of compelling stories led directly to Reagan’s career as an actor.  
Following the 1935 season, Reagan approached his station manager about giving up his 
vacation time if the studio would pay his way to accompany the Cubs to spring training in 
Catalina, California.181  He argued that doings so would improve the “color and 
atmosphere” of broadcasts during the next season.182  The experience in Catalina proved 
valuable, as Reagan cultivated personal relationships Cubs manager Charles Grimm and 
many of the players.  While at spring training, Reagan sent back letters to for WHO to 
read on air that detailed off the field actions of players.  Learning about how a “smart-
bottomed young reporter” was on the receiving end of a “one-punch fight” made fans feel 
more connected to the team, and the stories helped Reagan expand his audience.183 
The success of Reagan’s trip in 1936 led the station to dispatch him to California 
again the next year.  This time, Reagan had an ulterior motive, to become an actor.  Using 
connections he made with singers as a WHO broadcaster, Reagan met with an agent and, 
just as he did at WOC, exaggerated his credentials.  He told the agent that the acting club 
he was a part of was actually a professional company, which naturally featured Reagan as 
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its lead.184  The agent was also not adverse to the use of “little white lies” and further 
built on Reagan’s potential to land a screen test with Warner Brothers.185  The gambits 
paid off, and soon after his return from California, Reagan received his first movie 
contract, which paid him two hundred dollars per week.  The merging of reality and 
fiction, and the pursuit of stories helped Reagan achieve his life’s ambition, reinforcing a 
sense that the message, and not the content, is all that matters. 
Acting in movies and living in Hollywood did little to dissuade Reagan from this 
belief, and likely served to increase his faith in the power of a well-told story.  Although 
his career peaked with the 1942 Oscar-nominated movie Kings Row, he spent nearly two 
decades in an industry that immersed him in narrative creation.  He also saw firsthand the 
way these narratives could influence the public as a whole during World War II.  Serving 
with the First Motion Picture Unit in Hollywood, Reagan made training films and 
propaganda throughout the war.  In his autobiography, he recalls with pride the role the 
unit played in reducing training times and contributing to the war effort.186  He also 
argues that the soldiers in his unit “understood better than a civilian” what war was like, 
as they edited the “millions of feet of raw” combat footage to avoid presenting disturbing 
images to the public.187 
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Reagan saw that images of fighter planes “in flames” with “the pilot vainly trying 
to get out of cockpit” could not receive a wide viewership.188  The violent, disturbing, 
reality of war could undermine popular support for the nation’s efforts.  Instead, the war 
effort demanded that the unit produce a triumphalist narrative of the war that, while not 
bloodless, did nothing to shock American sensibilities.  Reagan also starred in This is the 
Army, a sequel to Irving Berlin’s World War I musical Yip, Yip, Yaphank.  Featuring Kate 
Smith’s iconic performance of “God Bless America,” the entire effort was to raise funds 
for Army Emergency Relief and build popular support for the war.   Reagan believed 
strongly in the benefit of the work he and his unit did during the war, and believed that no 
similar unit “has ever been so successful in fulfilling its mission.”189  However, he would 
come to regret at least one part of his unit’s success. 
Hollywood’s role in building public support for World War II included presenting 
a more acceptable face of the Soviet Union to the public.  The entry of the Soviet Union 
into an alliance with the United States and Britain was an abrupt shift, born of existential 
necessity, from a quarter century of mutual suspicion and antagonism.  Convincing 
Americans that Joseph Stalin and Russians were now “friends,” as propaganda posters 
throughout the country claimed, was a difficult sell.  Reagan played a role in convincing 
an initially skeptical public.  





During a 1944 radio broadcast aimed at selling war bonds, Reagan played an 
infantryman on the frontlines.  He encounters Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, 
who assures him that the “final surrender” of Germany and Japan will be “complete and 
unconditional.”190  Reagan initially seems unsure of the Secretary’s assurance but is 
assuaged when Morgenthau informs him that he would find the “answer in Russia” and 
that the Soviet Union would provide the “final assurance of the future of free men.”191  
The broadcast served to reassure Americans that their Soviet allies were acting in the 
name of justice and freedom in the Eastern Front.  Morgenthau credits the Russians with 
“removing some of the worst stains from the face of the earth.”192  By “stringing the 
ringleaders of hate up,” the Red Army proved itself as a righteous force, acting in the 
greater good.193   
Morgenthau intentionally provided an overly positive appraisal of Soviet actions 
and intentions.  The reality of Russian behavior saw the wholesale slaughter of not only 
the “ringleaders of hate,” but also the deliberate killing of millions of innocents 
throughout Eastern Europe.194  The Roosevelt administration was loosely aware of the 
mass war crimes of their Soviet ally, but drawing attention to the crimes would make 
Stalin a less palatable partner in the eyes of Americans.195  Winning the war was more 
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important than holding the Soviets accountable, an arguably impossible task, and as a 
result, the administration consciously chose to push the fictional narrative of the Red 
Army as a righteous and moral force.  Radio programs like those that Reagan acted in 
played a large part of this propaganda, and Morgenthau would even write the actor telling 
him that his show was the “most effective program of its kind since the beginning of the 
war.”196 
Hollywood did more than paint the actions of the Red Army in a favorable light 
during World War II; it also sought to portray Soviet system more positively.  Reagan 
was not directly involved in these projects.  However, his studio and boss, Warner 
Brothers and Jack L. Warner, were involved, giving Reagan a unique insight and 
familiarity with the process.  Warner Brothers produced the movie Mission to Moscow, 
based on Roosevelt confidant Joseph Davies’ experience as the US ambassador to the 
Soviet Union during the purges.  The resulting movie portrayed Stalin and the Soviet 
Union so favorably that it would earn the nickname Submission to Moscow, and Davies 
personally presented a copy of the film to Stalin, who approved it for distribution 
throughout the Soviet Union.197 
There is no indication that Reagan objected to his or Hollywood’s role at the time. 
However, he later noted how Mission to Moscow and films like it hurt the U.S. over the 
long term.  He likened the movie to “agitprop” and lamented that someone “in the story 
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department approved a script… without lookin’ too closely at what was written between 
the lines.”198  Speaking with Jack Matlock and other advisors, Reagan argued that the 
soft-focus of the Soviets provided by Hollywood during World War II created a deep 
reluctance on the part of political leaders to speak frankly about the Soviet Union for fear 
of souring Americans on the notion of working cooperatively with them.199  Mission to 
Moscow was on Reagan’s mind as he prepared to meet Gorbachev for the first time at 
Geneva in 1985.  Just prior to departing, he spent much of his interview with Edmund 
Morris, his official biographer, discussing the biography.  Morris took the anecdote as a 
sign of Reagan’s disinterest in a testy exchange between Gorbachev and Shultz earlier in 
the day.  While this may be true, it is likely that given the context of how Reagan viewed 
the movie, his anecdote spoke to his intention to maintain a firmer line with the Soviets 
and continue to speak frankly about his views on the Cold War. 
Reagan’s World War II experience in Hollywood reinforced his beliefs in the 
importance of prioritizing message over fact, and the ability of popular culture to have a 
lasting influence on the population.  It also showed the difficulty in overcoming the 
prevailing narratives.  Reagan saw both the monumental combined effort of the 
government and Hollywood to create “Uncle Joe,” and how long that construct lasted 
despite overwhelming evidence of its inaccuracy.  Fiction again overrode reality.   
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Following the war, Reagan would undergo a gradual political transformation.  
Over a nearly twenty-year period, he would transition from identifying as a New-Deal 
Democrat to a Goldwater Republican.  The two are remarkably apart on the political 
spectrum, making the shift an unusual one.  Although Reagan often noted he did not 
“leave the Democratic Party, the party left me,” this is not the case.  His political beliefs 
changed dramatically during the late-1940s and 1950s, and once again, personal 
experience and fictional narratives proved a decisive factor.   
However, despite the shifting political allegiances, Reagan’s focus on the 
individual would not change.  The “hero-worship” of characters like John Carter and the 
emphasis on individual action taken from That Printer of Udell’s continued to inform 
how Reagan looked at the broader world.  As Reagan’s politics changed, he still sought 
out narratives that embraced these familiar themes.  Fiction like the westerns of Louis 
L’Amour, the military stories of James Michener, and the anti-communism of Arthur 
Koestler paired with the real-life spy stories of Whitaker Chambers and Reagan’s own 
experiences with communists in Hollywood to solidify how Reagan viewed the world 








Chapter 2 Friendly Witness: Politics, Belief, and Narratives 
 
While receiving the Patriot Award at the annual Medal of Honor Society 
Convention in December of 1983, Reagan sought to combat the idea that the United 
States and Soviet Union were morally equivalent.  Addressing a crowd of 650, including 
several recipients of the nation’s highest honor, he reflected on how awards like the 
Medal of Honor reveal national values.200  Reagan believed this because the awards 
recognized individual actions and demonstrated the type of person each nation valued.  In 
his view, the criteria for decorations spoke to the “great difference” between the Cold 
War rivals.  They revealed that the US was “morally strong with a creed and vision” and 
the USSR was not.201 
Reagan recalled a news article from the mid-1960s about a Spaniard who received 
recognition as a Hero of the Soviet Union, the USSR’s highest award.  He could not see 
what the recipient had done to merit such an honor.  The man was an interpreter who had 
only been in Moscow for a short period at the time prior to that lived in Cuba for eight 
uneventful years.  Only after reading another article did Reagan learn the cause for the 
award.  The man in question was Ramon Mercader, who assassinated Leon Trotsky in 
Mexico City. Reagan felt the Soviets giving “their highest honor to a political assassin” 
indicated a morally insidious society.202   
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He contrasted Mercader’s story with one of a Medal of Honor recipient from 
World War II he recalled reading while serving in the army during the Second World 
War.  Reagan told of a doomed B-17 returning to England from a bombing run over the 
continent.  As the plane lost altitude, the crew decided to bail out over the English 
Channel.  The belly-gunner, a young man too badly wounded to escape cried out as the 
last members prepared to parachute to safety.  The pilot heard the gunner’s cry and 
recognizing his fear of dying, chose to sit on the floor next to him saying, “never mind 
son, we’ll ride it down together.”203  Reagan paused a brief moment before adding, 
“Congressional Medal of Honor, posthumously awarded.”204  To the president, that the 
US would give its highest honor to a “man who would sacrifice his life simply to bring 
comfort to a boy who had to die” spoke to the exceptional “moral and spiritual character” 
of the country.205  It showed the “bedrock of [American] strength” that a nation with 
assassins for heroes could not match.206 
The contrast between award recipients dramatically and effectively made 
Reagan’s point.  The only problem with the story was the B-17 of his account never 
existed.  No pilot earned a Medal of Honor during World War II for bringing comfort to a 
dying boy.207  According to biographer Lou Cannon, it is likely Reagan first came across 
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the anecdote in an issue of Reader’s Digest.208 Despite Reagan’s claim in the speech, he 
discovered the story years after World War II, and knowingly fabricated that detail to 
personalize his narrative.   
That Reagan chose a fictional account when he could make a similar point using 
the heroics of members of the audience he was addressing seems odd but was in keeping 
with Regan’s character.   It reinforces the idea that Reagan cared less about the factual 
accuracy of his stories than the larger message.  It also demonstrates his preference for 
familiar tales.  Once Reagan found an appealing story, it became a touchstone for him.  
He would remember it and retell the story to emphasize a larger point.  The account of 
the doomed B-17 was an example of this.  Reagan’s bomber spoke to the values he 
viewed as most important.  The pilot of his story did not earn recognition for completing 
his mission and killing enemy soldiers, rather he earned it sacrificing himself to comfort 
anther.  His pilot freely chose to die to comfort another, placing his friend above himself.  
The selfless actions spoke to Reagan’s sense that individual freedom would produce 
bonds and community that could transcend fear and tyranny. 
Reagan first read the story as he was becoming more politically active and 
incorporated it into his early speeches.  While addressing the 1952 graduating class of 
William Woods College, a women’s college in Fulton, Missouri, Reagan used the B-17 
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story in a manner nearly identical to his 1983 address.209  While some minor details are 
different, the message Reagan attempts to impart is the same.  He believed the imagined 
crew of the plane represented the best of the United States and embodied the values of the 
nation.  In the commencement address, the future president exhorted the women in his 
audience to embrace the sort of “momism” needed to raise such men.210  He told them 
that by embracing the values shown by the pilot’s sacrifice they would “strike a match” 
to “help push back the darkness.”211  He closed with the hope that in doing so they would 
help more people to realize the U.S. represented “the last best hope of man on earth.”212 
The rhetoric and imagery of Reagan’s address at William Woods College is 
strikingly close to that of the speech that launched his political career.  In “A Time for 
Choosing,” his 1964 speech on behalf of the Barry Goldwater campaign, Reagan 
exhorted his audience to action in order maintain the US as “the last best hope of man on 
earth,” or risk taking “the last step into a thousand years of darkness.213  The casting of 
the Cold War as a Manichean struggle of light and darkness defined Reagan’s public 
comments about the conflict.  Reagan consistently framed the Cold War in this manner 
from the 1950s through the end of his presidency, reflecting the importance and the scale 
of the conflict in his mind and the special place for the United States in the world. 
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Reagan’s rhetoric drew heavily upon the work of his personal hero among the 
founding fathers, Thomas Paine.214  Intellectual historian John Patrick Diggins argues in 
Ronald Reagan: Fate Freedom and the Making of History that reading Paine strongly 
influenced the future president’s conception of freedom and liberty.215  Diggins notes that 
Reagan “liked to quote Paine to prove that the government had become alienated from 
the people,” even though Paine was referring to a monarchy rather than a democracy.216  
Reagan believed the purest expression of freedom came at the individual and small 
community level.  Domestically, this underpinned Reagan’s conception of how 
government should work and helped spur his calls to trim the bureaucracy.  More 
tellingly, Reagan also applied Paine’s philosophy of the sanctity of individual rights to 
his foreign policy. 
Throughout Reagan’s political career he spoke of the United States as “the last 
best hope of man,” using the phrase in his commencement address to William Woods, in 
“A Time for Choosing,” his 1983 Address to the National Association of Evangelicals, 
better known as the “Evil Empire Speech,” and his Second Inaugural Address in 1985.217  
The phrase expanded on one used by Lincoln in his Second Annual Address to Congress 
in December of 1862.  In that speech, Lincoln called for a constitutional amendment to 
abolish slavery by the turn of the century.  Lincoln argued that by “giving freedom to the 
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slave” Congress would “assure freedom to the free.”218 The decision in front of Congress 
was to “nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope of earth.”219 
The phrase used by Reagan and Lincoln channeled the urgency of Tom Paine’s 
demand from Common Sense that Americans “receive the fugitive” freedom and “prepare 
in time an asylum for mankind.”220  The powerful imagery of Paine revealed an 
opportunity for greatness, which Reagan embraced wholeheartedly.  He repeatedly 
quoted Paine, arguing that Americans had it within their “power to begin the world 
again.”221  Reagan typically noted that the quote came from the “dark days of the 
American Revolution, when it didn’t seem possible that the nation would come into 
being.”222  He would then explicitly link the Americans of those “dark days” with those 
he had meet on the campaign trail who were “disturbed but not dismayed” with the 
present state of the country.223   
Historian Steven Hayward argues that Reagan’s frequent use of Paine’s thought 
was evidence of his “idiosyncratic and unorthodox” conservatism.224  Diggins agrees, 
believing that Reagan loved the “blasphemous rebel” because “Paine saw freedom as the 
birth of the new and the death of the old.”225  Reading Paine encouraged Reagan to 
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believe in “hope, experiment, and freedom,” rather than the “history, precedent, and 
order” of traditional conservatives.226  This is largely accurate.  Throughout his 
presidency Reagan expressed optimism in the boundless creativity of a free people to 
overcome any challenge.  If unencumbered, he felt the ingenuity and ideology of 
Americans would usher in a golden age.  Only the Soviet Union and its totalitarian 
ideology threatened his vision. 
Reagan’s embrace of the language of the Revolution and Civil War demonstrate 
the vast significance he placed on the Cold War.  In the President’s view, the conflict 
represented nothing less than an existential struggle, the outcome of which would 
determine the future of American ideology and freedom as Reagan defined it.  He arrived 
at this belief because of the convergence of his post-war experiences and personal 
reading.  During the late 1940s and 50s, Reagan encountered communists in his 
professional life in Hollywood and in his personal life on the pages of books by Arthur 
Koestler and Whitaker Chambers.  The similarities in his own experiences and the 
synthetic ones of the books left him with no doubt that “there could be no security 
anywhere in the free world” unless the United States was willing to refuse a deal with the 
“slave masters” in Moscow and resist the temptations of appeasement and 
accommodation.227 
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 Reagan came to view Communism and the Soviet Union as an existential threat in 
the earliest years of the Cold War.  While in the Army during World War II, he viewed 
Stalin and the Soviets as crucial allies.  Reagan actively participated in government 
efforts to turn the ruthless dictator into “Uncle Joe.”  He appeared with Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau in a 1944 bond drive entitled Let’s All Back the Attack.228  In 
the radio spot, Reagan, playing a soldier, asks the Secretary about what is going to 
“happen to the apes that started this thing.”  Morgenthau responds that Reagan would 
find his “answer in Russia” which was “removing some of the worst stains from the face 
of the earth.”229  The Treasury Secretary’s argument that Soviet actions were the “final 
assurance of the future of free men” is darkly ironic given the atrocities of the Red Army 
as it moved west and stands in stark contrast to Reagan’s future assertions of Soviet 
“slave masters” leaving the US as “the last best hope of man on Earth.”230 
 However, Reagan viewed his activity as a success at the time.  Morgenthau wrote 
to him personally in the week after the program in thanks, stating that show “was the 
most effective program of this kind since the beginning of the war.”231  Although Reagan 
would “remember well” the bond drive in later years, he came to deeply regret his, and 
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Hollywood’s, role in softening the public image of the Soviets.232  This touchstone 
moment showed him the power of popular culture to influence public opinion.233  It 
further convinced Reagan of the ability of fiction to contribute to policy.   
It was his experience in Hollywood immediately after the war that brought about 
this revelation and shift in his geopolitical views.  Writing to his counselor, Fred 
Fielding, in 1985, Reagan stated his experiences during the 1947 Hollywood strike 
“opened [his] eyes” to the true nature of communism.234  He encountered communists in 
two ways during this period.  The first was through his work in the Screen Actors Guild, 
which he became president of in 1947, holding the position for over ten years and six 
terms in office.235  Reagan’s SAG presidency came during a tumultuous period for 
Hollywood.  Divisions between labor and management, and intra-union competition led 
to a series of strikes from 1945-1948 touching on nearly every aspect of film production 
and mirroring the significant labor unrest of the post-war period.236 
 Two unions, the Conference of Studio Unions (CSU) and the International 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (ISATE), became embroiled over an arbitrator’s 
decision to award jurisdiction of site erection to ISATE.237  Time characterized the strike 
as “like an old-fashioned serial.”238  It noted that CSU leader Herb Sorrell’s “politics 
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[were] of the far left,” and accusations of communist sympathies swirled around the 
former prizefighter.239  Sorrell addressed these directly while testifying before a 
subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor in 1948, denying all 
allegations of communist involvement in his Union.  Sorrell referred to the charges of 
communist membership as “phony” and something intended to “tangle [him] up.”240  
 During his testimony, Sorrell did express admiration for those who publically 
announced that they were Communists and then held to the declaration.  This was an 
unusual and risky statement to make given the anti-Communist fervor embroiling 
Washington.  Sorrell attempted to walk a line in his testimony, affirming that while 
personally “he had no use for communism,” he also did not understand the utility of 
seeking to “eliminate the Communist.”241  He admitted that he was aware of a number of 
communists in the CSU but insisted that the strike was “not communist inspired nor 
communist-directed.”242  However, Sorrell also allowed that the communists in the CSU 
“come out and whip the whole membership into line” in a manner that was “very 
efficient,” unintentionally implying an outsized influence of the ideology over the 
union.243  
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In his testimony, Sorrell admitted, “Communists… helped us substantially with 
contributions.”244  This support came from a number of communist-front organizations 
with links to Sorrell.245  The CSU also received support from Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano, the leader of the Confederation of Mexican Workers, who had established ties 
to Soviet Intelligence agencies.246  Max Silver, the “organization director” of the 
Communist Party in Los Angeles testified to the way the party viewed the CSU.247  
According to Silver, the “Communist Party was very much interested in the success” of 
the CSU, and wanted to make it “a nerve center” that would provide a way for “party 
policy and party people” to wield influence in Hollywood.248 
The Screen Actors Guild attempted to mediate the dispute, sending a group of 
representatives to talk with the labor leaders.  As part of the delegation, Reagan found the 
leadership of both sides intractable but made special note of accusations that Sorrell was 
working to advance communism.249  The strike descended into violence.  Striking CSU 
members “scattered tacks in the path of movie star’s automobiles,” “threw coffee in 
faces” of line-crossers, and “stoned buses of rival A.F.L. workers.”250  Strikers in front of 
Warner Brothers Studios made use of “clubs, chains, bottle, bricks, and two by fours” to 
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enforce the picket line.251  Attacks extended beyond the immediate picket line, as CSU 
strikers vandalized the homes of IATSE members and “ambushed and slugged” workers 
far from the studio.252 
The CSU-IATSE dispute exposed an ideological divide in SAG.  As Reagan 
prepared a report on the strike for the next SAG meeting, his friend Bill Holden informed 
him a group of communists and fellow travelers in the guild were meeting to plan their 
next moves.  The meeting was to take place at the home of actress Ida Lupino, a mutual 
friend of Holden and Reagan, and the two decided to crash it.  Greeted warmly by 
Lupino, who was not “one of Them,” Reagan found a chillier reception from the 
meeting’s attendees.253  He felt compelled to “spike their guns with regard to 
brainwashing,” by delivering a draft version of his strike report and argue against efforts 
to support the CSU.254 
The prominent role Reagan played in working against CSU efforts to gain SAG 
support made him a target of abuse.  After delivering his report, a fellow actor accosted 
Reagan calling him a “fascist” for refusing to support the strikers.255  More ominously, 
anonymous phone calls to the set of Night unto Night threatened violence against Reagan.  
The caller informed Reagan that a group was going to deal with him and ensure he would 
never be able to act again.  Upon returning to the studio, Reagan met with the police who 
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provided him with a pistol amid concerns the group would seek to throw acid on the 
actor’s face.256  The threat of violence had a powerful impact on Reagan, convincing him 
that communists would use any means to advance their interests. 
He also encountered communists through his work with advocacy groups.  After 
World War II, Reagan joined the American Veterans Committee as a part of its board.  
He liked the group’s slogan, “citizens first, veterans second,” and “expected great things” 
of the organization.257  However, Reagan gradually came to recognize that the group’s 
ideology did not match his own, and he feared it was a communist front.  When he 
included anti-communist rhetoric in one address to the group’s membership pledging to 
“speak out as harshly against communism as [he had] against fascism” the crowd’s 
response chilled him.258  The audience went from enthusiastic to silent as Reagan 
denounced communism as a “threat to all the we believe in and stand for,” demonstrating 
how deeply communist sentiments ran in the organization.259 
Shortly after the chilly reception to his speech, Reagan found more telling proof 
of “communist infiltration.”260  He identified a radio hall to hold a group meeting for 750 
members, but others on the board overrode this and instead booked a hall that could only 
hold 75.  Even though the larger venue was available for free, a majority of the board 
preferred only having enough room in the hall for “a small, working majority.”261  When 
                                                 
256 Ibid, 174. 
257 Brands, 62. 
258 Ibid, 63. 
259 Ibid. 




Reagan arrived for the meeting, he found hundreds of AVC members “milling about 
outside, unable to get in.”262  Inside, 73 members voted for the entire membership to 
picket a studio in the uniform of their services.  Reagan believed this to be “an old 
communist trick,” giving the illusion of democratic choice to actions that only a small 
minority desired.263  Following the incident, he resigned from the AVC, and tried to 
prevent the employment of similar tactics in SAG. 
Reagan’s experience on the board of the Hollywood Independent Citizens 
Committee of Arts, Sciences, and Professions (HICCASP) was like that of his time in the 
AVC.  He initially felt “honored” to join the board of a group with “more jewel-like 
names than a crown tiara,” but these feelings soured at the first meeting he attended.264  
The meeting descended into chaos after Reagan’s friend Jimmy Roosevelt asked the 
board to release a declaration denouncing communism.  In response, a musician offered 
to recite the constitution of the USSR to show it was more democratic than that of the 
US.  A screen writer went even further and declared he would volunteer for Russia in the 
event of war between the USSR and US.  Dalton Trumbo, one of screenwriters later 
blacklisted, led the group in denouncing the proposal and heaped scorn on Roosevelt and 
Reagan.265 
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Reagan and a small group of board members still sought to craft a resolution for 
the organization to denounce communism.  Presenting a draft at a later meeting, they 
again ran into vocal dissent.  John Howard Lawson, another of the Hollywood Ten, 
yelled that the group would never endorse a resolution that sought to endorse “free 
enterprise and repudiate Communism.”266  Reagan’s group wanted to put the issue to a 
secret ballot of the group’s membership, rather than leave it up to the board.  Lawson 
responded that the group was not “politically sophisticated enough to make this 
decision.”267  Instead, the issue went before the executive committee, a sub-set of the 
board, which had only one of Reagan’s allies, Olivia de Haviland.  The resolution failed, 
and Reagan’s group resigned that evening.268 
The resentment Reagan felt over the experience with HICCASP lingered, and he 
remained vocally opposed to the Hollywood Ten long after the end of McCarthyism.  In 
1960, Playboy published an article by Trumbo that alleged that the blacklist of the 
Hollywood 10 was a witch-hunt, no different from 17th century Salem.269  Trumbo argued 
that Americans’ need to hunt witches was “an instinct as deep as the sexual drive, almost 
as fun, and often safer.”270  He believed that Hollywood naturally carried everything to 
extremes and therefore allowed “the sport” to flourish “to the point of obsession.”271  
Casting himself as a victim, Trumbo argued the blacklist was “like a shroud” over 
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Hollywood and revealed a hypocritical, vapid industry that tried to turn its betters into a 
“good and faithful servant.”272  However, Trumbo, as one of the betters, knew there was 
no true integrity in the industry and instead disdained its laurels. 
Reagan read the article and disagreed vehemently with Trumbo’s framing of 
himself and the industry.  Still angry over the events of the late-1940s, he exchanged 
letters with Hugh Hefner to explain why he felt Trumbo’s ouster from Hollywood was 
not a blacklist, but rather the rational response to the demands of “millions of 
moviegoers.”273  Instead of engaging in free speech, Reagan believed Trumbo 
championed the use of “subversion and stealth” to impose rule “on an unwilling people,” 
in the same way small groups subverted the will of the AVC and HICCASP.274  Reagan 
described Trumbo as a “traitor” who “looked upon the death of American soldiers in 
Korea as a victory.”275    
Reagan’s experiences left him convinced that communism was antithetical to 
freedom, and its adherents would resort to any tactic, including violence, to ensure it 
prevailed.  His personal experience taught him that the ideology would trample 
individuals while claiming to speak for them.  His certainty about the nature of 
communist tactics solidified as he began to read the work of Arthur Koestler.  Reagan 
met the author at a 1948 event hosted by Henry Fonda, James Cagney, and Joan 
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Fontaine.276  He found the anti-Communist message Koestler presented matched his own 
experience and sought out Koestler’s books.  In Darkness at Noon and Koestler’s essay 
in The God That Failed, Reagan found realistic narratives about Communism that 
matched his personal experience and reinforced his belief that the ideology was the most 
serious threat to the US and the idea of freedom as Reagan conceptualized it. 
 
Darkness At Noon 
 
Koestler, a Hungarian-born British citizen, joined the Communist Party in 
Germany in 1931.  He joined because of his disgust about the “disintegrating society” of 
the Weimar Republic and witnessed the collapse of his family’s middle-class lifestyle.277  
In the wake of personal and societal collapse, the turn towards communism was a natural 
one for Koestler.  He eventually became active in a local cell, working to sell “the World 
Revolution like vacuum cleaners.”278  During a visit to the USSR, he toured the country 
and received lavish advances for his first book aimed at convincing him the Soviet Union 
was an “artist’s paradise.”279  Upon his return, the Soviets expected Koestler to spread 
propaganda about the treatment of artists and authors in the USSR.  However, Hitler’s 
rise to power forced Koestler to move to Paris where he took a job covering the Spanish 
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Civil War.  Franco’s forces captured him, and he spent four months in a Spanish 
prison.280  His time in prison led him to break with Communism, as he realized “men 
cannot be treated as units in operations of political arithmetic.”281 
Koestler was not the only prominent author to turn against Communism and the 
Soviet Union due to the Spanish Civil War.  George Orwell also became a vocal critic of 
Stalin and the USSR due to his experience as a member of the POUM, a Trotskyist 
militia.  Orwell witnessed the decision of Stalinist forces to turn on their allies.  Rather 
than cooperate and work against the fascist forces of Franco they sought to purge the 
ideologically impure militia, forcing Orwell to flee Spain or face arrest and execution.  
The experience left Orwell with “memories that are mostly evil,” and led him to spend 
the remainder of his life as a strident critic of Stalinism.282 
Unlike Orwell, Koestler’s break with Stalin was not the result of factionalism 
amongst communists.  Instead, it was “pity for the Andalusian and Catalan peasants,” that 
he shared time with in prison.283  Their plight humanized the sins of the Communist Party 
for Koestler and led him to realize that “man [was] a reality” and “mankind [was] an 
abstraction,” ideas that were “incompatible with the Communist faith” he previously 
held.284  Like Reagan, he became appalled by how communism forced the subjugation of 
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individual agency to party dictate.  Koestler’s realizations in prison started a slow process 
leading to his departure from the party and vocal criticism of the ideology. 
Koestler was unable to escape his past though.  French authorities arrested him in 1939 
due to his past work on Soviet propaganda.285  He remained in an internment camp for 
several months, before the intervention of British officials again secured his release.  It 
was during this period of internment that he began work on Darkness at Noon, a fictional 
narrative he used to explore the reasons for his own departure from the party.  In it he 
leveled a harsh critique of how communism destroys the very people it purports to 
defend. 
The book centers on the arrest, interrogation, and execution of Nicolas Rubashov, 
a hero of the 1917 Revolution and high-ranking Soviet official.  Rubashov is not 
surprised by his detention and was in fact dreaming of his first arrest years before in 
Germany, when the secret police arrive.  In Rubashov’s dream three “Praetorian guards 
of the German Dictatorship” arrest him, and the waking world reveals three members of 
the People’s Commissariat.286  Both troikas are menacing with “grotesquely big pistols” 
and a “brutality was no longer put on, but natural.”287  Throughout the novel, Koestler 
equates the Soviets with the Nazis.  Rubashov’s experience in the two nation’s prisons 
are mirror images and Koestler’s time living under each regime lent credibility to the 
work. 
                                                 
285 F Flagg Taylor IV, “Arthur Koestler’s Trail of Darkness,” Modern Age, October 2016, 31. 
286 Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon, 3. 
287 Ibid, 3, 6. 
86 
 
Betrayal is prominent throughout Darkness at Noon, reflecting Koestler’s own 
emotional experience.  The regime betrays Rubashov and his peers.  He frequently 
remanences about a photo depicting the “delegates to the first Congress of the Party” who 
sought “power with the object of abolishing power.”288  However, most of the men in the 
photo die on the orders of Stalin.  Each man guilty of disagreeing with the party, an 
irredeemable fault.   
While in prison, Rubashov’s own betrayals haunts him.  His actions on behalf of 
the state and to protect himself destroy those foolish enough to believe in the Party and 
USSR.  He turns on young idealists, seasoned revolutionaries, union organizers, and 
lovers for increasingly cynical reasons. The variety of those destroyed allowed Koestler 
to deliver a powerful message.  He that communism will eliminate all freedoms and flow 
“inert and unerring” as a river towards its goal, leaving only mud and the “corpses of the 
drowned” behind.289  True adherents knew that “the Party can never be mistaken” and 
accepted its will.290  Rubashov cannot escape either.  He confesses all charges and at his 
trial does not seek top revent his execution.  Instead he seeks to strengthen the Party, 
arguing “history treads into dust” those like him who resist.291   
Gletkin, Rubashov’s interrogator, does provide the doomed man with one piece of 
solace.  Guilty of his own betrayal when he turns on his superior out of ambition, Gletkin 
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tells Rubashov that “one day when it can do no more harm, the material of the secret 
archives will be published.”292  History will rehabilitate Rubashov and the “older 
generation” that the younger feasted upon to gain power.293  The words of Koestler’s 
fictional jailer proved surprisingly prescient, though not in the way Gletkin envisioned it.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, historians used the formerly secret archives to 
explore the causes of the purges of the 1930s. 
In particular, the show trial and execution of Nikoli Bukharin in 1938 shows the 
purges as an artificial construction that used ideology to mask Stalin’s power grab.  In 
Bukharin’s final letter from prison, he wrote Stalin that the purge was a “great and bold 
idea.”294  Historians J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov note that Bukharin’s letter 
“explicitly recognized that the campaign against enemies was constructed and not 
reflective of political reality.”295  Despite the lack of real enemies, Bukharin still 
confessed, even knowing it would lead to his execution.  He assured Stalin that he had 
“no intention of recanting anything” even as he swore he was “innocent of those crimes 
which [he] admitted at the investigation.”296  Though he pled for mercy, Bukharin 
admitted it “would be petty” to weigh his life against the “universal-historical tasks” 
undertaken by the Party.297 
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Bukharin confessed his own role in the enabling the purge.  He acknowledged the 
Soviet government cast a wide net that took in “1) the guilty; 2) persons under suspicion; 
and 3) persons potentially under suspicion.”298  The approach ensured that the vast 
majority of those killed in the purges committed no crime.  Rather than decry such 
violence in the name of ideology, Bukharin noted that it was instead reflective of “great 
plans, great ideas, and great interests” which rightly took “precedence over 
everything.”299  He also argued that being aware of the innocence of the vast majority 
made the entire affair a noble effort.  To execute them, and himself, believing they were 
actually guilty would instead amount to “wittingly committing an evil,” which “could 
never be justified.”300  It was better for the Party to knowingly consign millions of 
innocents to death, as they would then be martyrs for the Party.  He proudly told Stalin 
that the entire process “could not have been managed without me.”301 
 The presence of the letter in archives allowed historians to understand the purges 
in a completely different manner than the official Soviet narrative.  It explicitly 
confirmed previous arguments that the motivation for slaughter was not fear of enemies, 
but rather the consolidation of power.  It is remarkable that Koestler’s fictional 
interrogations bear so many hallmarks of Bukharin’s experience.  The author did not have 
                                                 






access to the archives; instead, he used his own experiences and understanding of the 
regime to craft a compelling and accurate narrative. 
 Koestler’s focus on the duplicitous nature of Communism appealed to Reagan.  
The portrayal of a Party that sought to limit individual thought and eagerly used violence 
matched Reagan’s experience with Communists and fellow travelers in Hollywood.  
Darkness at Noon and The God That Failed allowed him to take what his personal 
experience taught him about Communism beyond Hollywood and apply it to the ideology 
as a whole.  The books helped Reagan conceptualize the goals and methods of the Soviet 
Union in a way that permanently cast the nation as the archenemy of freedom. 
 Koestler’s work and life story also likely laid the framework for the nuanced way 
that Reagan viewed those under the sway of communism.  Throughout Reagan’s public 
life, he made a distinction between the ideology, which was irredeemable, and its 
practitioners, who were not.  Koestler, himself, stood as an example of someone turning 
back.  After reading Darkness at Noon and The God That Failed, Reagan began working 
with the Motion Picture Industry Council to rehabilitate Communists.302  The most 
prominent of those Reagan worked with was Edward Dmytryk, one of the Hollywood 
Ten. 
 Dmytryk confessed to joining the Communist Party in 1944, and viewed himself 
as one of 150 “intellectual communists” in Hollywood.303  His desire to “make honest 
                                                 
302 Edmund Morris, Dutch: A  memoir of Ronald Reagan (New York: Random House, 1999), 291. 




pictures about people” led to a number of meetings with Communist-affiliated groups and 
over a period of several years, they recruited him into the party.304  His membership was 
short-lived, as he conflicted with the Party for refusing to make changes to a movie he 
was working on.  However, he refused to cooperate with HUAC, which then charged him 
and nine others with Contempt of Congress.  After fleeing briefly to England, he returned 
in 1950 and served a six-month sentence.  While in prison, Dmytryk expressed shock at 
the “conditioned thinking” of his compatriots, who insisted that the Korean War began 
due to South Korean aggression.305  After the Chinese entered the war, he changed course 
and signed a full affidavit of his actions and upon release returned to Hollywood seeking 
to resume his career. 
 In his Saturday Evening Post confessional, Dmytryk expressed a desire for a “sort 
of an Ex-Communists Anonymous” to help people trying to quit the Party.306  This was 
the intention of the MPIC Committee started by Roy Brewer and Reagan.307  Reagan felt 
that Dmytryk’s recognition that the “humanitarian trappings” of Communism only 
masked an “ugly reality” was “heroic.”308  Dmytryk’s cooperation with the authorities 
and work with MPIC led to a backlash, as communist groups sought to discredit him.  
Reagan took this as further proof about the controlling nature of the ideology and through 
MPIC released a letter.  In it, the group noted that it took “courage and desire and time 
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for an American to work free of the tentacles of the Communist Party” and that they 
could not do so alone.309  However, MPIC was willing to help and wanted people seeking 
an exit to know that “you too can be free men again.”310 
Reagan’s desire to allow people to “be free men again” extended beyond those 
who consciously chose to embrace communism.  He increasingly articulated a gap 
between the Soviet system and the people under it.  Koestler’s work also furthered this 
sentiment.  In Darkness at Noon Rubashov’s porter Vassilij stands in for the millions of 
people who live under Communism but retain doubts about the system.  Vassilij served 
with Rubashov and remembers him as a “little bearded Partisan commander” capable of 
soaring rhetoric on the battlefield.311  He continues to follow his commander’s career, but 
expresses dismay that he “could never manage to find” the Rubashov he knew in the 
“long and difficult to understand” speeches of Party congresses.312  Vassilij’s loyalty is to 
the man, not the Party. 
 He also holds to religion.  At the end of each speech as the speaker wishes long 
life to the international, the revolution, and Stalin, Vassilij turns it to a prayer by 
inaudibly adding an un-Marxist “amen.”313  He follows by making the sign of the cross in 
secret, fearful that his true believer daughter will see.  Vassilij also believes that 
Rubashov’s early speeches would have made the Holy Madonna of Kazan smile on them, 
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implying a religious element to the revolution.314  Even at the end, as his daughter reads 
Rubashov’s testimony at the show trial Vassilij keeps to his religion, silently praying that 
“thy will be done” before adding an Amen and going to sleep.315  The message Reagan 
took from this was that religion was a key factor in defeating communism. 
 
Resistance and Redemption 
   
Reagan viewed religion as the key to the fight against Communism.  He believed 
that faith would provide the will necessary for people across the world to come together 
and fight against the hostile ideology, regardless of the sinister tactics communists would 
employ.  Speaking to the Conservative Political Action Conference in 1981, Reagan cited 
Whittaker Chambers’ argument that the Western world already had the answer to the 
“problem” of Communism: “its faith in God and the freedom He enjoins.”316  The line 
was a favorite of Reagan’s and it would appear in many his speeches throughout his 
presidency, including his “Evil Empire” speech to the National Association of 
Evangelicals in Orlando.317  Chambers exerted a powerful influence on how Reagan 
viewed Communism and how he sought to defeat the Soviet Union.  During staff 
meetings, Reagan would often quote Chambers’ book Witness verbatim.  Those around 
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the president knew he used the quotations to demonstrate the reasons for his enmity of 
communism and desire to defeat the ideology. 318 
Chambers came from a solidly middle-class background.  Like Reagan, his 
boyhood reading would do much to shape his future beliefs.  Chambers read Victor 
Hugo’s Les Miserables as an eight-year-old, and returned to the work throughout his 
life.319 He found the book to be a “great act of human spirit” and it provided the “forces 
that carried [him] into the Communist Party” as well as the ones which would lead him 
out.320  This is because the work “taught [Chambers] about two seemingly irreconcilable 
things- Christianity and revolution.”321  Chambers would pursue revolution first, and 
shortly after leaving Columbia joined the Communist Party, due to its intellectual appeal 
and his own disillusionment with his family and suburban life.322   In 1932, the GRU, the 
intelligence arm of the Red Army, recruited Chambers as a spy. 
Chambers initially remained in New York City, where his cell provided little of 
value to Soviet intelligence.  A 1936 move to Washington DC led to the recruitment of 
more fruitful sources.  Chambers helped turn State Department employees Alger Hiss and 
Julian Wadleigh as well as economist Harry Dexter White into sources for the GRU.  
Hiss and White were particularly useful as each would rise to high positions in 
government during World War II.  After recruitment, his primary responsibility was to 
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photograph the information sources provided him and deliver it to his handler in New 
York.323 
As the Party turned on itself during the Spanish Civil War and the purges in the 
Soviet Union, Chambers became increasingly paranoid about his and his family’s safety.  
Boris Bykov, the Soviet resident in New York, took “a special delight” in antagonizing 
Chambers about the purges and the events in Moscow hung ominously over the two 
men’s meetings.324  Bykov questioned Chambers about the fate of Bukharin even before 
the Soviet Union announced the death of the “Communist Party’s leading theoretician” 
and used the event to identify any “Communist heresies” Chambers may be guilty of.325  
The interrogations and way that the Purge generated fear reached even New York City, 
led Chambers to increasingly question the correctness of the Party. 
By 1938, Chambers resolved to leave the Party and his work as a spy for the 
GRU.  He skipped a planned meeting with Bykov, and took his family to Florida, fearful 
that Soviet agents would find and kill him.  Forced to return alternatively to Washington 
and New York to seek employment, Chambers began sleeping with a rifle by his bed and 
scanned the streets for agents of the Soviet secret police.326  Chambers eventually landed 
a job with Time writing book reviews, a role that soon expanded into a role writing cover 
stories and handling reports from overseas.  Despite the economic security, Chambers 
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still felt at risk from the NKVD.  The likely assassination of his friend Walter Krivitsky 
only added to his fears.  He even attempted to arrange a pardon in exchange for exposing 
the Soviet underground, though these efforts largely failed to bear results in the early 40s.  
Instead, Chambers used his role at Time to attack fellow travelers and criticize the 
Stalinist regime, even after the US had entered the World War II and allied with the 
Soviet Union.327 
Chambers came back to the attention of US authorities in 1947 amid efforts to 
find communists throughout government.  The testimony of his replacement as courier, 
Elizabeth Bentley, led to his subpoena to appear before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee.328  In his testimony, he confirmed much of what Bentley told the 
committee and identified members of the US government who had passed him classified 
information.  He also detailed how the organization handled funds, forged documents, 
and recruited new members.329  Most importantly, Chambers identified Harry Dexter 
White and Alger Hiss as individuals involved in passing information through his 
network.  He also firmly denied that the men were exploited without their knowledge.  
Instead, both were part of achieving the “paramount objectives” of the Communist Party, 
the ability to wield “power and influence” within the US government.330 
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In the time since Chambers’ defection from the underground, Hiss had risen to a 
senior role in the State Department advising Secretary of State Dean Acheson.  He denied 
all the accusations, setting the stage for a series of dramatic hearings pitting Chambers 
against Hiss and eventually leading the committee chair to declare, “certainly one of 
these witnesses will be tried for perjury.”331  Hiss’ attempts to deny knowing Chambers 
failed to sway the committee, and they planned his prosecution.  A resulting effort by 
Hiss to silence Chambers through a slander suit failed when Chambers produced 
classified documents provided to him by Hiss nearly two decades before.332  Due to the 
hearings, a jury found Hiss guilty of perjury and he served three years in a federal 
penitentiary.  While he maintained his innocence to his death, the archives of Soviet 
Intelligence agencies revealed his code name, ALES, and that while at Yalta, Soviet 
agents met with him secretly to express their appreciation of his work.333  Chambers also 
provided substantial evidence of Harry Dexter White’s role as a spy for the Soviet 
Union.334  White was a leading economist and the author of much of the US’ plans for the 
post-war economic order and its lead negotiator at Bretton Woods.  He appeared before 
the committee in August of 1948 to deny his role and suffered a fatal heart attack before a 
second session.335  Like Hiss, Soviet archives exposed White’s espionage. 
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The revelations from the HUAC investigation and series of resulting trials caused 
Time to dismiss Chambers as he had held secrets from the company.  He initially sought 
to return to the magazine once the legal proceedings finished, but instead began work on 
memoir.  Witness, published in 1952, told the story of why Chambers became a 
Communist, his actions in the underground, and why he left the Party.  The Saturday 
Evening Post paid a staggering 75,000 dollars for the serialization rights, and published 
the first chapter in an issue that eschewed a cover illustration for the first time in its 
history.336  Within two months of publication, the book topped The New York Times 
bestseller list, and would become the ninth best-selling book of 1952.337  Reagan read the 
book shortly after publication, and it cemented his view of both the threat from the Soviet 
Union and the way to he felt the US needed to fight it.   
Chamber’s narrative reads as a non-fictional spy thriller and provided Reagan 
with a story that he could easily imagine himself in.  The portrayal of GRU and NKVD 
agents as ruthless, exploitive assassins fit Reagan’s experience.  Both Chambers and 
Reagan felt the need to literally arm themselves in order to stave off communists.  The 
threats against Reagan left him feeling paranoid, in a manner not unlike Chambers own 
fears after defecting.  He recalled answering the door on a rainy day to a man who 
identified himself as a striker.  Fear struck Reagan, as he had left his gun upstairs and was 
certain that the man intended to attack him.338  Though the man turned out to be 
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sympathetic and had resolved to turn against Sorrell, the flash of fear shows how deeply 
fearful Reagan was about the prospect of communist-directed violence against him. 
The figures of Herb Sorrell, the leader of the CSU, and Boris Bykov, the Soviet resident 
in New York share a number of characteristics.   Chambers portrays Bykov as a figure 
obsessed with control and settling accounts.  During the period of defection, Chambers 
describes him as a man with rude manner and deep cynicism.339  He deliberately harassed 
the members of the underground, and delighted in his power over them.  Eventually, 
Chambers gives up on finding anything human about the Soviet colonel, concluding that 
he was a “caricature” of a communist.340  The only thing that brought him close to 
pleasure was “brutality” and had a “vengeful and malicious” character.341  This 
description of the natural brutality of Bykov bears striking resemblance to that of 
Koestler’s Gletkin. 
Reagan viewed Sorrell similarly.  His descriptions of the labor leader consistently 
show an obnoxious, cynical, and rude man, filled with “delusions of grandeur.”342  
Physically, Sorrell was “a large and muscular man,” reflecting his past a boxer, who 
displayed a “most aggressive attitude.”343  He also demonstrated no regard for those 
under him, repeatedly showing his willingness to sacrifice their pay and well-being for 
his own power.  In Reagan’s view, Sorrell shared Bykov’s love of brutality, as he not 
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only refused to stop his union’s violent attacks but also appeared to revel in them.  Sorrell 
also shared Bykov’s view that subordinates were like “ammunition—easily 
expendable.”344  Sorrell and Bykov both deceived their followers, using their loyalty and 
good faith to turn them into “cannon fodder in this war” of competing ideologies.345 
Similarly, the Chambers’ depiction of educated American communists fit Reagan’s 
perceptions and experience.  Chambers argued that Hiss could not or refused to see the 
weakness of Bykov’s character due to the “transforming power of anything Russian” to 
the intellectual.346  When Chambers sought to criticize Bykov, he found Hiss dismissive 
of both the complaint and Chambers’ intellect.  Over time, Chambers realized that Hiss 
was one of those “who affected to act, think, and speak” for the “plain men and women 
of the nation.”347   
The condescension he exhibited stemmed from his own overconfidence that the 
Party could do no wrong and that he, by virtue of his role in the party, was best equipped 
to guide intellectual inferiors.  Hiss exploited his peers, many of whom “snapped their 
minds shut” to the possibility of his guilt.348  The refusal to acknowledge the possibility 
that someone with the skills and gifts of Hiss could work for the Soviet Union was, for 
Chambers, a sign that the nation could not distinguish between fact and fiction.  He 
                                                 
344 Ibid, 185. 
345 Ibid, 184. 
346 Chambers, 358 




resented that “the forces of enlightenment” would both dismiss the “Communist danger” 
and stoop to “calling every allusion to it a witch hunt.”349   
Reagan saw Dalton Trumbo in a similar light as Hiss.  His encounters with 
Trumbo in HICCASP reflected what Reagan viewed as the snobbery and undemocratic 
elitism of communists.  He was similarly taken aback when Edward Dmytryk revealed 
several of the Hollywood Ten expressed sympathy for the North Koreans and reveled in 
the death of American soldiers.350  Reagan also resented efforts to portray anti-
Communist efforts as a witch-hunt.  Trumbo’s 1960 Playboy article infuriated Reagan for 
this reason.  The communist writer’s insistence that he had committed no sins and his 
insinuation that Reagan and others were shamelessly hunting witches prompted Reagan’s 
forceful rebuttal to Heffner and the disingenuous claim that there was no blacklist. 
Reagan thought Chambers a “tragic and lonely” figure who believed he had left “the 
winning side” in the name of what was right.351  Although Reagan admired the strong 
moral sense that led the writer to cease supporting an evil cause, he found himself “too 
optimistic to agree” that the West would not prevail.352  He did agree with Chambers that 
the fight would not be an easy one however.  Reagan learned firsthand of the “fierce 
vindictiveness of [Communism’s] revolutionary temper” when he faced increasingly 
vocal opposition on his General Electric speaking tours.353  Reagan’s use of the 
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Tennessee Valley Authority as an example of government waste, led to demands that GE 
forbid Reagan from referencing the program again or risk losing government contracts 
valued at fifty million dollars or more.  Although GE’s chairman backed Reagan, he still 
opted to remove the reference from his speech.  Reagan noted in his autobiography that 
there were “a hundred examples of overgrown government” he could use instead, but the 
incident showed how late the moment was to “save freedom,” echoing Chambers’ dark 
words.354 
Organized labor also increasingly targeted the former SAG leader during this 
period.  The AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education included Reagan in a “one-
hundred-dollar book” which “gave the lowdown on Right-Wing extremist speakers.”355  
The committee urged its affiliated unions “to head off and prevent the appearance… of 
speakers listed in the book.”356  A teacher’s union in St Paul, Minnesota complied, 
passing a resolution before a Reagan address demanding that he not be allowed to speak.  
The statement declared him a “controversial personality” whose appearance would not be 
beneficial to the school assembly.357  The speech took place as planned, but the union 
then demanded the school host Ben Davis, the party secretary of the US Communist 
Party, on the grounds of providing equal time.358 
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The AFL-CIO backed resistance in Minnesota, and their labeling of Reagan as an 
extremist was particularly galling to Reagan given his personal history.  One of the 
earliest partisan messages Reagan recorded was on behalf of the AFL.  In a 1948 radio 
broadcast sponsored by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, which had an 
affiliation with the AFL, Reagan stumped for Hubert Humphrey.  Reagan presented 
Humphrey as his “friend from Minneapolis” and a staunch opponent of the Taft-Hartley 
Act.359  The strident opposition from a group Reagan had previously worked with, in a 
state where he campaigned on their behalf reinforced his belief that leftist groups did not 
value free speech.  Instead, in Reagan’s view, they sought unquestioning acceptance of 
the party line.  This revelation was a confirmation of Chambers’ view of the 
vindictiveness of communism. 
Chambers’ experience left him pessimistic about the prospect of the US 
prevailing in its fight against communism.  He believed the world was at a turning point 
that would determine “whether the whole world was to become free” or if it would be 
“completely destroyed or completely changed.”360  While Chambers believed the West 
had the answer to the problem, he feared that it did not realize the solution and would 
therefore fall.  Chambers’ rhetoric about the world facing a pivotal moment mirrored 
Reagan’s sense that freedom was under siege.  In 1952, the same year Witness debuted; 
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Reagan addressed the graduating class at William Woods College and identified the US, 
for the first time, as “the last best hope of man on earth.”361  
Over his political career, Reagan cited Chambers’ sense of the challenge to 
freedom frequently.  Addressing CPAC in 1982, Reagan quoted Chambers passage about 
“whether the whole world is to become free” directly.362   Reagan then linked the current 
struggle back to the Revolutionary War and founding of the United States.  He argued 
that modern Americans had the same opportunity that the founding fathers had to 
preserve the “sacred fire of liberty” through “the darkest and coldest nights.”363  Reagan’s 
reading of Witness strengthened his belief that US ideology was revolutionary and world-
changing. 
Chambers was more than a rhetorical tool for Reagan employed as red meat for 
conservatives.  Instead, the author’s work was emblematic of his strategic vision.  While 
developing National Security Decision Directive 32, one of the key policy documents 
outlining Reagan’s Cold War strategy, he would discuss Chambers with his aides.364  He 
used Witness with his staff to argue the US was in a pivotal moment in history.365  The 
resulting policy clearly evoked this view and provided the strategic basis for the US to 
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take aggressive action “to contain and reverse” the Soviet Union and communist 
ideology.366 
The president also created a minor political controversy when he honored 
Chambers in 1988.  His regard for Witness led him to propose recognizing Chamber’s 
Pipe Creek as a national historic landmark.  Reagan’s pushed for the recognition over the 
unanimous dissent of his advisors and the objections of a National Park Service advisory 
board.367  At Reagan’s urging, Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel overruled the board 
and granted landmark status, the only time in the history of the program a secretary 
ignored a unanimous vote by the board.368  Critics alleged the decision represented “an 
unprecedented politicization” of the program and “an unwise mix of ideology and 
history.”369  There is validity to their argument, as Chambers’ contribution to Reagan’s 
anti-communism was through his writing rather than the geographic importance of a 
Maryland pumpkin patch. 
  Reagan identified strongly with Witness for more than its proclamation that 
communism was the “concentrated evil” of its time.370 Importantly, Chambers also 
offered insight into how the US could win its struggle.  He argued that since communism 
was “man’s second oldest faith” and the “vision of Man without God” that religion and 
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faith in God offered the path to defeating communism.371  Chambers felt that “political 
freedom as the Western world has known it” was derived from the Bible, and that the 
concepts of religion and freedom were indivisible.372  The emphasis Chambers placed on 
religion as the decisive factor in the conflict with communism appealed to Reagan, who 
viewed religion in a similar way.  
Reagan also strongly identified with the way Chambers found his faith.  Both 
Chambers and Reagan credited fictional characters in defining their religious beliefs.  
Dick, the protagonist of Harold Bell Wright’s The Printer of Udell’s, offered a “role 
model” to Reagan and “set [him] on a course” that the President was “always grateful” 
for.373  For Chambers, it was Victor Hugo’s Bishop of Digne from Les Miserables who 
modeled Christianity.  Chambers recalled being thrilled by the story of the Bishop trading 
his palace for a hospital to better care for the sick.374  Even after Chambers disavowed 
religion and became active in the Communist Party, the Bishop’s imprint on him 
remained.  The character “was invisibly present” as Chambers broke with communism.375  
The similarities between Chambers’ religious development and his own, increased the 
affinity Reagan felt for Witness.  It provided another point of convergence between his 
own story and the author’s, making the work more immersive and allowing the future 
president to imagine and live a higher stakes struggle against communism.   
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Chambers’ powerful description of how God led him to reject the party imprinted onto 
Reagan and became hallmarks of his speeches.  Chambers described realizing the 
“immense design” of his infant daughter’s ears as beginning his rejection of 
communism.376  In that moment, Chambers believed that “the finger of God was first laid 
upon [his] forehead.”377  Reagan found this passage moving, and used it frequently when 
discussing the Cold War.378  He favored the passage to such an extent, that when 
speechwriters included different sections of Witness in his speeches, he would cross them 
out and instead hand write the anecdote of Chambers and his daughter’s ear instead.379  
Reagan favored that story because it conveyed a powerful idea in a manner that was 
short, memorable, and easily understood. 
Reagan most prominently defined his view of the religious nature of the Cold War 
in his address to the National Association of Evangelicals in 1983.  In it, he labeled the 
Soviet Union “an evil empire.”380  The speech enraged Soviet leaders, though longtime 
Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin allowed that in it Reagan was simply 
“giving them a dose of their own medicine.”381  The Soviets perceived the speech as part 
of Reagan’s “uncompromising new ideological offensive” and indicative that he was 
“deliberately and persistently” seeking “a break with the past.”382   The Soviet perception 
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matched Reagan’s intent.  He intended his words to challenge the notion of moral 
equivalency in the Cold War.   
The “Evil Empire” speech was more than red meat for his political base and an 
attack on the USSR.  Reagan used it to challenge what he felt was the complacency of 
American evangelicals.  During his remarks he referenced C.S. Lewis’ The Screwtape 
Letters. Reagan accused the audience of allowing the titular demon to tempt them into 
“blithely declaring yourself above it all and label both sides at fault.”383  He highlighted 
the ongoing popularity of the Nuclear Freeze Movement among church groups as 
evidence of the group acting immorally and irreligiously giving in to “the temptation of 
pride.”384 
Reagan sought to use his address in Orlando and other speeches to counter those 
who would place “the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority” to the 
Soviets.385  He also made it clear that the latter was more important, and that “the real 
crisis” of the Cold War was a spiritual one.386  Reagan again quoted Chambers, noting 
that the only way to prevail over communism was to ensure that western world’s “faith in 
God and the freedom He enjoins” was greater than that of “communism’s faith in 
man.”387  Reagan then segued into his favorite Thomas Paine quote about the power of 
                                                 







the US “to begin the world over again,” linking the Founding Father’s ideas to 
Chambers’ and Reagan’s own conception of the Cold War.388 
The works of Arthur Koestler and Whittaker Chambers helped Reagan to broaden 
his personal experiences with communists and apply them to the Cold War.  The two 
authors held each other in high regard, with Koestler declaring Witness a book which if 
“unwritten would leave a hole in the world,” and Chambers’ holding Koestler in a higher 
esteem than other former communists due to Koestler’s Darkness at Noon.389  Upon the 
death of Chambers, Koestler noted that “the witness is gone; the testimony will stand,” an 
epitaph that Reagan borrowed when he posthumously award Chambers the Presidential 
Medal of Freedom in 1984.390  Reagan also recognized James Cagney in the ceremony 
for his work in the movie industry.  Cagney was also one of Reagan’s allies in SAG 
during the late 1940s and involved in his resistance against communist elements in the 
union.  It was Cagney who introduced Reagan to Koestler at an event at his Hollywood 
home.391  Reagan noted in presenting the awards, that the Medal of Freedom was for 
those “who changed the face and the soul” of the nation, something he certainly believed 
Chambers succeeded in.392 
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Chapter 3 Cowboy Values: Fighting the Right Way 
 
 During his farewell address, Reagan worried over the state of patriotism in 
America.  His “proudest” accomplishment over two terms was “the resurgence of 
national pride, that [he] called the new patriotism.”393  However, even though “this 
national feeling [was] good” Reagan feared it may not last.394  He believed Americans 
over the age of thirty-five grew up in a different country and he and older generations 
“absorbed, almost in the air, a love of country and appreciation of our institutions.”395  
The commonness of military service and popular culture created the patriotic air of 
Reagan described. 
 While Reagan believed patriotism started in the home, he recalled that children of 
the 1950s could look to their neighborhood and the “father down the street who fought in 
Korea or the family who lost someone in Anzio” to see the importance of sacrifice and 
the value of America.396  Failing that, popular culture would fill the void.  Regan believe 
the movies and television of his generation “celebrated democratic values and implicitly 
reinforced the idea that America was special.”397  Reagan identified the mid-1960s as a 
turning point, and feared that as the US entered the nineties, young parents no longer 
believed “unambivalent appreciation of America [was] the right thing to teach modern 
                                                 







children.”398  Due to this, “well-grounded patriotism [was] no longer the style” of popular 
culture.399  The passage of the speech revealed how Reagan viewed patriotism.  Although 
claiming he desired “an informed patriotism,” his view was one that lacked nuance.400  
He expected largely uncritical celebrations of both American history and the US military.   
 In The New American Militarism, historian Andrew Bacevich argues Reagan 
“beguiled himself and his supporters” through his depiction of “soldierly ideals” which 
offered a “trove of instructive and inspiring anecdotes.”401  The administration created a 
“sanitized version of US military history and fostered a romanticized portrait” of those in 
the armed forces.402  The sanitized narrative that Bacevich described came from Reagan’s 
genuine belief in both the virtue of military service and that American military forces 
during his administration fought on a new frontier.  In his view, they served on the edges 
of civilization, holding back a gulag, expansionist state that viewed “issues as freedom 
and human rights very differently.”403 
 Reagan believed in an idealized version of the American frontier.  Throughout his 
political career he spoke in glowing terms about the American West of the post-Civil War 
era.  Reagan, in many ways, believed the settlers and military force that extended federal 
control to the Pacific embodied the best of America.  However, his view of the west did 
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not come from a careful study of history, which would reveal not only the development 
of a post-war national identity, but also a deeply problematic racial legacy.  Instead, 
Reagan’s mythical west came from the adventure stories and westerns he read as a young 
man and in his Hollywood years.  These stories showcased a moral system that Reagan 
respected and sought to emulate. 
 He also paired his view of the American West with his reading of the imperialist 
literature of his youths.  The “Tommy” of Rudyard Kipling became indistinguishable 
from Burrough’s John Carter or a cavalry trooper in a western.  Reagan also linked the 
missions of each nation, equating British military action in India, Afghanistan, and Sudan 
with the American West.  In his mind, both nations extended freedom and civilization to 
otherwise neglected regions.  The open embrace of the idea of the “White Man’s Burden” 
would become a major component of his foreign policy, both in dealing with the Soviet 
Union and Europe and in how he approached issues in the developing world.  Reagan’s 
understanding of the frontier directly impacted his policy approach, as the stories he read 
dictated a code and set of actions he believed universally applicable.  The values he took 








Sage of the West: Louis L’Amour, Hondo, and the Frontier 
 
In the same ceremony he recognized Whitaker Chambers, Reagan celebrated the 
work of another author who influenced his worldview; Louis L’Amour.  As he presented 
the Medal of Freedom, Reagan noted L’Amour “played a leading role in shaping our 
national identity.”404  His westerns “portrayed the rugged individual and the deep-seated 
values” of the frontier.405  L’Amour’s books reminded Americans of their “potential as an 
exploring, pioneering, and free people.”406 
 These remarks echoed the ones Reagan made two years previously, when 
awarding L’Amour the Congressional Gold Medal, a first for a novelist.  Presenting the 
award at a barbeque for rodeo cowboys on the South Lawn, Reagan felt “the men and 
women of the Old West” possessed a “certain integrity of character” that still appealed to 
Americans.407  L’Amour and the cowboy attendees represented the “great tradition of the 
American West” to Reagan and he stressed how much the group meant to America.408  
The repeated references to western values in the two ceremonies Reagan hosted honoring 
L’Amour speaks to the importance of the mythologized West in defining his values and 
global outlook. 
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 Few brought the mythos of the Wild West to more Americans than Louis 
L’Amour.  Over the course of his career, he wrote over one hundred books, and at the 
time of his death, nearly two hundred million copies remained in circulation.409  A South 
Dakota native born in 1908, four years before Reagan, L’Amour was particularly proud 
of his unconventional education.  He left school halfway through the 10th grade at the age 
of fifteen due to a combination of financial necessity and a sense that he could achieve a 
superior education through reading books.410  L’Amour recalled growing up in a family 
that “was constantly reading” and credits the works of H.G. Wells, Rudyard Kipling, 
George Bernard Shaw, and other noted authors as his teachers.411 
 As a boy, he became fascinated with stories of the west, seeking to learn about the 
Sioux peoples, which had killed and scalped his grandfather in 1862.412 His maternal 
grandfather told stories of his own experiences in the Civil and Indians Wars that stayed 
with the future author and inspired fascination with the West.  Like Reagan, L’Amour 
discovered Burroughs’ John Carter stories as a boy and delighted in the depictions of 
Mars.  Burroughs received special mention in L’Amour’s official website biography and 
in his memoir Education of Wandering Man, where he noted that the Carter stories drove 
him to read more science fiction and non-fiction.413  Many of L’Amour’s protagonists 
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would bear strong resemblance to Carter.  They straddle the worlds of white and native 
societies and follow a moral code strongly evocative of Burroughs’ lost Virginian.  
 L’Amour’s young adulthood was like Burroughs’, each traveled widely working a 
variety of jobs.  Between 1930 and the publication of his first novel, L’Amour worked in 
ports, timber camps, mines, and on freighters, and compiled 51 wins as a professional 
boxer.414  The outbreak of World War II led to him to join the Army, and he attended 
Officer’s Candidate School at Camp Hood in Texas.  The possibility of “movement and 
action” led to his selection of service with tank destroyers, the modern equivalent of the 
cavalry of the post-Civil War West.415  He landed at Normandy on D-Day in his tank 
destroyer, and would earn four Bronze Stars for his actions in combat.416  After returning, 
he moved west and to continue his career as a writer, finding intermittent success selling 
short stories to pulp magazines. 
 His big break came after the publication of “The Gift of the Cochise” in a 1952 
issue Collier’s.  L’Amour’s short story focuses of an Apache warrior, a pioneer woman, 
and a “lean angry man” and the slow burning romance of the latter two.417  John Wayne 
read the story and purchased the rights to make it into a movie, entitled Hondo.  As part 
of the agreement, L’Amour received the opportunity to write the novelization of the 
screenplay, which greatly expanded on the themes and characters of the original short 
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story.  The successful novel, declared one of the top 25 westerns by the Western Writers 
Association of America, launched L’Amour’s career as a popular writer and started him 
on the path of becoming the most-read author of Westerns in the world.418 
 Hondo takes place amid escalating tensions between the Apache tribes of Arizona 
and New Mexico and the settlers in the area.  Hondo, a scout working with the army, 
comes across an isolated farmstead after narrowly escaping the Apache.  There, he meets 
Angie Lowe and her son, Johnny. He takes an immediate liking to both and assists with 
masculine duties that Angie’s missing husband had not fulfilled.  After he departs the 
ranch, an Apache war party led by Vittoro arrives.  Vittoro adopts Johnny into the tribe 
after the boy shows courage in trying to fight the warriors.  Hondo eventually returns to 
the ranch, but only after killing Ed Lowe when the latter tries to ambush him as revenge 
for a bar fight.  Angie, unaware of the nature of her husband’s death, claims Hondo is her 
husband to stave off Vittoro’s demand that she marry an Apache warrior.  As war 
between the Apache and the army breaks out, the ranch tries to remain neutral but 
eventually Hondo and Angie side with the Army and help defeat the Apaches before 
riding off as a family to Hondo’s ranch in California.419 
  Throughout the book, Hondo exhibits a strong moral compass and follows a set 
code.  He initially helps Angie and Johnny with the ranch not out of desire for gain but 
because it needed to be done.  Hondo admires that the ranch reflected “good solid work 
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that a man could be proud of” and felt compelled to help restore it.420  Similarly, he 
returns to the ranch at great risk because “no right kind of man would ever leave a 
woman alone” under threat from the Apache.421  Typically straightforward and honest, 
Hondo hates a lie but acknowledges there were times “a man has to lie if it makes it 
easier for someone.”422  This becomes relevant when Angie intervenes in a conversation 
between Hondo and Johnny to prevent Hondo from revealing that not only did Ed Lowe 
not die well, but that it was Hondo who killed the boy’s father.423   
The continuation of the lie about Lowe’s death fits into Hondo’s code because it 
allows him to remain on the ranch.  He can marry Angie, protecting her and becoming the 
father that Johnny needs.  While this also clearly benefits Hondo, his original willingness 
to throw away his own desire in service of the truth shows how seriously Hondo takes his 
code and reveals his motivation to be a good man regardless of consequence.  Only after 
Angie presents a case that the lie would be in service of a greater good does Hondo 
relent.   
The morally driven protagonist who seeks no reward but the accomplishment of 
“good” is a staple of both L’Amour’s work and westerns in general.  The simple morality 
of the western appealed strongly to Reagan, who believed that “the brief post-Civil War 
era when our blue-clad cavalry stayed on a wartime footing against the plains and desert 
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Indians” were the American equivalent of Kipling’s India “for color and romance.”424  As 
an actor, Reagan frequently lobbied to star in westerns to no avail.  John Wayne became a 
close friend, who staunchly supported Reagan during the strikes of the late 40s, and likely 
introduced Reagan to L’Amour’s stories.425   
The author quickly became Reagan’s favorite and remained so throughout 
Reagan’s life.  As he was recovering from cancer surgery in 1985, Reagan took the 
opportunity to read L’Amour’s newest book, Jubal Sackett, in his hospital bed.  The 
president’s love of the author was widely known, and he would often receive copies of 
L’Amour novels as gifts, which he enthusiastically accepted.426  When presenting the 
Congressional Gold Medal to the author, Reagan showed his familiarity with the 
honoree’s work.  When it came time to give the award, Reagan sought out L’Amour not 
realizing the author was already beside him.  Surprised to see the author standing there, 
Reagan quipped that L’Amour “sneaked up on [him] just like Bowdrie,” a Texas Ranger 
that featured in many L’Amour short stories.427  The off the cuff use of the character 
reflected Reagan’s deep knowledge of the author’s work.  Upon Reagan’s death, the only 
books that Nancy Reagan kept rather than donate were five by L’Amour.  Nancy 
explained that she saved them for herself “because Louis L’Amour was [her] husband’s 
favorite author.”428 
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Westerns provided more than escapist entertainment for Reagan. The values of 
characters like Hondo and Bowdrie were ones that Reagan sought to emulate both in his 
personal actions and in the policy of his administration.  While working on the National 
Security Council, Thomas Reed recalled that the President would often use books and 
movies as a shorthand to describe the policy outcomes he desired.  Reed argues that this 
was because Reagan “developed a few beliefs that worked quite well for him,” and using 
well-known pieces of popular culture to explain them allowed his staff to understand 
these beliefs fully and immediately.429 
Reagan’s habit of communicating beliefs through stories and culture also reveals 
how he thought about issues.  Books and movies provided a creative space for Reagan to 
work through his own beliefs and to measure against his own experiences.  A favorite 
policy touchstone for Reagan was Marshal Kane from the movie High Noon.430  In the 
movie, Kane opts to defend from a recently released group of bandits.  Despite his stature 
as a popular figure and his years protecting the town, no one rises to Kane’s calls to fight 
an obvious evil.  Instead, the townspeople encourage him to leave, and even blame him 
for the oncoming violence.  Rather than flee, Kane remains, and with the help of his new 
wife, defeats the bandits before dropping his star in the dust and riding away from the 
ungrateful townspeople. 
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For Reagan’s staff, a reference to Kane was a “code.”431  It meant that the 
President wanted to “do what’s right; deal with the risks; leave the recognition for 
others.”432  Reagan saw the US as the Marshal Kane of the Cold War.  His experiences 
and reading into communism left him convinced that it was a moral evil, and a good man, 
or in this case a good nation, had no choice but to oppose and vanquish it. That many 
argued that the USSR and US were morally equivalent appalled him but also played into 
Reagan’s sense of morality.  His administration would stand alone against the bandits and 
after prevailing, would ride off into the sunset content that it had done the greatest good. 
Reagan’s view of High Noon partially explains his administration’s actions in 
Central America.  In 1979, the Sandinistas, a communist guerilla movement backed by 
the Soviet Union and Cuba, overthrew the dictator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle.  US aid to the Somoza Regime dated back to the 1930s, when Anastasio’s 
grandfather Augusto Cesar Sandino used the US Marine-trained Nicaraguan National 
Guard to stage a coup.  By the 1970s the regime was internationally known for its 
corruption, with some US columnists labeling Somoza as “the world’s greediest 
dictator.”433  Somoza employed increasingly authoritarian and violent methods to defeat 
the Sandinista insurrection before eventually acceding to Sandanista demands to release 
prisoners and schedule free elections.  The brutal murder of ABC correspondent Bill 
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Stewart by government forces forced a final suspension of US aid to Nicaragua and 
expedited the victory of the Sandinistas.434 
Reagan largely refused to acknowledge US complicity in supporting the Somoza 
regime and could not empathize with why Nicaraguans may view the Sandinistas as a 
better option.  He strongly criticized Carter’s approach to the situation and viewed the 
situation as a repeat of Cuba.435  Reagan feared a communist government in the country 
would serve as a beachhead, leading to an expansion of the ideology in the region and 
placing it on the borders of the US.  In a speech, he argued that “Nicaragua is closer to 
Miami, New Orleans, San Antonio, Los Angeles, and Denver” than Washington DC.436  
The prominence of leftist movements in El Salvador, where communists took power in 
1979, Guatemala, and Honduras seemed to confirm his fears. 
Reagan believed Moscow backed communist movements throughout Latin 
America and as a result amalgamated the conflicts in the region as part of the broader 
Cold War.  A State Department issue paper from January of 1981, identified that the 
USSR was aware of Reagan’s concern over their involvement in the region and argued 
that while the Soviets would “not gratuitously undertake provocative actions” they would 
“probe…US tolerance of their political-military initiatives in the region.437  The paper 
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also concluded that the Soviets likely provided aid to communist insurgencies throughout 
the region. 
One week later, Soviet support for communist insurgencies was the topic of a 
National Security Council meeting.  During the meeting, Reagan continued his pre-
election criticisms of Carter and argued that the administration need to “change the 
attitude of our diplomatic corps.”438  He argued the US was too quick to “throw out our 
friends because they can’t pass the ‘saliva test’ on human rights.”439  Reagan wanted to 
“see that stopped” and advocated for lending more support for regimes like Allende’s in 
Chile, without worrying about their domestic actions.440 
Both popular opinion and the legislative branch disagreed.  Congress passed a 
series of Boland Amendments which limited the ability of the administration to support 
the Contras, who operated out of Honduras and sought to overthrow the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua.  Charles Hill, an advisor to Secretary of State George Shultz, believe that 
congressional action prevented Reagan from having any leverage over Nicaragua.441  He 
felt the action stemmed from a broader anti-war movement that existed not due to 
legitimate moral opposition, but rather from general anti-military and anti-American 
sentiment.442 
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Reagan believed the amendments originated due to an organize lobbying effort 
backed by the Sandinistas.  Writing to a retired Marine general in 1985, Reagan argued 
that a “sophisticated lobbying job” that was a “well-funded operation” backed by the 
Sandinistas prevented the administration from acting as aggressively as it wanted to in 
the region.443  He was not the only one to suspect illicit Nicaraguan activity behind the 
Boland Amendments.  Prescott Bush Jr, the brother of Vice-President George Bush, 
wrote CIA Director William Casey in 1984 to ask that he investigate Connecticut Senator 
Chris Dodd.  Bush believed that Dodd’s relationship with Bianca Jagger, ex-wife of 
Rolling Stone lead singer Mick Jagger was suspicious.  He alleged Jagger “was trained in 
Cuba by the Cuban equivalent of the KGB” to work with the Sandinistas.444  Dodd’s 
relationship with the human right’s activist and actress explained “Dodd’s hand-ringing 
[sic] dovish attitude on the Salvadoran situation,” as Bush felt Jagger was the source of 
the “considerable amount of disinformation” he believed Dodd operated under.445  Casey 
responded to Bush that the proposed operation was “somewhat out of our bailiwick” and 
referred him to FBI Director Bill Webster.446  The conspiracy theories around the Boland 
Amendments ignored the real reasons for the restrictions.  Congress acted out of fears of 
executive overreach leading to another Vietnam, the absence of viable partners in the 
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region, and a sense that the administration exaggerated the nature of the communist 
threat. 
Reagan agonized over how to bring down the Sandinistas.  In an October 1981 
diary entry, he referenced a meeting of the National Security Policy Group on the 
Caribbean and Central America that “left [him] with the most profound decision [he had] 
ever had to make.”447  He described Central America as the “world’s next hotspot” and 
Nicaragua as “an armed camp supplied by Cuba and threatening a communist takeover” 
of the region.448 He felt the amendments wrongly restrained the ability of the US to take 
actions he viewed as morally right and essential to the preservation and expansion of 
freedom. 
During a NSC meeting in November, worried that the US would be unable to 
“solve this problem with Congress and public opinion being” against direct intervention 
and aid.449  He speculated about taking covert action and specifically requested the 
members of the NSC identify potential operations that “would be truly disabling and not 
just flea bites” against Nicaragua.450  Reagan stated bluntly he did not want to back down 
or accept defeat on the issue.451  His belief in the need to support anti-communist groups 
led to the creation of the Reagan Doctrine in 1985.  During his State of the Union 
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Address, Reagan argued the US could “not break faith with those who are risking their 
lives… to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from 
birth.”452  In both his public comments and internal meetings, Reagan identified support 
to the Contras as a moral necessity. 
Reagan’s frequent reference to High Noon as an exemplar of policy and his 
declarations about the imperative of anti-Sandinista action sent a clear signal to many in 
the administration.  John Poindexter, one of Reagan’s National Security Advisors, 
recalled the president “had very simple straightforward principles” which he used to 
provide policy guidance.453  Reagan did not concern himself with specifics and “put great 
trust and confidence in his staff to care of the details.”454  On the issue of the Contras, 
Poindexter and others on the NSC took Reagan’s statements as an imperative to act and 
illegally circumvented the Boland Amendments to provide aid to the rebel forces.  Once 
publicly revealed, the Iran-Contra scandal threatened to bring down the entire 
administration. 
While Reagan correctly viewed the Sandinista regime as an autocratic regime 
with strong ties to Cuba, he failed to acknowledge that the Contras were not morally 
better.  The groups engaged in terrorist activity, committed human rights violations, and 
raised much of their funds through drug trafficking.  They were not the white hat allies of 
a marshal or innocent villagers needing protection from a heroic figure.  Similarly, 
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Reagan administration support for authoritarian and violent regimes like that of Rios 
Montt in Guatemala demonstrated a hypocrisy inherent in his rhetoric and value system.  
 Reagan was fundamentally unable to see past the Cold War to empathize with and 
understand the issues facing Latin Americans.  As a result, the administration, believing it 
was acting as a moral and stabilizing force, did great harm.  Reagan’s use of westerns to 
guide policy in this area was also racially problematic given the genre’s frequent 
villainous portrayal of indigenous and Spanish-speaking peoples. 
The importance of High Noon to Reagan is somewhat ironic, given the 
environment surrounding its production.  Carl Foreman, the screenwriter, expected that 
High Noon would be his last movie, due to his appearance before HUAC.455  Marshal 
Kane’s character represents those facing the blacklist and the bandits are the members of 
HUAC.  The townspeople who refuse to help stand in for the broader Hollywood 
community.  In Foreman’s script, Reagan, as head of SAG, would not be Marshal Kane, 
but rather one of the cowardly townspeople who quietly abet the bandits.  John Wayne 
took a starkly different view of the final scene of the movie than Reagan.  He described 
the site of Gary Cooper dropping and stepping on a marshal’s star as “the most un-
American thing” he had ever seen, very different from Reagan’s view of it as the western 
ideal.456 
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Reagan’s misinterpretation, or ignorance, of the allegory Foreman inserted into 
High Noon shows the risk inherent in becoming over reliant on fiction as shorthand.  It 
opened the possibility of misunderstanding between himself and his staff, as those he 
worked with could have an entirely different interpretation of the work referenced.  While 
longtime advisors, like Thomas Reed, would know how Reagan interpreted the story, 
those without years of experience and personal knowledge had more difficulty.   
David Stockman, Reagan’s Director of the Office of Management and Budget, expressed 
frustration with the constant use of the “presidential anecdote.”457  The New York Times 
review of Stockman’s memoir, The Triumph of Politics, noted that Reagan’s use of 
stories typically reflected that he had “totally misunderstood the preceding 
conversation.”458  Reagan’s reluctance to engage in a nuanced policy discussions became 
a source of frustration to those outside his immediate circle, and the lack of clear 
guidance caused staffers to interpret his words and stories in the way most favorable to 
their project. 
 
The Korean Frontier and Hills to Die On: Reagan and Heroic Sacrifice 
  
 Another aspect of westerns that Reagan demonstrated a fondness for was the 
heroic last stand.  Many of the moments he referenced from these novels involved 
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cavalrymen dying heroically and exhorting their brethren to greater heights.  When 
addressing cadets at the United State Military Academy in 1981, Reagan referenced a 
story by James Warner Bellah. Although he was most famous for his work as 
screenwriter of the John Wayne films Rio Grande, Fort Apache, and She Wore a Yellow 
Ribbon, Bellah also worked with Reagan on a project entitled Battle Mountain and wrote 
an episode of General Electric Theater.459  In addition to his work in Hollywood, Bellah 
also found significant success writing western novels. 
 In his speech to the cadets, Reagan referred to Bellah as “our Rudyard Kipling 
because of his stories of our Army on the frontier.”460 The characterization of the post-
Civil War era in this light matches Reagan’s autobiographical musing that the period was 
America’s version of Kipling’s romanticized British Empire.  In his speech, Reagan drew 
on Bellah’s tale of a dying commander who passes his command to a subordinate.  As he 
hands command over in “a poignant scene,” the dying man tells his subordinate to be 
prepared to “do the nasty job that has to be done…or forever after there will be the taste 
of ashes in your mouth.”461  Reagan equated the fictional passing of command to the 
“torch of leadership” that the graduating cadets were receiving.462  In linking the two, the 
president sought to impart the same morality he took from westerns to the new officers.  
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 He also sought to link the new officers to the British Army of the late-1800s.  As 
a boy, Reagan’s mother introduced him to the poetry of Kipling, which he took a strong 
liking too.  “If,” Kipling’s paean to British values, became Reagan’s favorite.463  The 
poem captured the ethic that Reagan would later find romantic and appealing in westerns.  
In “If,” Kipling offered advice on how to not only win “the Earth and everything in it,” 
but also how to “be a Man.”464  He exhorts the reader to keep confidence in themselves 
and their actions, even “when all men doubt you,” to do what is right regardless of the 
cost and perception of others.465  Reagan wanted the graduates of West Point to adopt the 
frontier mentality of Kipling and Bellah, believing that confidence in themselves and 
their code would help them in their career and to serve in confusing and treacherous 
environments. 
 Intention and action were critical to Kipling.  His poems are frequently 
bittersweet, showing British soldiers in impossible positions, but praising their 
willingness to do what they have to do.  He extended this sentiment to Americans.  In 
“The White Man’s Burden,” Kipling argued that the US should venture into the world 
and take on colonies even though it would only yield “the blame of those ye better, the 
hate of those ye guard,” and in all likelihood, “sloth and heathen folly” would bring the 
endeavors to failure.466 However, doing so would end America’s childish days” and 
                                                 
463 “Reagan’s Country” July 2012, ReaganFoundation.org accessed 07JUL17. 
464 Rudyard Kipling, “If” 
465 Kipling, “If” 
466 Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden: Or the United States in the Philippines” 
129 
 
prove the nation’s readiness to assume a role as a great power.467  For Kipling, it was 
more important to do what was expected than succeed.  The honor was in the attempt.  
The poet’s descriptions of British soldiers valiantly struggling on the frontier of the 
empire captured Reagan’s imagination in the same way Burroughs’ John Carter stories 
did.  He could easily substitute British infantry in Afghanistan or the Sudan with US 
cavalrymen fighting on the plains.  Poems like “Gunga Din” and “Fuzzy Wuzzy” 
entranced him with their mix of heroic sacrifice, respect for foes, and defending 
civilization.   
Reagan enjoyed this, though likely missed the bittersweet tone of much of 
Kipling’s work.  He clearly expected honorable attempts to yield positive results in a way 
that Kipling did not.  In a speech to administration officials in 1988, Reagan noted that as 
he prepared to leave office he felt “that what Kipling said of another time and place [was] 
true today for America.”468  The nation stood “at the opening verse of the opening page 
of the chapter of endless possibilities.”469  However, here he was taking a quote from 
Kipling somewhat out of context.  The poet was not referring to the British Empire, but 
rather to airplanes.470  The romantic way Reagan viewed Kipling’s work only captures a 
part of the author’s intent but spoke to the how Reagan saw the role of America.  He, in 
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many ways, embraced the “civilizing” mission that Kipling charged the US with in “The 
White Man’s Burden” as the natural and rightful job of Americans.   
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt argued that Kipling was the “author of 
imperialist legend” whose work had little to do with the “realities of British 
Imperialism.”471  She accuses Kipling of knowingly engaging in “hypocrisy or racism” in 
propagating the “White Man’s Burden” and that, “only those who had never been able to 
outgrow their boyhood ideals” would take him seriously.472  The result was the 
infantilization and preservation of western ideals.473  Reagan did have difficulty escaping 
his boyhood values, though the critique that this was infantile is perhaps unfair.  He did 
reappraise throughout his life but consistently arrived at the same conclusion.  Part of the 
reason for this is that the works of Bellah, L’Amour, and others owe a large debt to 
Burroughs and Kipling and speak to the same ideas.  Reagan’s narrow selection of 
readings led to affirmation bias.  The reaffirmation of his own experience and thoughts 
led him to continue to view Americans in a consistent way, and as a result, he maintained 
an unchanging view of what the right actions of a man were. 
The narrow reading also led to unconscious identification with the racial 
undertones of Kipling, Burroughs, and westerns.  Typically, the works portrayed non-
whites as villains or simple victims who required rescue.  A common thread between 
Burroughs’ Barsoom, Kipling’s India, and the American West was that the protagonists 
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engaged in a “civilizing” mission, often directly against the desires of indigenous 
peoples.  However, the stories’ heroes were confident in their code and believed the local 
peoples would eventually be grateful for the intervention and development.  They 
effectively suppressed local agency in the name of ideology. 
Reagan displayed a similar tendency when engaging in foreign policy outside of 
Europe and the Soviet Union.  In dealing with Soviet Union, Reagan’s policy and rhetoric 
displayed a subtle understanding and nuance that was absent in his administration’s 
approach to Latin America and Africa.  Reagan’s actions with regard to apartheid 
regimes in southern Africa demonstrated an embrace of the “White Man’s Burden” 
rhetoric and a hypocritical denial of freedom in the name of broader Cold War objectives.  
In his syndicated newspaper column, Reagan frequently raided the issue of apartheid in 
Rhodesia and South Africa.  He consistently advocated for movement towards majority 
rule but criticized “high voltage rhetoric by the left” and their demands for immediate 
transition.474 
Reagan was accurate in his belief that the ZANU-PF of Rhodesia and ANC of 
South Africa had ties to communism and the Soviet Union, but wrong about the extent of 
those ties and the popularity of the movements.  In a 1977 radio broadcast, Reagan 
argued that Robert Mugabe, the leader of the ZANU-PF, could not win an election and 
had “no substantial following among black Rhodesians.”475  He used his syndicated 
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column to continue the attack, alleging Mugabe and his party rejected “all conciliatory 
moves by the Ian Smith government” on orders from Moscow.476  The attack greatly 
overstated the relationship between the Soviet Union and Mugabe and failed to recognize 
why black nationalist parties would rightly doubt Smith’s intention and dedication to 
giving up power.  Reagan was correct in his belief that Mugabe cared only about personal 
power, as after the elections Mugabe ruled until 2017 and led an autocratic, corrupt, and 
violent regime.  However, his misreading of the influence of the Soviet Union on the 
region led him to favor a gradualist approach that would have extended the life of the 
racist and autocratic rule of Smith. 
As president, Reagan reacted in a similar fashion with regards to South Africa.  
He called Bishop Desmond Tutu “naïve” for requesting the US suspend aide to the 
apartheid state.477  In a letter to South African President Pieter Botha, Reagan pushed the 
leader to implement change but also asserted the country “must not become a playing 
field for Soviet ambitions.”478  The letter struck a sympathetic tone and Reagan promised 
to do more to publicly support Botha and publicly credit him with moving towards 
reform.  Reagan’s words indicate a willingness of to allow Cold War priorities to take 
precedent over individual freedom in a region on the periphery of the conflict. 
In 1986, Reagan addressed the nation and attempted to prevent Congress from 
passing sanctions on South Africa.  While acknowledging that South Africa fell “terribly 
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short on the scales of economic and social justice,” Reagan argued that imposing 
sanctions would play into the interests of the Soviet Union.479  He expressed fears that 
immediate transition or revolutionary violence would lead to a communist government 
and give the Soviets access to “vital minerals… for which the West has no other secure 
source of supply.”480  Reagan’s efforts failed, and Congress passed the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 over his veto.  Republicans held the majority in the Senate at 
the time, indicating Reagan was out of step with his own party on the issue. 
Reagan’s language and actions regarding southern Africa indicate an acceptance of 
“White Man’s Burden.”  He believed in individual freedom for the people of the region, 
but only on a timeline dictated by US success in the Cold War.  Black South Africans and 
Rhodesians would need to delay exercising their rights until the US completed it global 
mission of civilization.  Reagan felt patience and sacrifice would led to stability and 
eventually gratitude on the part of Africans towards the US. 
 Sacrifice was a frequent theme of Reagan’s speeches.  He often used stories that 
ended in death.  The doomed B-17 from his addresses at the Medal of Honor Society in 
1983 and at the 1951 commencement of William Woods College offer examples of this.  
Soldier’s deaths were also a theme of his own writing as a young man.  A short story he 
wrote entitled “Killed in Action,” ends with the death of a World War I veteran.  The 
story focuses on an exchange between two men, David Bering the doomed man, and 
                                                 




James Edward, another soldier.  Edward speaks ill of the war and its purpose, while 
Bering insists the cause is just and describes the future he put on hold to fight.  Upon 
learning that Bering delayed finishing his degree at Harvard and marrying his hometown 
sweetheart, Edward is moved by “the talk of sacrifice and glory” but curses that the world 
demands such sacrifice.481 
 Combat erupts at the end of the conversation, and in the ensuing battle Bering 
saves Edward’s life before suffering a wound in a gas attack.  Edward is unable to find 
Bering after the battle and hears nothing of him until reading about Bering’s death in a 
newspaper years later.  In the intervening years, Bering became a tramp and died under 
the wheels of a train he was trying to board.  Upon his death, no one claims his body, 
leading to his burial in a potter’s field.  While the story ends tragically, Reagan’s writing 
puts the focus on the nobility of Bering’s sacrifice rather than the wasted potential and 
destruction of life.  Edwards lives because of Bering, and is able to honor the life and 
sacrifice as a result.  In Reagan’s telling, Bering’s actions are heroic and like a hero from 
a western, he needs no reward beyond the personal knowledge that he acted as a good 
man.482 
 While on the surface, it would seem odd for Reagan, who avoided conflict and 
disliked sad stories, to use and talk about military death as often as he did.  However, he 
viewed those anecdotes of heroic sacrifice as happy endings.  They were the fulfilment of 
                                                 





the masculine ideal he gleaned from the works of Burroughs, Kipling and others.  Dying 
in the name of the right cause, with honor preserved, was desirable and worthy of 
celebration in Reagan’s eyes.  It appealed to his romanticism and stems in part from his 
readings of science fiction, westerns, and other adventure stories.  His frequent use of 
James Michener’s The Bridges at Toko-Ri shows how Reagan viewed the members of the 
American military and the nobility of the last stand. 
 Michener’s novella focuses on a carrier group in the Korean War with the mission 
of destroying a group of bridges critical to the efforts of the Chinese to support the war 
on the peninsula.  The targets were in “a deadly combination of mountains and narrow 
passes and festering gun emplacements” which made destroying the bridges an 
exceptionally difficult mission.483  Admiral George Tarrant, the task force commander, 
believes that the destruction of such a fortified target will not only hurt the supply lines of 
the Chinese, but also “convince the Reds we’ll never stop… never give in… never 
weaken in our purpose.”484  The double blow to the communist’s means and will would 
hasten American victory in the war. 
 Lt. Harry Brubaker, a fighter pilot and the primary protagonist, lacks the 
admiral’s confidence.  He was recalled to active service against his will, leaving behind a 
successful law practice, wife and two daughters in Denver.  However, despite the coerced 
nature of his service, he performs superbly and is one of the top pilots in the squadron.  
                                                 




While Brubaker does his job well, he still harbors resentment towards the American 
people, noting that “in Denver nobody even knew there was a war on.”485  When 
questioned about why, despite regulations prohibiting it, he encouraged his wife to visit 
him on the upcoming shore leave in Japan, Brubaker argues that “she couldn’t take 
America anymore… we gave up our home, my job, the kids.  Nobody else in Denver 
gave up anything.”486 
 Admiral Tarrant dislikes the excuse, referring to it as “rubbish,” and noting that 
“society is held together by the efforts… and sacrifices of only a few.”487  However, 
Tarrant is fond of Brubaker, who reminds him of his sons who died in WWII, and allows 
Brubaker to avoid punishment and even makes a point to talk with Nancy Brubaker about 
what her husband does while on leave.  The conversation with Tarrant prompts Nancy to 
discuss the war in detail with Harry and “whispered until dawn… talking of a war so 
terrible that for them it equaled any in history.”488 By morning, they still can find “no 
explanation of why they had been chosen to bear the burden of war” and continue to 
express resentment for the apathy of Americans towards the Korean War.489 
 That morning the family goes to a bathhouse and while bathing nude are startled 
by a Japanese family that enters and disrobes as well.  The initial awkwardness fades 
because of the warmth of the room and the openness of the Japanese and the two families 
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socialize despite the language barrier.  Watching the children, Harry reflects that in 1944 
he “hated the Japanese and had fought valiantly against them” but over time “hatreds 
dissolved.”490  The realization helped him understand a small piece of why he had to 
fight. 
 Upon returning from shore leave, Brubaker serves as the wingman to the 
squadron commander on a reconnaissance of the bridges.  Seeing the defenses in person 
led to a rebirth of the fear he felt about the war.  Only after a sleepless night, spent 
writing to Nancy and in the piston room of the carrier is Brubaker able to control his fear 
and embark on the mission.  The squadron successfully destroys the bridges, but while 
engaging a secondary target Brubaker’s plane takes damage to its fuel tank forcing him to 
land behind enemy lines.  Communist forces surge into the area and Brubaker dies in the 
resulting firefight.  At the exact moment of his death, he thinks of his girls and then 
“understands in some fragmentary way the purpose of his being in Korea.”491 
 The news of Brubaker’s death shakes Tarrant, and he is unable to find the right 
words to write to Nancy.  After challenging the squadron commander about the 
correctness of hitting a secondary target, and becoming convinced it was a good mission, 
Tarrant reflects on the men who serve under him.  Watching another flight leave, he asks 
himself “why is America lucky enough to have such men” and wonders “where did we 
get such men” who were able to risk their lives for little recognition and without fully 
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understanding what they were fighting for.492  Michener’s novella resonated strongly with 
Reagan, and Admiral Tarrant’s closing question of “where did we get such men” became 
a staple of his speeches addressing service members.   
In February of 1981, just a month after taking office, Reagan presented the Medal of 
Honor to Master Roy Benavidez in a ceremony at the Pentagon.  Reagan intended the 
event to set a different tone in civil-military relations from that of the Carter 
administration.  Harold Brown, Carter’s Secretary of Defense, had planned to give the 
award in a quieter ceremony, without presidential involvement.493  In elevating the profile 
of the presentation and by personally reading the citation, a presidential first, Reagan was 
seeking to bridge the divide between the military and broader population caused by the 
Vietnam War. 
 The event would show that “the American people as a whole… respected honored 
and appreciated” the military.494  In his remarks he draws on Michener’s book, which 
explored themes of the civil-military divide, and Reagan talks of how the author wrote 
“movingly of the heroes who fought in the Korean conflict.”495  Reagan then quotes 
Admiral Tarrant’s question of “where did we get such men,” and noted he “asked that 
same question when our POW’s were returned from savage captivity in Vietnam.”496  
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Reagan, unlike Tarrant, arrived at an answer.  America got such men where it had 
“always found them, in our villages and towns, on our city streets, in our shops, and on 
our farms.”497 
 Reagan offered the same anecdote about Michener’s “commanding officer who 
thinks about self-sacrifice” during his remarks to the nation for Armed Forces Day in 
both 1981 and 1982.  He also provided the same answer to Tarrant’s question in his 1982 
remarks that he did at the ceremony honoring Benavidez.498  During a 1983 ceremony to 
honor Hispanic Americans in the military, Reagan again used Michener’s words to speak 
to the “lonely and sometimes thankless life endured by those who wear their country’s 
uniform.”499  That there are no Hispanic characters in The Bridges at Toko-Ri make it an 
odd reference for Reagan to employ, especially given that every other anecdote in the 
speech directly referenced Hispanics in the military.  However, his use of the story in this 
context, despite its lack of diversity, showed how important he felt its message was and 
that the core moral was universally relatable. 
 It is unsurprising that Reagan felt drawn to The Bridges of Toko-Ri.  Much like 
Hondo, it became a successful Hollywood film that starred a friend of Reagan’s, William 
Holden.  Holden was the best man, and one of only two guests, at Reagan’s wedding to 
Nancy.  However, despite the film, and Reagan’s personal connection to it, he always 
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took care to cite Michener when introducing the story of Admiral Tarrant’s lonely vigil.  
This speaks to Reagan’s appreciation of the author, and Michener’s role as a voice that 
strongly supported the US in the Cold War. 
 Historian Christina Klein argues in Cold War Orientalism that Michener “put his 
writing in service to the government.”500  He outspokenly supported US policy and 
served as a “paraphraser,” who translated “Cold War rhetoric into popular narrative.”501  
Michener’s writing made the US Government’s position in the Cold War readily 
understandable and brought it into the homes of millions of Americans, making him an 
invaluable resource for US leadership.  While serving in the House of Representatives, 
Medal of Honor recipient Daniel Inouye argued that Michener was “one of our most 
effective anti-Communist weapons in the worldwide struggle.”502  His writing had, in the 
eyes of the future senator, made many parts of Asia immune to the danger of 
Communism.  Michener did this not only through his fiction, with novellas like The 
Bridges at Toko-Ri, but also through his work as a journalist. 
 Michener served as a war correspondent during the Korean War and his 
dispatches typically chronicled the heroism and struggle of the military personnel in 
general, and the Navy in particular.  One 1952 dispatch told his readers about the exploits 
of Commander Paul Gray, a Navy pilot with the call sign “Bald Eagle.”  Describing Gray 
as “completely bald, handsome, and apparently without fear,” Michener recounts how the 
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pilot had been shot down three times and forced to bail out into the ocean, “where 
exposure kills a man in less than 20 minutes.”503  Admiral Perry, the commander of the 
task force Gray serves in, decides to ground the pilot, noting no man was “required to risk 
his life more than four times in a row.”504  However, before Gray gets word of his 
grounding he departed on another mission where he was shot down for a fourth time.  
Despite this, he still demanded to return to the Essex hoping to fly again, but Michener 
noted “from now on paper work” would comprise the commander’s responsibilities.505 
 Michener also depicted the new technology employed by the US military in its 
wars.  His article about the B-52 introduced the venerable platform to the American 
public for the first time.506  In Toko-Ri he describes the latest jet fighters in poetic terms.  
The “singing beauty of the jet” allows it to speed “almost silently” and as a result cheat 
death by flying in “the vast upper reaches of the world.”507  This technology turns the 
war-torn landscape of Korea into something else, as the ability of Brubaker to defeat the 
“savage, cheated mountains” containing the bridges lets him look on Korea “with a 
kindlier eye.”508  The jet puts him beyond the war, giving the illusion, later shattered, that 
it cannot touch him. 
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 The depiction of helicopters in Michener’s journalism and fiction also builds a 
sense of American power and inevitability.  Commander Gray was rescued from the grip 
of frozen waters on five occasions to fly again.  The character of Mike Forney in The 
Bridges at Toko-Ri, wears a Kelly-green scarf and hat as he flies search and rescue 
missions, allowing the hypothermic pilots to put a human face to the marvel of 
technology coming to save them.  Michener combined advanced technology with 
American character to showcase the “powerful assembly” that was a carrier group.509  In 
doing so, he sought to build in Americans minds a sense that with the right men and 
technology, the United States could do anything. 
 Michener’s approach helped Reagan expand his view of American power and 
capability.  The character of Brubaker fit into the mold of a cowboy protagonist, who 
does the right thing for its own sake regardless of consequence.  After flying the 
reconnaissance mission, Brubaker receives several opportunities to ground himself and 
not fly against the bridges.  He chooses not to because while in the Navy, you “could 
weasel out at any time, but within the essence of your conscience lived the memory of 
other men no less afraid” who would still carry out the mission.510  This sentiment is the 
same uttered by Bellah’s fallen cavalryman and provided a tangible link for Reagan 
between modern servicemen, and those of his idealized frontier. 
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 Michener evoked the works of Kipling and the authors of westerns by portraying 
those serving in the American military as a small, noble group sacrificing themselves in 
the name of civilization.  Tarrant explicitly argues in Bridges at Toko-Ri, that it is the 
efforts and sacrifices of the few that hold together society.  The world, according to 
Tarrant, depends on “the voluntary men.”511  The use of the term “voluntary” is telling, 
given the widespread conscription of the Korean War, and the fact that Brubaker is a 
conscript of sorts in the novel.  Michener used the idea of “voluntary men” to describe an 
expectation of behavior and the sense that being a man was more than biology.  It 
required honor as well, which Michener, through Tarrant, defined that as the willingness 
to sacrifice in an unnecessary but inevitable war.512  This also evokes Kipling’s “If,” 
where the poet tells the reader that if he can achieve a seemingly impossible list of things 
“you’ll be a Man, my son.”513  The capitalization of “Man” in the poem adds an 
emphasis, implying that manhood stems from action rather than biology and age.  
 The role of women in Michener’s view was to define civilization.  Again, through 
Tarrant, he noted a man fought to defend civilization, which was “composed mainly of 
things that women and children want.”514  Women were “invariably right,” even though it 
was “bright, lovely” women who wanted to end the war.515  However, they would also be 
responsible for goading their husbands into fighting for freedom, and thus defined peace 
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as “no more war… but no humiliation” as would come from an unjust peace or 
occupation.516  The portrayal of men’s and women’s roles in this manner matches the 
works of Kipling, Burroughs, and others Reagan read in the consistent portrayal of 
women as the embodiment of civilization.  They also shared the notion that the role of a 
true man was to fight and sacrifice, even if the threat was obtuse, distant, or unclear. 
 Much of Reagan’s 1952 commencement address at William Woods College could 
as easily come from Michener.  Addressing the all-female graduating class in Fulton, 
Missouri, site of Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech,” Reagan lauded the heroism of 
soldiers fighting in Korea.  He told the women that “the boys your age [were] tonight 
standing…in Korea” and General Ridgway “spoke of their courage” recently when 
Ridgway took over the role of Supreme Allied Commander of NATO from Dwight 
Eisenhower.517  While it was likely there were boys the girl’s age in Fulton, it was those 
in Korea that the graduating class “was going to marry” and “teach, and heal, and 
mother” the sons of.518  This is because, those serving were Michener’s “voluntary men” 
who were sacrificing for civilization.  The women in the audience could help “push back 
against the darkness” as well, though through birthing and raising sons of those men 
rather than dying for a cause.519 
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 In the speech, Reagan also noted that many at the time were decrying the 
“momism” that led to a high number of men who “have been unable or unwilling to face 
the test of war in behalf of their country.”520  He responds by telling a series of anecdotes 
about men who met the call and died doing so.  The audience could combat the bad sort 
of “momism” by meeting their own feminine responsibilities to choose men who had 
fought and support them in their fight.  This debate reflected in part the same civil-
military discord reflected by Michener when he detailed how most in the US avoided 
talking about the Korean War even as men died on their behalf. 
 The civil-military relationship appeared with increasing frequency in books 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s, in large part due to the vast expansion of both the 
military and the US role in the world.  Michener’s work stands with classic political 
science texts like Samuel Huntington’s 1957 work The Soldier and the State and science 
fiction like Robert Heinlein’s 1959 Starship Troopers in debating what service meant and 
what the role of the military was in safeguarding a free society.  It is likely Reagan read 
both while traveling via train to General Electric plants and found himself in agreement 
with the need to defend civilization and utilize “objective control” which grants 
significant autonomy to the military.   
 Reagan found ideas of voluntary sacrifice noble as evidenced by his support of 
the All-Volunteer Force.  Bacevich argues in The New American Militarism that 
Reagan’s vocal and consistent support for it reflected his sense that those who serving 




were patriots, heroes, idealists.521  He viewed the issue as a moral one.   Amid calls to 
reinstate the draft, Regan wrote to Senator Hatfield that “only in the most severe national 
emergency [did] the government had a claim to the mandatory service of its young.522  
Historian H.W. Brands notes Reagan made similar statements at the height of the 
Vietnam War.  Speaking on an ABC television show, Issues and Answers, Reagan 
admitted he “questioned the whole business of the draft” and feared it would make the 
“uniform a symbol of servitude.”523  While he believed in the justness of the call he felt 
the US government had the responsibility to make service desirable through financial and 
moral compensation.   
 In a 1979 article entitled “Do Your Kids Belong to Uncle Sam,” Reagan wrote 
against restoring the draft or establishing a program of universal service.  He noted that 
American service members were “experts” in “understanding the cause and effects of 
inflation” due to the paucity of their pay.524  Increasing pay and benefits would draw 
people into the military.  Increased public regard for the military would have a similar 
effect.  Bacevich notes Reagan’s language about the military established a “new standard 
of civic responsibility” by encouraging the public to speak positively about the 
military.525 This undemanding standard would not “entail sacrifice on the part of the 
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average American,” but did create a public environment favorable to the building and 
employment of military strength.526  The expansion of the rhetoric of “supporting the 
troops” did much to restore confidence in the military after the prominent failures of the 
1970s, but also simplified how Americans interacted with their armed forces.  The shift to 
the all-volunteer force and forced patriotic rhetoric excused Americans from thinking 
critically about the military’s role in society and the use of American force throughout the 
world.  Reagan set a precedent future administrations built upon with detrimental effects 
to the civil-military relationship and US foreign policy. 
The ability of authors like Michener and Heinlein to put theoretical concepts into 
narrative form helped Reagan to both understand them and to project his own experiences 
and beliefs onto a larger stage.  Reagan felt a kinship with Kipling’s soldiers, Bellah’s 
cavalrymen, L’Amour’s cowboys, and Michener’s pilots because of his own service.  In 
the author’s work, he saw that the principles he believed in were universal and timeless.  
He believed the same core values linked the frontiers of India, the American West, and 
Korea and indelibly connected those who served on the frontier despite the passage of 
time.  In each case, they were a small band and the fate of the world rested upon them 
doing the “right thing.”  To Reagan, the willingness of these men to do so, with what he 
viewed as insufficient reward, reflected the strength of western civilization; the ability to 
raise men who will sacrifice everything for other’s sake.  His reading of fiction, solidified 
this personal belief into one of the core components of his political message 




Creative Spaces and Projection 
 
 Much as he did with Whitaker Chambers and Louis L’Amour, Reagan took time 
in 1983 to honor James Michener accomplishments.  He could not award the writer the 
Presidential Medal of Freedom, since Gerald Ford had done so before leaving office in 
1977.527  Instead, Reagan proposed the establishment of new medal, modeled on the 
National Science Medal, to honor both those who create art but also those who support it 
financially.528  Michener received recognition for his grants to the Iowa Writers 
Workshop hosted by the University of Iowa, the same workshop which helped propel 
Kurt Vonnegut to fame.529 
 In his remarks at the luncheon, Reagan spoke of why arts and humanities were 
worthy of honoring.  He argued that they “teach us who we are and what we can be,” in 
addition to providing “the core of culture” and “the foundation” from which the US 
reaches out to the world.530  These comments captured what books meant to Reagan.  In a 
period that saw his political allegiances shift and then harden, the printed words of others 
played an essential role in both affirming Reagan’s own experience and beliefs and 
provided a foundation to engage with others in a broader, but meaningful way. 
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 Reagan experienced communist infiltration of unions and advocacy groups in the 
late 1940s.  He came to view them as subversives, who sought to restrict free speech and 
expression, operate against the will of the majority, and prone to violence when events 
turned against them.  The words of Chambers and Koestler showed him that his 
experiences, far from being outliers, were the norm for communist movements.  They 
demonstrated the scale of the problem in a way that Reagan did not necessarily grasp 
before, helping to shift his rhetoric from the generic anti-communism expected of a 
Hollywood actor in 1950 to that of existential struggle seen in his 1952 commencement 
address and then throughout his political career. 
 Chambers also built upon Reagan’s childhood reading of Harold Bell Wright.  
Though Chambers credits Les Miserables the actions of the Bishop in the book are 
indistinguishable from Reagan’s sense of the “practical” Christianity in That Printer of 
Udell’s.  That acts based Christianity sparked Chambers to leave communism, taught 
Reagan that faith could be more than the rallying point suggested by the civic religion of 
the 1950s.  It could be a powerful weapon to rollback communism.  It underpinned not 
only the harsh rhetoric of his “Evil Empire” speech, and pursuit of closer relations with 
Vatican, but also his constant pressure on smaller issues like the evangelicals in the US 
embassy basement that the Soviets continually denied exit visas too. 
 Fiction in the 1950s also reinforced and expanded Reagan’s sense of honor and 
masculinity.  Raised on the works of Kipling and Burroughs, he maintained a romantic 
sense about what self-denial and sacrifice meant.  The works of Michener and L’Amour 
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built upon this foundation by continuing to present Reagan with heroes who consistently 
chose the obvious right despite the cost to themselves.  For him, this meant the need to 
talk about sacrifice in the context of the Cold War as he viewed the US as clearly morally 
superior to the USSR and therefor on the side of right.  This also meant that any policy 
which contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union was a worthy one, regardless of its 
popularity.  Those it aided would recognize afterward, perhaps after the US had departed, 
and realize they were better off. 
 Stories helped Reagan understand both what he was, and what he could be.  They 
afforded the creative space for him to think about complex ideas and apply his limited 
experience to a greater stage.  They also served as the foundation for his communication.  
The use of parables, jokes, and other anecdotes were his method of sharing his vision.  At 
its best, such as with the Soviet Union, this led to a common understanding and an 
administration that could act in flexible, unexpected ways.  Other times, such as in 
Nicaragua, it led to confusion and the creation of policy with disastrous consequences for 
the people of the region and broader US goals. 
 Popular culture in the 1950s was an essential part of forging Reagan’s political 
identity.  Reagan was conscious of the influence of stories and culture, a sentiment 
expressed throughout his presidency.  However, the cultural environment shifted 
drastically by the end of the 50s, towards an embrace of moral equivalency in the Cold 
War.  This shift deeply concerned Reagan, as it ran counter to his political ideology and 
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Chapter 4 Up From the Depths: The Means and the Will 
 
Looking out on the assembled cadets of West Point, Reagan told the future 
officers the United States was amid a great revival.  The “hunger on the part of the people 
to once again be proud of America” produced a “new spirit” and ended “the era of self-
doubt.”531  Reagan viewed his audience as a critical part of this spirit.  The cadets and the 
military in general were the “prime ingredient” ensuring the freedom of Americans.  
Drawing on West Point’s history, Reagan contrasted his audience with the great chain 
used during the academy’s time as a Revolutionary War fortification.  He told the cadets 
that as the original chain existed to deny British use of the Hudson, they were part of a 
“chain holding back an evil force that would extinguish the light we’ve been tending for 
6,000 years.”532 
However, Reagan contended that in recent years the military lacked both the 
public regard and compensation it deserved.  He catalogued the ills plaguing America’s 
armed forces, including low pay, the diminishment of the GI Bill, and “widespread lack 
of respect for the uniform” due to the Vietnam War.533  Too often “young men and 
women volunteered for duty” only to find that the only reward they could expect was 
“patriotism,” and even in that “they were shortchanged.”534  Reagan felt those in uniform 
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deserved better and supporting them was essential to maintaining America’s role in the 
world. 
He listed with pride the accomplishments of his young administration.  In just five 
months they raised pay, established a task force to expand GI Bill benefits, and made 
more funds available for readiness and new equipment.  These changes put the military 
and its personnel on “better than a bare subsistence level.”535  Reagan argued that the new 
policies already had contributed to strengthening the military.  He pointed to increasing 
rates of enlistments and reenlistments, and more importantly, saw a “decided rise in 
quality” of those entering service.536  While his administration’s efforts explained part of 
this, Reagan also believed Americans had “rediscovered how much there is to love in this 
blessed land.”537  The American people were rejecting the arguments of moral 
equivalency and viewing their country in a favorable light. 
Reagan charged his audience to go forth and “restore the sense of pride our men 
and women [were] entitled to have in wearing the uniform.”538  Restoring military honor 
was a key objective for Reagan in his first term, and his exhortation to the cadets 
captured the message he wanted the audience to take away from the speech.  He believed 
that without widespread public regard for the military, it would be impossible for 
America’s armed forces to accomplish his administration’s ambitious Cold War goals.  In 







his first months in office, Reagan took every opportunity to shore up public support for 
the military, and his speech at West Point offered a highly visible way to do this.  He 
noted in his diary there were few things “more stirring than a West Point graduation,” and 
clearly hoped the pride he felt as he “shook 900 hands” in the graduating class would 
extend to the nation.539 
Prior to the speech, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger wrote to Reagan 
noting it must “increase the appreciation and honor the American people feel for the 
uniformed services.”540  The topic was one the two had “discussed before,” as both men 
worried about the generally negative public perception of the military that existed as they 
took office.541  Weinberger suggested Reagan use part of his speech to encourage the 
American public to do as their predecessors did during the Civil War and the World Wars 
and express “deep appreciation and honor” for the military in every way they could.542  
He felt Americans must to augment service member’s pay with “psychic income” in the 
form of earnest public appreciation.543 
While Reagan and his speechwriters opted not to use Weinberger’s language, the 
President shared his Secretary of Defense’s beliefs.   Both men felt that “the United 
States lacked the will to regain the military strength necessary” to achieve their policy 
                                                 
539 Ronald Reagan, “27 May 1981,” The Reagan Diaries Volume 1, edited by Douglass Brinkley, (New 
York: Harper Collins, 2007) 
540 Memorandum, Caspar Weinberger to Ronald Reagan, April 17, 1981, Folder: “West Point Speech and 







goals.544  Historian Gail Yoshitani argues in Reagan on War that the administration 
entered office realizing they needed to build the “will and spirit” of Americans to meet 
the nation’s national security challenges.545   Without it, they would be unable to increase 
the size, capability, and mission of the US military.  Popular will was an essential 
component of national power, and Reagan’s rhetoric alone could reverse negative 
perceptions of the military and the Cold War.  Popular culture mattered as well.  The 
depiction of the military in books and film shaped the public’s will to support both the 
military and the administration’s foreign policy.   
An early draft of Reagan’s West Point speech, established this link explicitly.  It 
argued the “ingratitude and lack of respect shown to those in a military uniform was a 
national disgrace.”546  In particular, “the film industry’s pandering to this anti-American 
and anti-military sentiment was reprehensible.”547  In the margin, it listed Coming Home, 
Deer Hunter, and Apocalypse Now as examples.  Each were best picture nominees at the 
Academy Awards and all three depicted the Vietnam War in a harshly negative light. The 
films depicted members of the military as mentally damaged and morally compromised.   
The passage did not make the final draft of Reagan’s speech due to concerns of senior 
White House staffers about the tone and antagonizing Hollywood needlessly.548 
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 However, it still revealed how the White House viewed the contemporary cultural 
environment.  The administration felt that Hollywood and television believed that the 
Cold War “was an exaggerated concoction of a president halfway between stupid and 
crazy.”549  Reagan “felt personally about the movies,” given his own background.550  He 
felt that over the course of the previous two decades, cultural portrayals of the military 
and the US government were unfairly negative.  He wrote the producer of Patton in 1970, 
to praise the film for countering the “pernicious and constant degrading of the 
military.”551  As president, Reagan hoped to reverse American’s belief in moral 
equivalency in the Cold War.  In Morning in America, Gil Troy argues the administration 
merged politics and culture seeking to “resurrect the grandeur” the nation.552  Restoring 
the grandeur of the nation required Americans to view those in uniform in a positive 
light.  Reagan’s administration actively cultivated narratives favorable to the military.  
They wanted to ensure Americans routinely encountered depictions of the military that 
showed its people as the best the country had to offer and its capabilities as more than 
able to handle the gravest threat. 
Major sporting events became one venue to build support.  There was a long 
relationship between organized sports and military remembrance.  Many the America’s 
largest and most famous sporting venues such as the Coliseum in Los Angeles and 
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Soldier Field in Chicago also serve as memorials for soldiers killed in combat.  College 
stadiums like Camp Randall in Madison and Darrel K. Royal Stadium in Austin 
incorporate monuments dedicated to service.  Military leaders like Theodore Roosevelt 
and Douglass MacArthur argued sports were part a masculine ideal that made better 
soldiers, an association that many Americans agreed with.  The long-standing 
relationship between athletic competition and the military made it a good area for the 
Reagan administration to rebuild American’s positive view of the military. 
In September of 1982, a Reagan supporter and donor wrote Michael Deaver, the 
President’s deputy chief of staff, with an idea to use NFL games as “an informal structure 
to promote patriotism.”553  The supporter suggested Reagan record a message of support 
that NFL teams could play at halftime of their games on Veteran’s Day.  The message 
should encourage “a standing ovation to the veterans,” enticing the crowd to publicly and 
enthusiastically demonstrate support for the military.554  Deaver liked the idea, but the 
NFL was engaged in a strike he feared tying the administration to the unpopularity of 
both the strike and the replacement players.555  Instead, they would work with the NCAA 
and recorded a message for college football games.  Millions of Americans heard the 
President proclaim veterans and those on active duty were “an elite group of men and 
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women” who even in times of peace keep the country “secure from foreign threats.”556  
Seeking to destigmatize Vietnam, Reagan equated service there with that of veterans of 
the World Wars and Korea, stating all four conflicts made the US “safer and freer.”557  
The lack of distinction about the causes, methods, and outcomes were an attempt by 
Reagan to construct belief in universal goodness of military service. 
In addition, the military increasingly used sporting events to highlight new 
technology.  The use of flyovers and displays outside stadiums helped build a belief in 
the superiority of American military technology and diminish doubts raised by military 
failures in the 1970s.  Over time, these actions solidified links between sport and the 
military in many Americans minds and events such as Super Bowl XXV, played in the 
wake of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, became a “multilayered patriotic display.”558  
Americans increasingly had to cheer for both their favorite sports team and the US 
military at games.  While in some ways this was a revival of a link exhibited during both 
World Wars, sporting events by the 1980s were bigger in size and cultural importance 
than in the past.  The advent of television also expanded their reach, bringing military 
fueled spectacle into the homes of most Americans. 
Reagan’s administration worked directly with authors who favored their policies.  
Allen Drury, who won the Pulitzer Prize for his 1959 novel Advise and Consent, enjoyed 
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a close relationship with the administration.  When published, the anti-communism and 
conservative bent of Drury’s Advise and Consent stood in stark contrast with the 
emerging themes of popular culture.  The book displayed Drury’s “belief that American 
liberalism was actively abetting international communism,” a theme that appealed to both 
Reagan and Weinberger.559  Weinberger, moonlighting as a book reviewer for the San 
Francisco Chronicle, glowingly reviewed it and Drury’s other works.560  After Reagan 
took office, the author sent the president one of his books, which Reagan happily reported 
helped him in “learning how to be president.”561  Reagan appointed Drury to two three-
year terms on the National Council of Arts, which oversaw the National Endowment for 
Arts.562  He hoped that the author would promote art favorable towards the 
administration.  By 1984, Drury wanted to take a more active role. 
He wrote Weinberger requesting a meeting to pitch his idea for a new novel.563  
Drury believed that the administration would want to know about the topic and seek to 
support it.  Entitled Pentagon, it would show the “sickness in the building” caused by 
years of neglect.564  Weinberger liked the idea and granted Drury’s request to shadow 
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him for a day.  He also arranged a special pass for the author providing over a month of 
access to the Pentagon.565   
Released in 1986, the book received poor reviews and did not sell well.  It also 
failed to capture the tone and themes the Reagan administration desired.  The conclusion 
that the Pentagon suffered from a “fundamental weakness” that prevented the “greatest 
concentration of brains and ability in [the country] or anywhere,” did not fit with the 
positive messaging of the administration.  Even worse to Reagan, Drury’s argument that 
“the Kremlin has two enormous advantages on its side—history’s greatest arsenal and the 
innate weakness of [the Pentagon]” were diametrically opposed to how he and his 
administration viewed the Cold War in 1986.566  Despite the official support given to 
Drury as he wrote the novel, the administration ignored the book and did nothing to draw 
attention to it.  
Even as Drury began research for Pentagon, another author was poised to assume 
Drury’s desired role as the Reagan administration’s favored author.  In July of 1984, the 
Naval Press Institute released The Hunt for Red October the debut novel of Tom Clancy.  
Reagan’s love of the book, and its influence on him, helped make Clancy one of the best-
known voices in national security. 
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The Rise of Tom Clancy 
 
 Clancy was an unlikely person to become a prominent voice in national politics.  
He graduated from Loyola College in Baltimore with a major in English and minor in 
physics.  Unable to join the military due to extremely poor vision, he instead began 
working with his wife at a small insurance agency in Owings, Maryland.567  The agency’s 
location between Annapolis and Washington, resulted in the firm having many naval 
officers as clients.  Clancy’s conversations with them helped further his interest in the 
Navy and build the technical knowledge his books would become famous for.  He also 
learned about naval tactics and procedures through playing Harpoon, a tabletop miniature 
game designed by former naval officer Larry Bond.  After purchasing and playing the 
game, Clancy wrote to Bond that “after digesting” the rules it would be easy to explain 
the concepts of modern naval warfare to anyone.568 
 Politically, Clancy was a lifelong Republican and strong supporter of Ronald 
Reagan.  He requested a signed photo of Reagan through his Congressman, William 
Broomfield, shortly after Reagan took office.  Broomfield sent the request to the White 
House along with a note that identified Clancy and another constituent as “faithful 
Republicans.”569  The White House rewarded Clancy’s stalwart support with a photo 
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inscribed to him and his wife, Wanda.570  Clancy noted in a letter to a friend after the he 
had voted for Reagan four out of the five times he could, the only blemish a vote for 
George H.W. Bush in the 1980 primary.571 He then asked for God’s forgiveness and 
ruefully acknowledged, “NOBODY’S perfect.”572  It is unsurprising that his positive 
feelings for both Reagan and the military led him to intentionally integrate many of the 
President’s messages as he began work on Hunt for Red October in early 1982. 
 The plot centered on a Soviet submarine captain attempting to defect and deliver 
his new, advanced submarine to the US.  Clancy drew on the Storozhevoy mutiny of 1975 
to develop the idea.573  In the mutiny, a Soviet political officer and group of enlisted men 
took over the ship, a destroyer, and planned to defect to Sweden.  While they did gain 
control of the ship, Soviet aircraft disabled the ship’s rudder as it traversed the Baltic Sea 
preventing the defection.  Soviet authorities tried and executed the leader of the revolt 
and handed down long jail sentences for the other mutineers.574  Clancy adapted the real-
life events slightly and changed the setting to a submarine, adding dramatic tension to the 
novelized mutiny.  The blending of historical and contemporary events with increased 
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fictional stakes would become a hallmark of Clancy’s books and a driver of their 
popularity. 
 As he wrote his first novel, Clancy entertained a grand vision for his future as a 
writer.  He saw The Hunt for Red October as the middle book of a trilogy and created 
outlines for what would become Patriot Games and The Cardinal of the Kremlin.575  By 
late 1982, he completed the draft of Hunt, the outlines, and early chapters of Patriot 
Games.  In addition, he began work on outlines for two books that would stand apart 
from the Jack Ryan trilogy, The Panache Procedure and The Pandora Process.576  The 
former would center on a Coast Guard cutter and the latter around a terrorist attack 
utilizing a nuclear weapon.  Clancy later adapted plot elements from these outlines into 
Clear and Present Danger and The Sum of All Fears.  That he completed all these drafts 
and outlines in a little over a year hinted at his future prolific output. 
 Clancy began his project without any publisher interest or personal knowledge of 
the industry.  Instead of seeking a literary agent, he simply provided the draft manuscript 
unsolicited to the Naval Institute Press, a small publisher located on the grounds of the 
US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.  He selected them not due to their status in 
the publishing world, but because they published a letter in their journal, Proceedings, 
that Clancy hand delivered to the editor.  This marked the first time anything Clancy 
wrote appeared in a publication, and the success of his informal approach encouraged 
                                                 




him to try the same technique again.577  The decision to provide the manuscript to the 
Naval Institute Press was odd, as they had never published original fiction before. 
 At the time, the publisher’s best-known work was The Bluejacket’s Manual.578  
The Navy provided a copy of the manual to every recruit since 1902.  It also published 
previously out of print naval stories, and its journal, Proceedings, examined 
contemporary naval issues.  Fortunately for Clancy, the board of directors had recently 
decided to publish new fiction, if it was “wet.”579  In order to defray the costs of 
publishing, they sold the paperback rights in advance.  The rights sold to Berkley Books, 
a division of Putnam, for $35,000, an amount Clancy’s editor Deborah Grosvenor viewed 
as middling for a first-time author.580   
The Hunt for Red October appeared on bookshelves in July of 1984, with most stock 
going to stores in Washington DC and New York City.  When Clancy first began the 
project, he wrote a friend that “the odds of becoming the next Frederick Forsythe 
are…somewhere between merely exponential and astronomical-incredible.”581  
Mentioning, “Writers normally die poor,” he stated that he would happily settle for a 
“book-jacket with [his] name on it.”582  Early sales of Hunt seemed to vindicate Clancy’s 
belief.  While the initial run of 16,000 copies sold out by November, interest in the book 
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was only regional.  It did well in DC, making the local bestseller list but generally failed 
to expand beyond that.583 
The book received mixed reviews.  The Wall Street Journal found that Clancy’s 
work rewarded the reader “quite satisfactorily” in a thriller that was “great fun.”584  A 
reviewer for The Los Angeles Times was less effusive.  The review, entitled “Adrift with 
Subplots,” stated Clancy had a talent for making “arcane information of US and Soviet 
submarines approachable,” but the “cardboard characters” left much to be desired.585  
Overall, the book was a success but six months after publication there was little to 
indicate it would launch a multi-media empire that would leave Clancy with an 82 
million dollar estate at the time of his death thirty years later.586 
 
Reagan and Clancy 
 
 While traveling to visit the US ambassador to Argentina, Nancy Reynolds, who 
had served as Reagan’s assistant for electronic media when he was governor, read a copy 
of Hunt for Red October she received as a gift from a DC reporter.587  Reynolds knew of 
Reagan’s love for books, the President told her previously that “if you have a book 
around, you never lack for friends,” and realized that Clancy’s novel was one that Reagan 
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would enjoy.588  She gave a copy to Reagan as a Christmas gift, and he enthusiastically 
read a third of the book that day.589  He continued reading it throughout the week, at one 
point confessing to his staff that he was tired at the meeting since he had been up until 
three in the morning reading Hunt the night before.590 
 He also began publicly praising the book.  During a news conference, when asked 
what he was reading Reagan called the book “the perfect yarn” and later told Time that it 
was “unputdownable.”591  His staffers realized that the book was something Reagan 
viewed in a special manner and began to read it as well.  After the President praised it so 
fulsomely, Kenneth Adelman, one of the lead negotiators on arms control, decided to buy 
a copy and read it himself.  As of January of 1985, the book remained relatively difficult 
to find though Adelman eventually located a copy which was misfiled as a non-fiction, 
technical work.592   
The efforts that Reagan’s staff went to read the book showed their awareness of 
how fiction could influence him.  It also implied Reagan praised more than the 
entertainment value of the book.  Longtime staffers knew of Reagan’s tendency to use 
fiction as policy shorthand and their efforts to procure and read Hunt to some extent 
demonstrates an expectation on their part that the book could play a similar role as High 
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Noon and Witness.  The Time magazine profile of the book hinted at this and noted that 
Clancy’s book impressed Reagan with its technical accuracy.593  The Hunt for Red 
October provided a relatable narrative of arcane technical detail which likely increased its 
appeal to Reagan and would allow him to use it as a substitute for the sort of wonky, 
detailed language he disdained.  Kenneth deGraffenreid, who served as Senior Director of 
Intelligence Programs for the NSC, reflected that reading Clancy reinforced “a lot of 
what we might assume was in Reagan’s head.”594 
 The endorsement from Reagan drew increased media attention to Clancy’s book, 
leading to a spike in sales.  Over the next two months, total sales surpassed 75,000, more 
than triple what it sold in the first six months on shelves.595  A March 1985 profile in 
Time which noted that the Soviet Embassy “reportedly bought several copies, presumably 
for shipment to Moscow” added intrigue.596  Over the next two weeks, Clancy’s book 
would become a New York Times bestseller, and he would get the opportunity to visit the 
Oval Office to meet the man who helped put the book there.597 
 Clancy’s visit to the Oval Office left him awestruck.  He recalled the experience 
of stepping into it as being like Dorothy going from “the wrecked house into 
Munchkinland.”598  Reagan exceeded the author’s expectations, he was “a Mensch” with 
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charisma an “order of magnitude” more than Clancy expected.599  The President could 
“charm the fangs off a cobra” and his personality “envelopes you like a cloud.”600  The 
two men discussed Hunt for Red October and Reagan asked how Clancy could get so 
many technical details right.  Clancy demurred, insisting the characters were the hard 
part.  Reagan asked about Clancy’s next book, and upon hearing it was about World War 
III, wanted to know who won.  The author replied, “the good guys.”601  
 Reagan then went to a lunch with Henry Kissinger to discuss the death of 
Chernenko two days prior and what the ascension of Gorbachev meant for US-Soviet 
relations.602  After meeting the President, Clancy was confident that Reagan would be 
able to charm “Garbage-ov” or failing that “Ronnie [could] probably drive him into the 
pavement.”603  The meeting left both mean confident they had read the other correctly.  It 
further convinced Clancy that his work was valuable and that he needed to incorporate 
Reagan’s policy into it.  He wrote Reagan afterwards, effusing that the meeting was one 
of three things “more important that monetary success to him.”604  The other two were his 
son recognizing his picture on the dust jacket and receiving the twin dolphin badge of a 
submariner at the Pentagon.  Clancy assured the President that “he would deem it a 
privilege” if he could “ever be of the slightest service” to him.605 
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 Although he never expressed it to the author, Clancy did more than slightly serve 
the administration.  Reagan was impressed with the writer’s personality, identifying with 
Clancy’s middle-class background, and pleased that the author depicted service members 
in the gallant way that Reagan saw them.606  The President became a dedicated, lifelong 
fan and Clancy’s books had a clear impact on the way he spoke about policy and 
developed his strategy.607  
 
The Hunt for Red October 
 
The Hunt for Red October begins with a murder.  Soviet Captain Marko Ramius 
helms the USSR’s newest and most advanced submarine, the Red October, on its maiden 
voyage.  As he and the ship’s political officer prepare to open their orders, Ramius 
assaults and kills the commissar.  Ramius then substitutes fake orders for the political 
officer’s copy and convinces the crew they are bound for Cuba after silently lurking off 
the eastern seaboard.  He and his senior officers actually intend to defect and deliver their 
ship into American hands in Norfolk, Virginia.  The submarine’s nearly silent engines 
should make this an easy task, but Ramius’ ego caused him to inform Soviet leadership 
about his intentions in a letter, triggering a massive movement by the Soviet Navy to 
interdict their wayward submarine.608 
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As this unfolds, Jack Ryan, a CIA analyst and historian, flies to Washington DC 
to share images of the Red October acquired by British intelligence, and after what is 
supposed to be a brief meeting, buy a Christmas present for his daughter.  However, the 
massive westward movement of the Soviet Navy triggers a crisis, and Ryan quickly finds 
himself drawn into a White House meeting.  There he explains to the National Security 
Council that the CIA believes Ramius is attempting to defect which explains the 
movement, rather than the Pentagon’s fear that it represents war.  As tensions escalate, 
the president charges Ryan to work with the British and American fleets to verify the 
theory and, if it is true, aid in the defection of Ramius and his officers.609 
Thanks to a combination of advanced American SONAR technology and the keen 
ears of a vastly over-qualified sailor, an American submarine identifies the noise profile 
of the Red October.  This allows them to track it and for Ryan to contact Ramius.  After 
confirming the defection theory, they position the Red October over a deep trench and 
fake a radiation leak which forces the crew off the ship.  The officers remain aboard, 
ostensibly to protect the Soviet secrets, and the crew witnesses what they believe to be 
the torpedoing of the submarine before they are rescued by a US destroyer.610 
However, a protegee of Ramius does not believe the ruse and finds the Red October.  
Seeking to sink it, he fires a torpedo and damages the submarine badly but not fatally.  
Ramius then uses the much larger Red October to ram and destroy the attacking 





submarine.  The Red October sails into a hidden harbor in the United States, giving the 
Americans access to its new technology.  At the close of the book, the US has won an 
important secret battle of the Cold War and left its opponent unsure of exactly what 
happened.611 
 
Reagan’s Reading of The Hunt for Red October 
 
 Clancy’s book was almost tailor made for Reagan, and it is likely the book would 
have been a favorite of the President’s even without its political utility.  As a protagonist, 
Jack Ryan strongly resembles those of traditional western, science fiction, and adventure 
stories.  He lives by a strong moral code not out of desire of a reward, but due to the 
intrinsic value of doing the right thing.  Ryan, though working for an intelligence agency, 
dislikes misdirection.  When his cover forces him to wear a Navy uniform with the rank 
of commander, he apologizes to an admiral at his first opportunity as he does not “like 
pretending to be what [he’s] not.”612  Much like Hondo, Ryan is willing to lie but only in 
the service of a much greater good. 
 Ryan’s refusal to accept reward resembles the characters Reagan loved from 
westerns.  At the end of the novel, Ryan refuses to meet with the president to receive 
praise for his successful mission.  Instead, he flies home to London, falling asleep on the 
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plane holding the skiing Barbie doll which marks the completion of his original goal.  For 
Reagan, this scene strongly resembled that of Marshal Kane in High Noon leaving town 
with his star gleaming in the dust behind him.   
 The way Clancy depicted sex and violence also fit the framework of Reagan’s 
favorite stories.  Writing to a friend about the book, Clancy detailed six action sequences 
in the book, with a death toll of a little over two hundred people.613  However, even 
though many people die violently in the book, Clancy did not engage in graphic 
descriptions of their deaths.  Language describing wounds bordered on clinical, imparting 
a picture of violence as relatively clean.  Similarly, there are only hints of sex in Hunt.  
The most explicit comment in the book is about Ryan’s friend Skip Taylor, and his “zest 
for life” represented by he and his wife’s many children.614  The Wall Street Journal 
review recognized the absence of sex, describing that the only positive trait of Ryan’s not 
mentioned was “his undoubtedly impressive technique in bed.”615  This is true of most 
Clancy books, though the author did consider writing a romance novel while on hiatus 
from the Ryan series, as the genre was “where the real money was.”616 
 The clean violence and lack of sex in The Hunt for Red October increased its 
appeal to Reagan.  He disliked the explicitness of much contemporary pop culture.  
Writing in 1970, he lamented “Good and inspirational stories… are too often tarnished by 
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dialogue laced with profanities and vulgarities.”617  Similarly, “inevitable bedroom 
scenes” which left “little to the imagination” hurt the quality of film.618  His reaction to 
An Officer and a Gentleman demonstrated his view.   The film contained many of the 
themes Reagan promoted.  Historian Andrew Bacevich argues that it showed that 
“service in uniform…was a worthy aspiration,” and that joining the military “offered a 
way to be somebody.”619  However, Reagan disliked it, believing it was “a good story 
spoiled by nudity, language, and sex.”620   
 Reagan did not mind violence in movies nearly as much.  He viewed Rambo: 
First Blood Part II shortly after its release and recorded in his diary that everyone “had a 
good time.”621  He joked with reporters that because of the movie he would “know what 
to do” the next time there was a hostage crisis.622  Reagan showed his appreciation of the 
film to Stallone by inviting him to a state dinner in October of 1985, one of two such 
functions Stallone attended.623  Compared with Rambo, the violence in Hunt for Red 
October was both tame and imagined rather than seen.  Additionally, it was of the sort of 
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military combat that Reagan sought out in fiction, placing the book easily into the range 
of what he found acceptable in modern culture. 
 The president of Hunt is unnamed, but Clancy intentionally modeled the character 
on Reagan.624 The positive portrayal of himself was likely something that Reagan greatly 
enjoyed.  The character is an effective communicator, who as a prosecutor could earn 
convictions through “sheer rhetoric.”625  The fictional president had “dazzling charm” 
which could “turn on and off like a spotlight.”626 Clancy based this on the Reagan he saw 
on television and heard in speeches, and later confirmed his image of the president in 
their Oval Office meeting. 
 The president’s adversaries in the book also cannot help but respect him.  The 
Soviet ambassador views the president as “a strange man, very open, yet full of guile,” 
whose friendliness made it “easy to underestimate” him.627  He was also “always ready to 
seize the advantage.”628  The fictional Soviets’ frustration matched their real-life 
counterpart’s exasperation.  Gorbachev frequently expressed disbelief and frustration 
with Reagan’s ability to “pocket concessions” without having to give much back.629  
Clancy saw these traits in Reagan.  As they met, Clancy observed that Reagan displayed 
the “twitchy alertness of a fox” despite his “soft voice” and “very relaxed manner.”630  
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The movie version of the novel also hints at Reagan as the inspiration.  In the penultimate 
scene, a triumphant president eats jellybeans, Reagan’s favorite snack, as the Soviet 
ambassador realizes the magnitude of the USSR’s defeat.631 
 While the familiarity of the story and the positive portrayal of himself appealed to 
Reagan, they were not why he promoted.  In general, Reagan disliked talking about 
reading fiction, a trait encouraged by Nancy Reagan who felt that if the public knew of 
his less than literary tastes they would view the president poorly.  Lou Cannon, a reporter 
who covered Reagan in Sacramento and DC and the author of two biographies on the 
president, believed that part of the reticence came from Reagan’s “reader’s conceit that 
books were secret, personal treasures.”632  Such a conceit meshes well with Reagan’s 
statement to Nancy Reynolds about books being like friends.  The term implied intimacy 
and trust which Reagan would be loath to publicly violate.  However, The Hunt for Red 
October also played an important role in shaping how Reagan viewed the success of the 
first term and he felt it could shape public opinion about the military in the 
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Combatting Vietnam Syndrome 
 
 Reagan intended his West Point address to “declare that the Vietnam syndrome 
was over.”633  He personally drafted much of the speech and wanted to present the 
military as gallant.634  Ideally, he could make the American people view their military as 
romantic, chivalric, dedicated and brave like Kipling’s Tommy and the cavalry of the 
American West.  In Reagan’s first inaugural, he criticized those who argued “there are no 
heroes,” insisting “they just don’t know where to look.”635 Reagan explicitly intended this 
to reference the military.636   
Throughout his first five months in office, Reagan sought out opportunities to 
extol military service.  He concluded his Inaugural Address with the story of Martin 
Treptow, a doughboy killed in World War I, whose diary contained the pledge to work, 
save, sacrifice, endure, and do his utmost to ensure an American victory.637  A month 
later, he presented the Medal of Honor to MSG Roy Benavidez.  During his remarks, he 
heralded the courage of MSG Benavidez, which the previous administration had 
“overlooked or buried for several years.”638  Reagan used the opportunity to highlight the 
“incurable humanitarianism of our troops” during the Vietnam War.639  He highlighted 
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the efforts of Army soldiers in 1969, which resulted in the construction of “1253 school 
and 597 hospitals and dispensaries” and noted they contributed over “$300,000 from their 
own pockets” to help the Vietnamese.640  For Reagan, Vietnam veterans “fought as 
bravely and as well as any Americans” in history, and “came home without a victory” not 
through their own failures, but “but because they’d been denied permission to win.”641 
   Reagan consciously helped the development of an alternate public history of the 
Vietnam War, somewhat akin to the “Lost Cause” ideology of the American Civil War.  
He helped build a narrative about US failure of decision-making.  Historian Mark 
Lawrence argues Reagan believed “a failure to commit fully to war” prevented US 
victory.642  While campaigning in 1980, he stated that he felt it was time for Americans 
“recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause.”643  The comment sparked immediate 
condemnation in the media with some commentators accusing Reagan of trying to “open 
up national wounds that had scarcely healed.”644  Historian Steven Hayward argues in 
The Age of Reagan that the comments demonstrated “Reagan could be said to be ahead of 
his time” as he was challenging the conventional cultural portrayal of the war and 
foreshadowing the more favorable portrayal of the conflict in popular culture during the 
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1980s.645  However, Reagan was not a prophet in this regard, instead he cultivated a 
politically favorable narrative of the war to rebuild support for the military. 
In The Invisible Bridge, Rick Perlstein argues that for Reagan it was not the “the 
Vietnam War revealed an America that suddenly knew sin, but that it helped reveal once 
more that America was a nation that redeemed everything it touched.”646  Reagan knew 
the US presence in Vietnam was not humanitarian, and that while some units did do 
charitable work, many others committed atrocities.  Writing about the My Lai massacre 
in 1971, he argued “the Calley affair” was “one of the most complex problems we 
had.”647  He conceded that Calley “did wrong,” but felt that society “must accept that 
some men become brutalized by war.”648  Regardless, the enemy “had a different 
standard than ours” and Reagan compared the Vietnamese to Native Americans fighting 
the US cavalry in the Indian Wars.649  To Reagan, the failure of the press to expose “the 
savagery and atrocities performed” on both civilians and American military personnel 
created a false equivalency.  This then made Calley’s actions “more understandable,” and 
Reagan felt that while Calley was not a hero, he should also not be “treated as just a 
wanton criminal.”650  
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 The letter revealed several interesting things about Reagan’s beliefs about the 
military.  His return to the imagery of the Indian Wars, highlights the prominence of the 
conflict in his mind, and belief that most in the military, even in the 1970s, met the 
Kipling and L’Amour ideal of the self-deprivation hero working for the greater good of 
civilization.  Even when Americans committed atrocities, it was not a reflection of their 
poor character, but rather the fault of the very nature of war.  Reagan argued that Calley 
“probably could have gone through life without committing a single crime until we 
exposed him to the brutalizing force of war.”651  In this view, one that he sought to bring 
to the American people writ large, individual service members could only be responsible 
for success, which would be due to their outstanding character.  Any military or moral 
failure was the fault of the incredibly difficult nature of war, further complicated by 
feckless politicians and a mendacious press.  In short, the military and those serving in it 
were beyond reproach.  While politically advantageous and perhaps a necessary 
corrective in the short-term, the perpetuation of the narrative proved profoundly 
damaging to Civil-Military relations and caused Americans to engage with military topics 
in a superficially supportive manner. 
 Reagan’s efforts to equate the North Vietnamese to Native Americans was telling.  
He argued “not since the Indian Wars have we fought an enemy who sent women and 
children onto the battlefield armed with knives to torture the wounded,” language that 
implies both the Vietnamese and Native Americans were violent savages acting in a 




manner contrary to civilization.652  It unequivocally accepted the worst racial stereotypes 
of Kipling, Burroughs, and popular westerns.  Even as a senior citizen, Reagan still 
viewed the developing world in a manner like the imperialists he read in his youth.  It 
also demonstrated a misunderstanding of history and a shocking lack of empathy and 
desire to understand why the North Vietnamese fought.  The lack of effort to understand 
the Vietnam War and the motivations of communists there stands in stark contrast to the 
nuance and empathy Reagan displayed when discussing the Russian people and those in 
Europe living under communist rule. 
 Clancy’s The Hunt for Red October captured Reagan’s romantic view of the 
American military perfectly.  All the military personnel in the book share above-average 
intelligence, willingness to sacrifice, and unimpeachable moral standards.  Jack Ryan, 
though no longer in the military due to a helicopter crash, leaves his job as a stockbroker 
to serve with the CIA.  He does so because he was “bored with making money” and 
wanted to help his country again.653  Ryan is also a family man, whose competent and 
accomplished wife, adoring daughter, and toddler son speak to his virility and passion for 
the American Dream. 
 The naval officers of the book are moral paragons.  The commander of the U.S.S. 
Los Angeles, Bart Mancuso, is “one of the youngest submarine commander in the US 
Navy,” and got there through his intelligence and instincts, as well as a willingness to 
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listen to subordinates.654  The CIA director of the novel is an admiral, James Greer,” who 
stayed in the Navy long “past retirement age… through brute competence.”655  Clancy 
explicitly compares Greer to Admiral Hyman Rickover, but notes that Greer “was a far 
easier man to work for” than the father of the nuclear Navy.656  Greer also took some 
inspiration from Admiral Bobby Inman, who was a former director of the National 
Security Agency serving as the deputy director of the CIA when Clancy began work on 
Hunt.657  Clancy’s carrier group commander, Admiral Joshua Painter, is “a gifted 
tactician and a man of puritanical integrity.”658  The latter trait adds nothing to the plot, 
and is there only to bolster the sense of moral righteousness in the Navy.  The only 
negative comment about a naval officer in the book belongs to Admiral Charles 
Davenport, who is “supposed to be a bastard to work for.”659  However, this is easily 
excusable as Davenport shows the same brilliance in performing his duties as the rest of 
the officers. 
 Veterans also display superior character in Clancy’s work.  Ryan is a former 
Marine officer forced out of service due to a helicopter crash and resulting back injury.  
Skip Taylor was on track to command a submarine before a drunk driver cost him his leg.  
After medically retiring, Taylor continues to serve as an instructor at the Naval Academy 
and plays a crucial role in developing a computer model to detect the Red October.  Like 
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Ryan, he eschews reward.  Taylor could come back into service and command after his 
work finding the Red October, but he declines knowing that to do so would “just be 
taking someone’s slot.”660  The admiral making the offer expected Taylor to decline for 
just that reason, and believed Taylor could have been an admiral himself if not for the 
leg, but “nobody ever said the world was fair.”661  Taylor’s willingness to forego personal 
advancement and achievement for the best interest of the nation spoke to the idea of self-
sacrifice Reagan admired in the military. 
 Enlisted sailors display the same characteristics as the officers.  Sonarman Second 
Class Ronald Jones is vastly overqualified for his position, having been close to finishing 
a degree in electrical engineering at the California Institute of Technology before a prank 
gone awry cost him his scholarship.  Jones joins the Navy to rehabilitate his name and 
finance a return to school with the G.I. Bill.  His understanding of SONAR and refined 
ear allow him to track the supposedly silent Soviet sub, and his confident demeanor leads 
to him playing a key role in the success of the mission despite his low rank.  Even the 
Soviets that Jones encounters on the Red October are amazed by his skill and the 
responsibility he is entrusted with.  Clancy goes out of his way to establish that Jones is a 
more qualified and intelligent sailor than Bugayev, a senior officer on the Red October 
who dreams of getting “a proper degree,” rather than the one he has from the Soviet naval 
academy.662  Clancy’s message in the passage was clear, that even the most junior 
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American service member was potentially superior to mid-level and senior Soviet 
officers. 
 Clancy captured the “new appreciation for men and women in military service” 
that Reagan sought to instill in Americans.663  Addressing the graduating class at the 
Naval Academy in May of 1985, he argued that the country now had faith in Naval 
officers to “make [their] judgement and move forward” in environments where the 
“issues [would] not be black and white.”664  Equally important, the best people in 
America were choosing to serve.  Citizens joined both the regular Navy and the reserves 
to “share their time, energy and talent to keep America strong, safe and free.”665  Reagan 
referenced soaring reenlistment rates on multiple occasions and repeated his 1981 claim 
that testing showed the overall quality of recruits had never been higher.  In his diary, 
Reagan described the commencement at Annapolis in the same terms he used for West 
Point four years earlier.  Reagan felt “it was a stirring day” and the cadets spirit was 
“something to behold.”666 
 The Hunt for Red October showed Reagan’s efforts to build support for the 
national security establishment in general.  In addition to rehabilitating the image of the 
military in the public eye, Reagan wanted to bolster the CIA and FBI.  As he assumed 
office, the intelligence community was still reeling from the results of the Church 
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Committee’s investigation.  Beginning in 1975, the committee uncovered significant and 
wide-reaching abuses of power by the FBI, CIA, and NSA.  As a result, the agencies 
faced significant new oversight, which Charles Hill argues “pretty much devastated the 
CIA.”667  The illegal actions paired with a lackluster record led to the diminishment of 
each in the eyes of Americans.  Just as with the military, the agencies saw increasingly 
negative portrayals in popular culture, such as the movie All the Presidents Men (1975) 
portrayal of the FBI and the 1980 Robert Ludlum novel, The Bourne Identity’s depiction 
of the CIA.  Kenneth deGraffenreid believed the oversight was a good thing still felt the 
administration needed to move away from the “hypercritical” view of intelligence that 
was pervasive after the Church committee.668   
 Reagan sought to move the country beyond this legacy as well, and change the 
public perception of the FBI, CIA, and other intel agencies towards a positive one.  He 
spoke outside CIA Headquarters in Langley in 1982 and argued that “the days of such 
abuses” are past and that the agency was now executing its mission in “a way that is 
lawful, constitutional, and in keeping with the traditions of our way of life.”669  He spoke 
of the CIA’s employees in a manner like that of military service members, noting that it 
was their “intellect and integrity” along with their “wit and intuition” upon which “the 
fate of freedom rests for millions.”670  They were “heroes of a grim twilight struggle,” 
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remarks which Reagan repeated in a closed-door session with members of the CIA’s 
Directorate of Operations.671  Reagan strongly condemned that the agency endured 
“nearly a decade of neglect and sometimes overzealous criticism,” and instead argued 
that those serving today served as heroically as Nathan Hale in the Revolutionary War, or 
the members of the OSS in World War II.672  The strong rhetoric on Reagan’s part 
reflected his belief that intelligence collection was a critical tool of national security 
policy that was “part and parcel of defending American constitutional values.”673  His 
efforts to restore a positive public perception of the intelligence community was a 
“companion piece” to similar efforts directed at the military.674  The US needed popular 
support for both to succeed in the Cold War. 
 The Hunt for Red October built upon Reagan’s views.  The CIA is the first to 
recognize that the Red Navy is not moving west to start a war, and Jack Ryan, one of 
their analysts is the driving force in achieving a major Cold War victory.  FBI agents 
identify that a staffer for the Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a key 
part of the oversight of the intelligence community created in the wake of the Church 
Committee, was passing intelligence to the Soviets. The aide’s actions previously 
resulted in the execution of a CIA source which put the FBI onto the Senator’s office.  
Using false information to identify the leak, they catch the aide in the act and use the 
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information to force the retirement of the Senator, striking a blow against governmental 
oversight of the CIA.675  The scene in the book is gratuitous and only serves the purpose 
of castigating Senate oversight as something that risked lives to no good end. 
 Clancy’s portrayal of the security establishment effectively argued every major 
Reagan talking point about the military and intelligence community.  Reading Clancy’s 
account was undoubtedly reassuring to Reagan, who was highly sensitive to the currents 
of popular culture.  Equally important to this was Clancy’s portrayal of the stakes of the 
Cold War and the morality of each side.  The administration believed the “Cold War was 
profoundly serious” and eagerly embraced an author who shared their view.676 
 
Confronting the Evil Empire 
 
 Throughout his first term in office, Reagan undertook what Soviet Ambassador to 
the United States Anatoly Dobrynin termed an “uncompromising new ideological 
offensive.”677  In March of 1981, a conversation between Dobrynin and Weinberger at a 
private function left Weinberger convinced Moscow was “really quite concerned at the 
perceived strength of the anti-Soviet position.”678  The ambassador’s concern was 
understandable even in the early period of the Reagan administration.  The president 
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frequently employed blunt language, depicting the USSR as an evil nation that sought to 
extinguish freedom. 
 In his inaugural address, Reagan told the nation that no weapon was more 
powerful than “the will and courage of free men and women,” something that America’s 
“adversaries in the world [did] not have.”679  The clear reference to the Soviet Union was 
Reagan’s first effort as president to rebuild belief in the US moral high ground in the 
Cold War.  Reagan saw the US as the “white hats” in a western.  To expand his belief to 
the country as a whole he sought to draw attention to Soviet authoritarianism. 
 Reagan and his advisors planned to use the traditional commencement address at 
Notre Dame contrast “an imperial Soviet Union” that was “hostile to human rights and 
economically ruinous” with an America that respected self-determination and rule of 
law.680  The public rhetoric would “swing the President’s full weight behind key ideas” 
that were “struggling to penetrate the bureaucracy” and the American public more 
broadly.681  The speech would “satisfy the curiosity of domestic and foreign audiences” 
about the administrations intentions and “articulate a fresh and coherent national 
strategy.”682  It also left observers with little doubt that Reagan intended to pursue a more 
aggressive Cold War policy. 
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 Though Reagan did not directly mention the Soviet Union, the frequent allusions 
to communism and totalitarianism revealed the target of the speech.  Echoing language he 
would use at Westminster a year later, Reagan promised the “West won’t contain 
communism, it will transcend communism.”683  The entire ideology was nothing but a 
“bizarre chapter in human history” the “last pages” of which were being written.684  
Communist nations used “ideology and war machines” to project a “façade of strength,” 
that the people of the free world would vanquish.685 
 Speaking at the nation’s most prominent Catholic university, Reagan referenced a 
recent papal encyclical to take aim at the “use of the rhetoric of class struggle to justify 
injustice.”686  Pope John Paul II’s encyclical spoke out against both communism and 
Liberation Theology, stating they were a “distortion of justice.”687  Reagan quoted the 
Pope’s argument that the ideologies left people “stripped of fundamental human rights” 
in the name of the “alleged justice” of the rhetoric of class struggle.688  He tied John Paul 
II’s language into his own feelings about the role of religion in combatting communism 
and the sanctity of individual liberty.  American commitment to “a law higher than [its] 
own” paired with “belief in a Supreme Being” gave the country the tools it needed to 
defeat communism and offer real freedom.689 
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 The speech at West Point four days later focused more on military aspects of the 
Soviet Union than ideological ones.  Reagan again avoided mentioning the USSR, but 
intended to highlight its “militaristic imperialism” and identify the Soviets as a threat “so 
grave as to cause all nations to rethink their fundamental assumptions” about the Cold 
War.690  In the speech, he portrayed the Soviets as a “great society” that was “marching to 
a different drumbeat” that threatened the world with global “retreat into the dark ages.”691  
Reagan contrasted the all-volunteer force of the US with the compulsory service in the 
USSR.  Despite conscription, Soviet citizens had “little more to say about their 
government than a prison inmate has to say about the prison administration.”692  The 
juxtaposition highlighted Reagan’s belief that the moral superiority of the US came from 
the willingness of its population to sacrifice itself freely.  That Americans would fight on 
the frontier to preserve their freedom stood in stark contrast to the disgruntled, unwilling 
Soviet conscript. 
 Reagan expanded these themes of the Notre Dame and West Point 
commencements most famously in his addresses to the British Parliament in 1982 and his 
address to the National Association of Evangelicals in 1983.  At Westminster, Reagan 
promised to leave “Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history” and in Orlando, in a 
speech that drew heavily on Whittaker Chambers and C.S. Lewis, labeled the USSR an 
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“evil empire.”693  The directness of the language in these speeches, and that they occurred 
in a period of obviously rising tensions between the superpowers, made them two of 
Reagan’s most quoted and remembered speeches.  However, they did not stand alone and 
were not the first times he used caustic rhetoric.  Rather, they were part of a strategy to 
reassert America’s position on the moral high ground of the Cold War and to bolster the 
will of people in the US and the rest of the world to resist and rollback communism.  
Reagan believed that his administration needed to use America’s military and diplomatic 
power to wage the Cold War more aggressively, but to do so needed to build both 
popular support and military capability.694 His first-term rhetoric enabled this approach 
and enabled him to adopt greater nuance in descriptions of Russians during his second 
term. 
 Clancy captured Reagan’s view of American moral superiority in The Hunt for 
Red October.  Religion plays an important role in Ramius’ decision to defect.  His 
grandmother had secretly baptized him as a Catholic and raised him on Bible stories. 
Ramius then committed the “gravest sin in the Communist pantheon;” becoming 
“individual in his thinking.”695  His wife died due to a drunk surgeon botching a 
procedure.  The resulting infection became fatal because factory workers, fearing 
punishment for missing quota, filled vials with water rather than admit there were not 
enough antibiotics.  However, there is no punishment for the deaths, as the surgeon’s 
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father is a high-ranking official who shields the doctor.  The medicine vial is also 
untraceable because of the byzantine Soviet procurement system. 
 Already bitter at a system that robbed him of his wife, Ramius stands over her 
grave and realizes the Soviet Union stole something even more important.  It “robbed 
him a means to assuage his grief with prayer” and deprived him of “the hope—if only an 
illusion—of ever seeing” his wife again.696  Communism stole Ramius’ identity by 
denying him religion, and he returned to his faith to redeem himself.  The use of religion 
as a tool to break free of communism echoed the work of Whittaker Chambers in Witness 
with a key difference, Chambers turned from the ideology “at the level of unconscious 
life,” while it took death for Ramius to leave.697  Defecting then became a trip from the 
land of the dead.  Clancy showed that Ramius was embracing Reagan’s promise from the 
1950s that “you too can be free men again.”698  The backstory also demonstrates nuance 
in its depiction of Russians.  Individual Russians come across well in Clancy’s work, but 
those who dogmatically adhere to ideology often meet grisly ends.  The sympathetic 
portrayal of Ramius embraces the ideas behind Reagan’s Ana and Ivan speech and softer 
rhetoric about the Russian people.  Clancy also captured the way Reagan talked about the 
Soviet system. 
 The Hunt for Red October frequently depicts the Soviet Union as inhumane, 
uncaring, and cruel.  References to the gulag abound, and the Russians in the novel tend 
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to have a vague nihilism concerning their state and their treatment from it.  The politburo 
is ruthlessly self-interested, and coldly willing to engage in state-sanctioned violence with 
the slightest provocation.  The cruelty and inefficiency of the system work against the 
USSR.  Most obvious is the case of Ramius deciding to defect because of a combination 
of personal oppression, the absence of justice, and economic failure.  
However, the system’s callousness also hinders its ability to respond to the 
defection. Ramius penned a letter to announce his intention to defect.  A mailroom 
worker, who is a veteran of World War II, delays delivery because of his personal disdain 
for the system.  He notes that he will be able to meet his quota easily, and that there “was 
no sense in hurrying.”699  The mail sorter’s actions delay the arrival of the letter by over a 
day, giving Ramius a head start that proves essential to his escape.  As he concludes his 
day, the worker notes, “as long as the bosses pretend to pay us, we pretend to work,” a 
variation on one of Reagan’s favorite jokes about the Soviet Union.700 
Clancy framed the ideological issues of the Cold War in a way that was identical 
to Reagan’s public remarks and personal beliefs.  The book rewards individual freedom 
and initiative and punishes blind adherence to an oppressive regime.  Clancy’s narrative 
affirmed for Reagan that popular attitudes about the Cold War were shifting in the 
direction the administration desired.  Historian Andrew Bacevich argues in The New 
American Militarism that Clancy was among a group of “market-savvy writers” who 
                                                 




“discerned the changing mood that Reagan had promoted.”701  Their books “powerfully 
reinforced the mythmaking” that was the key to Reagan’s Cold War strategy.  While this 
accurately captures the result, it is overly cynical.  Clancy wrote The Hunt for Red 
October not due to an in-depth understanding of publishing and market currents.  The 
unorthodox path to becoming a best-seller in fact shows how poorly Clancy understood 
both the market and the industry.  He instead wrote out of his own earnest agreement 
with the Reagan and desire to write a novel.  That Hunt succeeded to the extent that it did 
was because it was fit the shifting views of the public.702  Clancy’s editor, Deborah 
Grosvenor, believed the book was a “part of the era” and capitalized on the shifting 
cultural view of the Cold War.703  
  Reagan recognized this dynamic and took heart from the sweeping success of the 
book.  The administration viewed the book as a counter to the “largest block of popular 
culture,” which viewed the Cold War derisively.704  It saw The Hunt for Red October as 
an opportunity to advance an alternative narrative and as a sign that larger segments of 
the population were moving towards Reagan’s view about the moral superiority of the 
US in the Cold War. The book’s success provided tangible evidence that there was a 
renewed energy and will among many Americans to wage the Cold War on Reagan’s 
terms. 
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Reagan’s plan required significant investment in new weapons systems and 
technology.  The administration recognized the importance of advanced technology in 
mitigating the quantitative advantage of Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.  Reagan also 
appreciated Clancy’s depiction of the importance of technology and its decisive role in 
any engagement between the US and the Soviet Union. 
 
Perfect Weapons for Virtuous Men 
 
 Speaking at the commencement of the Air Force Academy in 1984, Reagan 
reflected on how much the nature of war changed in his lifetime.  He argued that despite 
nearly two millennia of separation, “the armies of Napoleon had not moved across 
Europe any faster than Caesar’s legions—and neither army worried about air cover.”705  
Yet in the half century between Reagan’s graduation and the cadets in the audience, 
technology went from “open cockpits to lunar landings” and the rockets of the science 
fiction from his youth became the space shuttles of the present age.706  He viewed this as 
evidence of the capabilities of Americans.  Reagan told the cadets that “technology, plus 
freedom, equals opportunity and progress.”707  The pairing of American scientific 
prowess with its ideology was the key to both the country’s future prosperity and victory 
in the Cold War. 
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 Reagan’s address at the Naval Academy the next year covered similar themes.  He 
highlighted the new “advance weaponry and sophisticated equipment” that the Navy 
received in recent years.708  Reagan spoke of the Aegis cruiser and advancements in the 
submarine fleet.  He highlighted the Los Angeles and Ohio class submarines, with their 
ability to track Soviet subs and deliver a second strike respectively, and argued they 
provided “the ultimate guarantee against nuclear attack.”709  Both classes far outstripped 
the equivalent Soviet submarines in capability and expanding both programs was one of 
the earliest initiatives of the Reagan administration. 
 Modernizing the military was crucial to Reagan’s vision of “peace through 
strength.”  NSDD-32 posited that there was a large gap “between strategy and 
capabilities.”710  The strategy called for the US “to deter military attack by the USSR” 
while also seeking “to contain and reverse” the expansion of their influence.711  However, 
as of 1982 US planners felt that “given our current force insufficiencies” there was little 
chance of the US accomplishing all the goals of the Reagan administration, unless it 
embarked upon “a sustained and balanced force development program.”712  It called for 
the immediate enhancement of the capabilities of the conventional forces that were 
forward-deployed in Europe and elsewhere, which effectively meant developing new, 
more lethal weapons to counteract the Soviet numerical advantage. 
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 Other documents from Reagan’s first term tell a similar story.  A 1981 study 
prepared by the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department identified the “US 
conventional and theatre nuclear force posture weaknesses” as a “priority problem” that 
severely hampered the ability of the US to pursue its European interests.713  Similarly, a 
March 1981 memo from Laurence Eagleburger, then the Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, to Secretary of State Alexander Haig argued that “Soviet power has 
grown enormously” over the preceding decade, and the ability of the US to restrain their 
influence had decline precipitously.714  The US needed to immediately embark upon the 
“development of adequate military capabilities” in order to restore the ability of the US to 
counter Soviet aggression and to offer a serious inducement to seek “serious, equitable 
arms control.”715  National Security Decision Directive 75 offered a similar appraisal in 
January of 1983.  The US still needed to “modernize its military forces” to ensure that 
“Soviet calculations of possible war outcomes” were so unfavorable as to prevent them 
from embarking on war.716    
 However, by the time Reagan read The Hunt for Red October in December of 
1984, he had reason to be optimistic that these concerns were no longer valid.  A study by 
the National Security Council conducted in advance of Reagan’s second term trumpeted 
that “America’s strength has been revitalized” thanks to the aggressive military spending 
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by the administration.717  The investment in personnel and the development and 
procurement of new weapons significantly “improved US military strength.”718  His 
optimism showed in his address at the Air Force Academy a week later, where he 
optimistically spoke about contemporary and future technological advances as ensuring 
the security and prosperity of America.  His proclamation that the US possessed “the best 
darn air force in the world,” was typical of his rhetoric but also rooted in the knowledge 
that new airframes, ordinance, and better training made the Air Force far more capable 
than it had been when he took office.719  Clancy’s work reinforced Reagan’s belief that 
US capabilities were significantly improved by the end of his first term. 
 The importance of technology is a central theme to Clancy’s work.  Reagan was 
particularly impressed with the author’s ability to accurately describe intricate technical 
details of weapons systems, something he asked Clancy about during an Oval Office 
visit.720  Clancy demurred and told the President that the dialogue was the harder part, 
though this undersold how seriously he took the research for his books.  As part of the 
publishing process, the Naval Institute Press submitted The Hunt For Red October to two 
active-duty submarine officers.  One cleared the book, while the second, Commander 
John Byron, told the publisher the book was unpublishable as it contained classified 
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information.721  Only after Clancy sat with the officer and showed the sources he used for 
research did the naval commander assent.  Reagan’s Secretary of the Navy had a similar 
reaction.  He later confided in Clancy that his reaction upon reading the book was to 
demand to know “who the hell cleared this.”722 
 In The Hunt for Red October, the strategic importance of technology fuels the 
entire plot.  The titular submarine possesses a “caterpillar drive,” which renders it 
theoretically undetectable by SONAR.  As Ramius issues his instructions to the crew, he 
tells them that their mission is to evade detection and skirt the Atlantic seaboard, bringing 
Soviet nuclear missiles to America’s shores.  Though the orders are fake, Ramius still 
expects to use the technology of the silent drive to defeat the US’s “newest and best 
hunter submarines,” the Los Angeles class boats Reagan referenced in his Annapolis 
address.723  The drive works flawlessly, as soon as the ship’s engineers activate it, a US 
submarine loses tracking of it, with the sonar man claiming that “the missile sub has gone 
dead,” even as the Red October travels west.724 
 The caterpillar drive represents a grave threat to the US Navy’s technological 
superiority.  If their attack submarines were unable to track Soviet missile ones, then the 
ability of the Soviets to launch a first strike would be greatly enhanced.  Upon realizing 
that Ramius intends to defect, the entire national security establishment plays a role in 
                                                 
721 Grosvenor interview 
722 Clancy to Richards, March 1985. 




learning how to track the submarine, take it, and then keep the knowledge of the Red 
October’s true fate out of Soviet hands.  Once captured, the Navy’s finest engineers and 
technicians board the boat to learn not just about the drive, but also every other secret the 
Soviet’s most advanced submarine hid.  At the open of Clancy’s fourth book, The 
Cardinal of the Kremlin, Ryan and Ramius are present at the scuttling of the Red 
October, which resembled “Frankenstein’s monster” due to the welding scars covering 
the boat.725 
 The Red October is the lone exception to American technological superiority in 
Clancy’s book.  That its advantage comes from a fictional and likely impossible 
technological advance is important.  The book then stands as an ode to the importance of 
technology in general, and a demonstration of the capabilities of the new and improved 
US military.  In every encounter with Soviet forces, US systems prove superior.  Even in 
the worst case, when a Soviet fighter pilot panics and shoots at an F-14, the American 
plane can endure a direct hit and return to its carrier even with the co-pilot 
incapacitated.726 
 Throughout the book, the Soviets are consistently unable to surprise the 
Americans, as ground, sea, and air-based radar provides US commanders with perfect 
situational awareness.  A Soviet pilot expresses frustration at his “intelligence officer for 
telling him he could sneak up” on the Americans, who instead intercept and embarrass 
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him.727  Soviet commanders do not enjoy the same benefits.  After the incident with the 
F-14, the US sought to show its anger and force the Soviets to moderate their behavior.  
A flight of A-10 warthogs, flying from the continental US, evade detection and jam the 
radars on the Soviet flagship before surrounding it with magnesium flares.  The Kirov 
only has sixty seconds to react to the flight and the entire engagement ends before the 
Admiral Stralbo, the Soviet commander, can reach the bridge.   
 The American commander intended to send a message with the mock attack that 
it the US “were serious [the Soviets] would all be dead now.”728  Stralbo recognizes the 
message and orders his fleet to be “meek as mice” from that point forward, as any 
escalation would likely end in its destruction at a slight cost to the Americans.729  He also 
forbids any response to further American provocation, as each action they take would 
only allow the US to gather valuable intelligence about Soviet systems and procedures.  
The scene plays out as a tactical-level version of NSDD-75’s goal of changing how the 
Soviets made their calculations.  The fictional action in The Hunt for Red October forced 
a realization on the part of the Soviets that they needed to moderate their behavior or face 
substantial and unacceptable losses. 
 Longtime speechwriter Dana Rohrabacher believes that Clancy’s work 
undeniably influenced Reagan.730  In the same way the President’s policies inspired the 
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author, the writers book helped Reagan grasp and visualize intricate military matters by 
casting them in the form he best understood; narrative.  Clancy’s book depicted Reagan’s 
first term military policy as a sweeping success.  He captured Reagan’s drive to bolster 
the public will, raise military morale, and increase the combat capabilities of the armed 
forces.  Without any high-level access, Clancy wrote a narrative version of what Reagan 
saw and heard from his advisors.  This allowed the President to see the success in a 
different way and provided a different medium to promote his administration’s 
objectives.  The Hunt for Red October became a valuable tool for him to both understand 
the current state of the Cold War and to communicate that vision to the American public.    
Reagan was not the only person in the administration to view Clancy in this manner, the 
author’s work took on surprising importance as those around Reagan sought to capitalize 
on his love of the book to advance their own agendas. 
 
Clancy and the National Security Establishment 
 
 In the summer of 1985, The Times Literary Supplement approached Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger with a request to review a work of fiction that deserved “to 
be better known.”731  Weinberger, who had reviewed books for The San Francisco 
Chronicle for nearly twenty years, agreed to the project.  Kay Liesz, his longtime 
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secretary, recommended The Hunt for Red October to Weinberger on the basis that she 
“had it on good authority that our big boss across the river thoroughly enjoyed it” and 
was “almost singlehandedly responsible for its zoom to the top of the best-sellers list.”732  
The Secretary of Defense took his secretary’s hint and amplified Reagan’s support of the 
book.  He produced a glowing review, which appeared in The Wall Street Journal as well 
as in The Times Literary Supplement, lauding the “vast and accurate” portrayal of 
technical detail and proclaiming that Clancy’s work held “many lessons” for “those who 
want to keep the peace.”733  Weinberger also reviewed Clancy’s Patriot Games for The 
Wall Street Journal two years later.  He again praised the portrayal of US technology, 
noting that it depicted US abilities “up to the limit of declassified information” and that 
the resulting “authenticity, and hence believability” made the book particularly 
valuable.734 
 Like Reagan, Weinberger was deeply sensitive to the power of fiction to influence 
the way people, including himself, thought about US policy.  He savaged Robert 
Ludlum’s The Bourne Supremacy in a review for The Wall Street Journal because it 
depicted a morally ambiguous US government.  The book’s protagonist, Jason Bourne, is 
a retired CIA assassin who opens the book living comfortably with his wife in Maine and 
working as a college professor.  Needing assistance in Hong King, the government forces 
Bourne to return to service by kidnapping his wife and fabricating incriminating 
                                                 
732 Kay Liesz to Caspar Weinberger, August 14, 1985, Box 596, The Papers of Caspar Weinberger, The 
Library of Congress. 
733 Caspar Weinberger, “Caspar Weinberger,” Times Literary Supplement October 18, 1985. 
734 Caspar Weinberger, “Patriot Games,” The Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1987. 
203 
 
information about him.  The book depicts the CIA and State Department as willing to 
engage in extreme, unethical behavior to achieve their aims.735 
 For Weinberger this was proof that Ludlum had ulterior motives.  He noted that 
“the required LeCarre syndrome” had “full reign” in the book as the author took extra 
effort to demonstrate that “those on our side are also guilty of several violations of good 
conduct” despite facing murderers and criminal syndicates.736  Weinberger’s attack on 
LeCarre echoes that of others in the administration.  Charles Hill, a close advisor of 
George Shultz, believed that LeCarre’s work was “anti-Western” since it depicted 
Americans “doing things that moral people would not do.”737  At the end of his review, 
Weinberger revealed his fear was that the book’s readers would “really think this [was] 
the way the government’s business [was] done.”738  The review demonstrates 
Weinberger’s conviction that the books people read could significantly sway how they 
viewed the world and influence their opinions on a wide range of issues.  Weinberger’s 
stance ignored that there was a basis to the more ambiguous views of LeCarre and 
Ludlum.  The revelation of the CIA’s “Family Jewels” in the Church Committee offered 
proof of enough misconduct to fuel the plots of many spy-thrillers.  Kenneth 
deGraffenreid acknowledged this and praised LeCarre’s George Smiley books for 
reinforcing many things about the nature of the KGB.739  The opposition of Hill, who 
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acknowledged the literary merit of LeCarre, and Weinberger, who was universally 
derisive of the novelist’s work, stemmed from a belief that powerful cultural forces 
aligned against the Reagan administration, and that they needed to push back on all 
fronts. 
 The Navy also quickly realized the value of narratives like The Hunt for Red 
October.  In February of 1985, the Navy’s senior-most submariner, Vice-Admiral Nils 
Thurman, invited Clancy to a lunch at the Pentagon.  There he presented the author with a 
large plaque and the intersecting brass dolphins of a member of the Navy’s submarine 
fleet.  Clancy counted receiving the badge as one of the three most meaningful events that 
came from publishing the novel.740  Five other admirals attended the lunch, including the 
Vice-Chief of Naval Operations, and over the meal, Clancy answered the admirals’ 
questions about how he wrote the book.  He took the opportunity to ask Thuman if the 
Navy would cooperate with a movie based on the book, a request to which the admiral 
provided “a qualified yes.”741  The Navy would make good on Thune’s conditional yes 
and supported the filming of The Hunt for Red October, in part, because Clancy insisted 
as part of his contract that the film could not depict the Navy in negatively in any way.742 
 Clancy was also popular with others in the White House.  After his meeting with 
Reagan, he attended a luncheon hosted by Reagan’s assistant Chief of Staff Michael 
Deaver.  At the lunch, he spoke with Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in what Wall 
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Street Journal reporter Robert Merry recalled as a “lively and erudite” discussion about 
the “arcana of naval warfare and strategy.”743  Clancy argued with once and future 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft about the prospect of winning a nuclear war.  
Scowcroft stated it was possible, while Clancy strongly disagreed.744   
Clancy also learned of his White House fans during a state dinner in March of 1985.  
While there, he met Bud McFarlane, then Reagan’s National Security Advisor.  
McFarlane commented that he liked the book, but joked that he was nothing like the NSA 
in the book, a sentiment Clancy agreed with.745  Clancy then shared an idea on “sea-
power and mobility” which he claimed McFarlane liked.746  Later in the evening, a White 
House photographer confided in Clancy that “everyone [emphasis Clancy] in the White 
House” had read and liked The Hunt for Red October.747  Given his experiences of the 
past several weeks, it would be difficult for Clancy to disagree.  At visits to the White 
House and the Pentagon, high-ranking leaders lined up to tell him how much the 
appreciated his book.  The verdict from ranking members of the Reagan administration 
was unanimous; The Hunt for Red October was not only an entertaining novel, but also a 
book with the potential to change how people thought about the American military and 
the role of the US in world. 
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 The Hunt for Red October was part of a significant cultural shift in the mid-1980s.  
Movies, television, and books increasingly adopted the themes the Reagan administration 
hoped for, with resurgent American nationalism foremost among them.  Hollywood 
depicted this trend most clearly.  In 1985, the same year Hunt made the best seller’s list, 
two Sylvester Stallone films showed how closely aligned Hollywood was to Reagan’s 
messaging.  Rambo: First Blood Part II and Rocky IV ranked second and third at the box 
office for the year and each earned over 125 million dollars at the box office.748  Both 
movies prominently feature Soviet villains with patriotic American protagonists.   
In Rambo, the titular character returns to Vietnam to rescue American POWs that 
the Vietnamese had secretly kept after the end of the war.  The focus on POWs left 
behind evoked a prominent, but unsubstantiated, Republican talking point of the 1970s.749  
After his superior explains the mission, Rambo asks him “do we get to win this time,” 
and receives the answer that this time it was up to him.  This reflected the emerging 
narrative about Vietnam that the unnecessary burdens placed on the military prevented 
victory in the war.  In the film, the CIA sabotages Rambo’s mission, resulting in his 
capture.  Held in a prison camp, a Soviet Lieutenant Colonel, Sergei Podovsky, tortures 
Rambo until he can escape along with the POWs.  After angrily confronting the CIA 
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handler, he storms off but not before he rejects his superior’s claim that he hates 
America.  Instead, Rambo says that he would “die for it” and only wants what every 
Vietnam veteran wants, “for our country to love us as much as we love it!”750  The plot of 
the movie embraced the preferred conservative memory of the Vietnam War.  It showed 
it as a noble cause undermined by feckless politicians and the bureaucratic state.  The 
prisoners of war were its true victims, who sacrificed years of their life and endured 
torture for an ungrateful country.  Rambo’s closing speech echoes Reagan’s 1981 West 
Point address in its demand for better treatment of America’s military service members.  
That the movie so perfectly captured Reagan’s message on this is likely part of why he 
referenced it casually with reporters soon after watching it. 
Rocky IV embraced Reagan’s Cold War moral framework.  In it, the Soviet boxer 
Ivan Drago is artificially manufactured.  His physique is steroid derived, and he trains in 
a laboratory where doctors and trainers use precise measurements to guide Drago’s 
exercise.  The Soviets extol him as the perfect Soviet man, and a model of strength and 
endurance.  However, Drago lacks morality.  He kills Apollo Creed in an exhibition 
match and expresses no remorse for the action, stating “if he dies, he dies.”751  In the film 
Rocky, and by extension, the United States is an underdog, forced to make the most of 
limited resources to compete on an uneven playing field.  Rocky’s heart wins over the 
Soviet crowd in the climactic bout, and even the Soviet premier finds himself applauding 
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Rocky’s exhortation that “if I can change, and you can change, everybody can 
change.”752  That change, though, came from recognizing basic human freedom and 
virtue, something that Rocky stands for in the movie.  The Soviet leadership and crowd 
accept he value of the individual and freedom over rigid adherence to a system by the 
movie’s end.  This embodied Reagan’s view of the Cold War, in which he was often 
careful to distinguish admiration and respect for the Russian people while simultaneously 
castigating the Soviet system. 
Rambo: First Blood Part II and Rocky IV finished behind Back to the Future at 
the box office.  While Back to the Future does not as explicitly embrace Reagan’s vision 
as the Stallone films, some of the worldview does slip into the film.  The opening act 
features the death of Doctor Emmett Brown, creator of the Delorean Time Machine, at 
the hands of Libyan terrorists, whose plutonium he had stolen.753  Following the rise of 
Muammar Gaddafi, Libya increasingly sponsored terrorist attacks and served as home to 
training camps.  The regime increased its antagonism of the US during the Reagan 
administration, including an incident where Libyan aircraft attacked American ones, 
leading to a brief air battle that saw both Libyan planes shot down.  The use of Libyan 
terrorists with fissile material in Back to the Future fit with contemporary events and 
matches the use of Libya as a sponsor of terrorism seen in Clancy’s Patriot Games. 
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The good cultural news for the Reagan administration continued in 1986, when 
Top Gun ruled the box office earning over 175 million.754  The movie, which received 
significant support from the Navy, was a two-hour long recruitment video for the service.  
It largely takes place at U.S. Navy Fighter Weapons School in San Diego and follows 
pilots training to earn the coveted status of Top Gun.  An ambiguous communist nation’s 
antagonism create confrontations at the beginning and end of the movie, but the 
American pilots and fighters so easily outclass their opponents it is difficult to view them 
as a real threat.  Instead, it competition among the American pilots provides the drama in 
the film, even though all are devoted to serving their.755  This fit Reagan’s emphasis on 
the universal competence and quality of American service members and the vast 
superiority of US technology that he emphasized throughout his presidency. 
 Although The Hunt for Red October is often referred to as the first techno-thriller, 
it was not the first book of its genre.  Books utilizing current and near-future military 
technology in a recognizable international environment were moderately popular in the 
1930s.756  Clancy also was not the first best-seller to use such an approach in the Cold 
War.  General Sir John Hackett published The Third World War: August 1985 in 1978.  
He had a similar aim to Clancy, intended to bolster support for more robust defense 
policy.  The Third World War is essentially a war game which predicted how a major war 
between the US and Soviet Union would unfold. 
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 The Hunt for Red October presaged these positive depictions of the military. It 
helped Reagan view his first term as a complete success.  The work offered a creative 
space to see what America’s defense capability currently was and the direction it was 
trending in.  That the public then largely embraced Clancy’s work only furthered 
Reagan’s sense that his first term restored US will and capability in the Cold War.  
Clancy’s next book, Red Storm Rising, helped Reagan conclude the US had the strength 

















Chapter 5 Techno-Thriller Rising: Conventional Balance and Nuclear Abolitionism 
 
As the US delegation flew to Reykjavik in October of 1986, Reagan went to one 
of Air Force One’s rear cabins to talk with his staff.  However, rather than discuss the 
preparations for the upcoming summit or the negotiating strategy he wanted to employ, 
he spoke of things his staff viewed as trivial.757  This did not surprise those who knew 
him well, as over the previous five years they had learned that Reagan did not “feel the 
need to have things fully staffed out before meetings.”758  His confidence in his 
negotiating skills and charisma led him to focus on core principles rather than detail.  
Reagan identified Red Storm Rising as his “research” for the summit.759  The negotiating 
team believed Reagan was joking and reference the book because part of the plot 
centered Iceland.760  However, Red Storm Rising did serve as a research tool.  Reagan 
used it to further his understanding of the conventional balance in Europe, the ability of 
the US to support its allies, and to examine how a theoretical war between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact could unfold.  It offered a creative space which Reagan used to develop his 
strategic vision and directly influenced his actions at Reykjavik. 
Before departing the summit, Reagan spoke with military personnel and their 
families at Keflavik Airfield.  He told of “hard and tough” negotiations in the previous 48 
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hours, lamenting how close they were “the most far-reaching arms control proposal in 
history” before breaking in frustration.761  Despite failing to achieve a historic accord, 
Reagan felt the two nations made “great strides…in resolving most of [their] differences” 
over nuclear weapons and pledged to “continue the effort.”762  He closed with a reminder 
to the service members that they served on “NATO’s frontline” for a purpose.  Their 
mission provided a presence that “strengthened world peace” ensuring “the prevention of 
war.”  As America’s “secret weapon,” they ensured the “flame of freedom” would 
“spread its light throughout the world.”763 
Reagan’s closing remarks built upon first-term rhetoric depicting the military as 
“gallant and brave.”764  It also evoked his longtime talking point of “peace through 
strength.”  His consistent devotion to the latter principle made Reykjavik shocking to 
many.  The “far-reaching” proposal at the summit came when Reagan told Gorbachev 
that “it would be fine with him if we eliminated all nuclear weapons,” prompting the 
Soviet leader to respond, “let’s do it.”765  The exchange prompted a period of furious 
negotiations that if consummated would eliminate all nuclear weapons.  Talks broke 
down over Soviet demands to confine Strategic Defense Initiative to the laboratory for a 
period of ten years, something Reagan was unwilling to do.   
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Reagan’s supporters and many American allies saw the Reykjavik framework as a 
sudden and dangerous shift.  They feared Reagan would throw away one of the most 
significant accomplishments of his first term.  His administration launched a five-point 
program to modernize the US nuclear triad.  It resulted in the design of a new 
Peacekeeper missile, a relaunch of the B-1 bomber program, improved submarine 
launched Trident submarines, modernization of the bomber force, and a more robust 
command and control program.766  The administration also set a target to grow the US 
nuclear arsenal by over 17,000 warheads by 1987.767  Reagan’s emphasis on expanding 
and improving the US nuclear arsenal throughout his first five years in office gave little 
indication he would favor the sweeping progress on arms control of his last three. 
Deployment of the Pershing-II intermediate range missiles in Europe also indicated an 
administration devoted to principles of deterrence and Mutually Assured Destruction. 
Though the decision for deployment came during the Carter years after the Soviet Union 
deployed intermediate range SS-20 missiles in 1977, Reagan and his advisors fully 
supported the NATO response.  Jack Matlock, a Reagan advisor and NSC member, 
argued that the Soviet deployment “changed the nuclear balance in Europe” particularly 
because rather than replace old missiles on a one for one basis, the Soviets emplaced  “a 
substantially larger number of the more capable weapon.”768  Weinberger similarly 
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viewed the Soviet actions as a “politically and military threatening change in the nuclear 
balance in Europe.”769  Charles Hill felt the US must deploy its own missiles or capitulate 
to Soviet dominance of Europe.770  The views of Reagan’s advisors echoed the 1979 
NATO Double-Track decision that argued the alliance needed a strong response to 
prevent “Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems.”771  
Reagan vocally supported the Pershing deployment despite mounting public 
opposition.  At the National Press Club in 1981, he argued that the US had no comparable 
missile to the SS-20 and had “dismantled the last such missile in Europe over 15 years 
ago.”772  In his view, NATO countries therefore had to modernize their forces to meet the 
Soviet threat.  Reagan offered to halt the deployment, but only if the Soviets agreed to 
dismantle the SS-20s and older SS 4 and 5 missiles.773  The proposal had little impact, 
and by 1986 there were 143 of the Pershing missiles in Europe.774  Reagan’s actions to 
ensure that NATO maintained equivalent strategic capabilities to the Soviet Union 
seemed to reflect acceptance of a traditional approach to deterrence. 
Similarly, James Mann notes in The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan that while 
running for office Reagan offered voters little indication he favored abolition.775  He 
consistently railed against the second round of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT 
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II) concluded under the Carter administration.  He wrote to Donald Rumsfeld in 1979 that 
the proposed caps would “be a serious blow to our security.”776  A 1977 radio 
commentary argued the framework favored the Soviets enough to cause “purring sounds 
from the Kremlin.”777  Utilizing the rhetoric of MAD, Reagan told listeners restrictions 
on missile range would ensure that the Soviets could range Western Europe, Japan and 
69% Americas, while the US would only be able to target 15% of the Soviet 
population.778   The absence of the Soviet’s Backfire bomber also demonstrated the 
imbalanced nature of the agreement.  While Reagan was correct that the treaty included 
the B-1 but not the TU-22, he overstated its importance.779  His decision to honor the 
terms of the unratified treaty through 1986 implies that his rhetoric of SALT II stemmed 
more from political opportunism than serious strategic concern. 
In between his 1976 and 1980 campaigns, Reagan advocated for new classes of 
nuclear weapons and devoted several radio programs to push for creation of a neutron 
bomb.  He believed the proposed weapon was “truly akin to the science fiction 
deathray.”780  Through allusion to science fiction Reagan inaccurately implied the 
weapon would kill only enemy soldiers.  The deathray analogy spoke to Reagan’s love of 
the fictional genre and showed a lack of technical expertise.  A neutron bomb still 
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required a nuclear blast, albeit one with significantly reduced explosive force.  While it 
would result in less collateral and property damage than the Lance missile in use by 
NATO forces at the time, a neutron bomb would still kill civilians and damage the 
countryside.  It was not the controlled, clean vaporization implied by the term “deathray.” 
Reagan’s rhetoric and actions convinced many Americans that he made nuclear war more 
likely.781  A 1984 gaffe in which an open mic caught him joking about “outlawing Russia 
forever” and beginning a bombing campaign in five minutes increased the unease.782  
Rising fear of nuclear war became a staple of popular culture during the period.  Two 
critically and commercially adored stories, Frank Miller’s The Dark Knight Returns and 
Watchmen by Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons, stridently criticized US foreign policy and 
argued it risked nuclear war and annihilation.783   
Miller’s Batman story featured President Reagan unintentionally causing a 
nuclear war over a small Caribbean island.  He depicts a smiling Reagan, clad in a 
radiation suit, praising American victory on a clear stand in for Grenada, before 
informing the people that the Soviets are “bad losers” who launched a nuclear missile in 
response.784  An iconic and stunning sequence took up the next four pages.  In the first 
panels, Superman places himself in front of a red star tipped missile, strongly evoking 
early Cold War propaganda.  Then the missile explodes. Superman, representative of 
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truth, justice and the American-way, appears zombie-like and barely survives the strike, a 
clear allusion to the potential fate of his adopted home. 
Reagan is not the president in Watchmen; instead Nixon circumvented the 22nd 
Amendment to serve five terms in office while pursuing policies pushing the US and 
USSR to the brink of war.  The comic uses the “Doomsday Clock” of the Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists to instill a sense of dread and pending disaster.  Only the destruction of 
major international cities in a fake alien attack orchestrated by a former-hero forces the 
nations to come together.785  Faced with a perceived existential extraterrestrial threat, the 
US and USSR set aside the Cold War in the name of mutual survival. 
There is some irony that Moore saw an alien invasion as the way to bridge the gap 
between the two nations.  While meant as a commentary on a conflict he saw as foolish 
and needlessly intractable, Reagan and Gorbachev did actually agree to abandon the Cold 
War if aliens attacked.  In their first face to face meeting, Reagan mused that news of an 
alien invasion would “unite all the peoples of the world” and asked Gorbachev what the 
Soviet Union would do in that scenario.786  The Soviet Premier answered that the USSR 
would help the US to defend itself, and Reagan promised the US would do the same for 
the Soviets. 
A 1983 made-for-tv movie, The Day After, also tapped into American fears of 
nuclear war.  The depressing film depicted life in a small Kansas town immediately after 
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a nuclear war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  John Corry, TV critic for The New 
York Times, argued the film’s relatively graphic depiction of the effects were an effective 
“primer on the horror of thermonuclear war,” despite being a “terrible” movie from a 
critical perspective.787    Other critics felt it was a “rallying cry” for the nuclear freeze 
movement.788  Concerned by the potential reception, the White House requested that 
ABC air a town-hall with Secretary Shultz immediately after.789  Their fears intensified 
after Reagan and several staffers watched the movie before it aired.790  However, the 
forced inclusion of commercial breaks and editing that rendered the film difficult to 
comprehend lessened the feared impact.791 
The Day After’s imagery struck Reagan and left him “greatly depressed.”792  
However, it also fueled his desire “do all we can to have a deterrent” sufficient to scare 
the Soviets from launching a nuclear attack.793  Reagan also noted in his diary that the 
film was “anti-nuke propaganda” and the administration had to do everything it could to 
“take over” the message of the film.794 He hoped that Shultz’s interview would help show 
the administration’s present course was the correct one.  While many histories argue The 
Day After inspired later efforts at arms control and abolition, they greatly overstate its 
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importance to Reagan.  The launch of SDI nearly nine months before the film aired 
already demonstrated his vision of a nuclear-free world.  Reagan became a nuclear 
abolitionist in the late 1940s, though he failed to effectively message why he believed 
achieving abolition required strategic modernization. 
A science fiction film did help inspire Reagan’s anti-nuclear beliefs.   Reagan 
spoke frequently about the 1951 classic The Day the Earth Stood Still.795  It was a 
surprisingly subversive film for its period.  Margot Henriksen notes in Dr Strangelove’s 
America that much of the film challenges Cold War notions of American power.  The 
alien, Klaatu, lands on a baseball field in Washington DC, “the center of all that 
represents American power and the American way of life.”796  Throughout the film, the 
US military is unable to penetrate the UFO and Klaatu’s guardian robot proves both 
indestructible and capable of melting weapons instantaneously.  Though killed by the 
military, his ship’s advanced technology revives Klaatu long enough to deliver a dire 
warning, the Earth must abandon its warlike ways or risk being “reduced to a burned out 
cinder.”797  Klaatu asks Earth’s leaders to follow his people’s example and allow a 
police-like force of robots to act with impunity to prevent aggressive behavior, a clear 
allusion to contemporary efforts to internationalize atomic energy and ban the atomic 
bomb. 
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Klaatu’s belief that security for all “does not mean giving up any freedom, except 
the freedom to act irresponsibly” appealed strongly to Reagan.798  He was fond of stating 
“with freedom comes responsibility,” and even linked the idea to arms control in a 1983 
address.799  The Day the Earth Stood Still cast nuclear weapons as an attack on individual 
freedom and liberty.  They made the world “face obliteration” and prevented individuals 
from “pursuing more profitable enterprises.”800  These ideas mirror Reagan’s own about 
the immorality of atomic weapons and their impact on individual liberty.  Colin Powell, 
one of Reagan’s National Security Advisors, believed the film helped inspire both the 
President’s aside about alien invasion to Gorbachev and his frequent attempts to 
incorporate references to “little green men” in speeches.801  The film and its 
internationalist message likely contributed to Reagan’s desire to share SDI.802 
Paul Lettow convincingly argues in Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons that Reagan “held audacious, unorthodox views regarding nuclear 
weapons” long before he became president.803  Some of his earliest political activity 
centered around his opposition to nuclear weapons.  Reagan planned to lead a mass 
antinuclear rally in December of 1945 and to read the poem “Set Your Clock at U-235” 
by Norman Corwin, which featured apocalyptic descriptions of the bombing of Nagasaki.  
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Only intervention by Warner Bros, which feared the political repercussions of the 
performance, prevented Reagan’s participation.804 
Reagan also fundamentally disliked the underlying principles of Mutually 
Assured Destruction.  While campaigning for the 1968 Republican Nomination he 
equated the concept to a western standoff.  For Reagan, MAD was no different than “two 
westerners standing in a saloon aiming their guns to each other’s head – permanently.”805  
Ed Meese noted Reagan saw MAD as “politically and diplomatically, militarily, and 
morally flawed.”806  Kenneth Adelman, on of Reagan’s lead nuclear negotiators felt the 
president’s “hatred for nuclear weapons” strongly influenced nuclear strategy and 
negotiations with the Soviets during the administration.807  Reagan’s sense that MAD was 
“morally flawed” stemmed from his view that it represented the absolute failure of the 
government to uphold its basic responsibility, protection of individual life and freedom.  
Americans could not be free if they lived under threat of annihilation. 
Reagan’s nuclear abolitionism was in apparent conflict with his large investment 
in the nuclear triad.  In The Triumph of Improvisation, historian James Graham Wilson 
argues that Reagan was “torn between a crusade for freedom and peace through 
strength.”808   Wilson acknowledges Reagan’s nuclear abolitionism, but feels it clashed 
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with his desire to eradicate communism and “when it came to foreign policy, Reagan’s 
thoughts and emotions were conflicted.”809  Achieving the first would mean forgoing the 
latter, but Reagan’s “abundant optimism and conservative political philosophy” meant 
“tradeoffs did not interest him.”810 Conceding on either would betray individual freedom, 
which he viewed as both the strength of America and the right of people everywhere. 
However, these goals were not as diametrically opposed as the language would 
indicate because of how Reagan defined “peace through strength.”  He adopted the 
language when campaigning for Barry Goldwater in 1964.  In his televised address 
during the campaign, which effectively launched his political career, he argued that 
strength meant having the “courage to say to our enemies, there is price we will not pay, 
there is a point beyond which they must not advance.”811  The expansion of strength to 
include more than military means, but also the will of the population was a critical one, 
and likely came from conversations with one of his political mentors, Dwight 
Eisenhower.  The view reflects Clausewitz’s maxim that the ability to defeat an enemy 
stems from being able to overcome resistance with strength that is “the product of two 
factors which cannot be separated, namely the sum of available means and the strength of 
the will.”812  Whether Reagan learned this from reading On War or from mentorship is 
largely irrelevant, as his first term sought to buttress both aspects of American strength. 
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Wilson notes that Reagan’s notion of “crusade for freedom” sought to “cast the 
Cold War struggle in terms of moral clarity.”813  The concept focused less on rollback 
than on eliminating notions of moral equivalency in the Cold War.  Reagan’s view of 
“Crusade for Freedom” came from his participation in a Radio Free Europe fundraising 
drive spearheaded by Eisenhower in 1950.  Eisenhower, then a private citizen, called on 
his fellow citizens to meet the communist “threat with courage and firmness” by aiding 
those behind the Iron Curtain with “access to truth.”814  America’s moral superiority was 
its “most formidable weapon” and one each citizen could “help forge through the 
Crusade for Freedom.”815  Reagan echoed these sentiments in television commercials for 
the program, stating the funds raised helped “pierce the Iron Curtain with truth” 
identifying the “Crusade for Freedom as your chance and mine to fight communism.”816   
As president, Reagan introduced the “Crusade for Freedom” in his address to the 
British Parliament at Westminster.  He concluded the speech, which famously promised 
democracy would leave “Marxism-Leninsim on the ash-heap of history,” by pledging to 
“begin a major effort” to support a “crusade for freedom that [would] engage the faith 
and fortitude of the next generation.”817  The New York Times noted the speech was “full 
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of echoes of the cold war of the 1950’s” and drew on Eisenhower’s own remarks.818  
Though the term “crusade” was part of a “militantly anti-Communist tone,” the Times 
recognized Reagan called for “a peaceful struggle for ideological supremacy.”819   
The pledge caught many in the administration off-guard.  Advisors did not expect the 
president to announce a major policy initiative in the speech.  Over the next eighteen 
months, the National Security Council worked with a broad array of government agencies 
to create the National Endowment for Democracy.820  The Endowment created a fund for 
non-governmental organizations that promoted democracy abroad.  In this context, 
“Crusade for Freedom” nested under “Peace through Strength” as a non-military way to 
rebuild and project American will. 
Reagan wanted to increase American military strength as well.  He felt this would 
allow him to negotiate from a credible position.  A key component of this strength was 
building enough strength to win a war in Europe.  Doing so seemed unlikely as Reagan 
entered office.  In 1976, the US developed a new doctrine of “Active Defense” to provide 
guidance on how to fight against the Warsaw Pact.  Army field manuals painted a 
daunting picture of the situation in Europe.  They warned the army would fight “battles at 
the end of a long, expensive, vulnerable, line of communications.”821  Worse, 
commanders “must prepare… units to fight outnumbered, and to win.”822  In order to 
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win, allied forces would substitute “firepower for manpower.”823  However, critics 
believed the new doctrine relied too much on achieving near-perfect intelligence to 
prepare for Soviet attacks.824  These doubts led to the development and 1982 adoption of 
AirLand Battle.  NATO’s new strategy would leverage technological advances to provide 
offensive opportunities not available under the Active Defense model.   
The new doctrine viewed an “integrated tactical nuclear-conventional response” 
to Soviet invasion “as mandatory.”825 A credible tactical nuclear capability would 
“discourage the enemy from forming relatively dense formations” that could overwhelm 
NATO units.826  Nuclear strikes would create offensive opportunities by halting Soviet 
advances allowing NATO forces opportunities to exploit breaks in enemy formations.  
The alliance would employ its nuclear weapons to “focus heavily on targets well beyond 
the front-line” for both political and operational reasons.827  It required “extending the 
battlefield and integrating conventional, nuclear, chemical and electronic means to permit 
attack of the enemy at the full depth of his formations.”828 
However, NATO lacked the ability to execute this doctrine during Reagan’s first 
term.  As the Reagan administration entered the White House, Admiral John Poindexter, 
the military assistant to the National Security Advisor, believed that the “Carter 
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administration had not done enough to keep the Defense Department funded.”829  He 
identified significant problems with the lack of maintenance and spare parts and a 
reliance on old and outdated weapons systems.  The problems ran counter to the 
emphasis on readiness and technological superiority, leaving the US and NATO in a poor 
strategic position to hold off a concerted Warsaw Pact offensive. 
Carter’s Secretary of Defense Harold Brown expressed similar concern about the 
about the alliance’s strength relative to the Soviets.  He wrote National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski in April 1979 to argue that Brzezinski was “too optimistic” about 
US conventional forces.830  Brown felt that despite recent efforts the US still had not 
“achieved any major changes… in our actual capabilities in Europe.”831  Without greatly 
increased spending the US would “slide behind rapidly in military capabilities across the 
board.”832  Brown’s concerns were a precursor to the Reagan administration’s.  While 
Carter took steps to address the concerns, Reagan viewed the steps as insufficient and felt 
he inherited a disadvantageous position in Europe. 
Early policy documents reflected this fear.  The Policy Planning Staff began 
efforts just a month into the administration to “identify US conventional and theatre 
nuclear posture weaknesses” preventing the US from “[competing] effectively with the 
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Soviet Union in Europe.”833  Lawrence Eagleburger, writing to Haig, argued the US must 
“correct the growing imbalance in US-Soviet military power” in the face of “increasingly 
aggressive Soviet behavior.”834  National Security Decision Directive-32 utilized similar 
language in May of 1982, identifying the “loss of U.S. strategic superiority” and the 
“overwhelming growth of Soviet conventional forces capabilities” as established fact.835 
That same month, while speaking at the commencement of his alma mater, 
President Reagan brought the message of NSDD-32 to the American people.  He argued 
that despite the economic and social difficulties faced by the Soviet Union, it had still 
forged the “largest armed force in the world.”836  Reagan built upon his rhetoric of peace 
through strength by asserting that “peace [was] not the absence of conflict, but the ability 
to cope with conflict by peaceful means.”837  He identified “a sound East-West military 
balance” as “absolutely essential” to peace.838  A NATO comparison of Alliance and 
Warsaw Pact forces showed such a balance was non-existent. The document showed over 
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the previous ten years the Soviets “built up their forces across the board” while US and 
NATO defense spending “declined in real terms.”839   
The study Reagan referenced was the first comparison NATO publicly 
released.840  In the foreword, NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns pointed out that over 
the last twenty years “the numerical balance of forces... moved slowly but steadily in 
favor of the Warsaw Pact.”841  NATO’s technological advantage also decayed, 
endangering the ability of the alliance to overcome quantity with quality.842  The study 
highlighted the challenging nature of NATO supply lines and the gap in intermediate 
nuclear forces as the two greatest challenges.843  Logistical challenges limited the 
likelihood the US and NATO could prevail conventionally and strategic imbalance meant 
their efforts at deterrence were less effective. 
Based on these weaknesses, Reagan felt the US could not afford to accept a new 
arms control deal.  During a 1981 National Security Council meeting Reagan insisted that 
the US needed “positive movement on modernization before we go into negotiations.”844   
He stated this publicly as well.  During an address at Eureka College he identified the 
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“growing instability of the nuclear balance” as the “main threat to peace posed by nuclear 
weapons.”845  Acknowledging those calling for a nuclear freeze, Reagan argued that 
would only be possible after the gap between the US and Soviet Union closed.846  Reagan 
expanded on his support for a future arms control deal in a press conference after the 
speech, stating his “goal [was] to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically.” 847  Rejecting the 
views of his advisors, he reiterated his belief that “everybody would be a loser if there is 
a nuclear war.”848  However, reducing strategic weapons depended on NATO’s ability to 
defeat the Warsaw Pact conventionally. 
At the Reykjavik Conference in 1986, Reagan felt NATO had that ability.  His 
optimistic read on the relative strength of the alliance put him at odds with his advisors, 
allies, and much of the defense establishment, a difference of option that he used to his 
advantage during the talks.  As negotiations broke down Reagan pleaded with Gorbachev 
to relent on SDI because the “most out-spoken critics of the Soviet Union over the years, 
the so-called right-wing” would react negatively to the ten-year framework. 849  Reagan’s 
critics were already “kicking his brains out” for discussing limitation, to say nothing of 
abolition.850   
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Reagan’s prediction of vocal opposition proved true.  Poindexter, now National 
Security Advisor, wrote immediately after the summit expressing his opposition.  He 
argued the elimination of nuclear weapons would return the US to a state like “that which 
[it] faced in the 1950s” when it only had a “chance” of stopping a conventional assault.851  
Poindexter supported abolition as a long-term goal but did not think it was the 
appropriate time to pursue it.  Instead, he felt the two powers should eliminate land-based 
missiles, believing ones from submarines were a sufficient deterrent.852  However, his 
proposal blatantly favored the US and had no realistic chance of Soviet acceptance. 
The Joint Chiefs also expressed immediate opposition to the Reykjavik 
framework.  In a December meeting with the president, they unanimously argued that the 
elimination of nuclear weapons within ten years would gravely impact the strategic 
balance in Europe.  In their view, the contemporary conventional deterrent was 
inadequate and would require an investment of tens of billions of dollars over a period of 
at least a decade.853  While the timelines for the buildup and nuclear abolition matched, 
the Pentagon felt political and social factors would prevent the necessary spending. 
Weinberger strongly dissented.  Shortly after the summit, NSDD-250 reiterated 
Reagan’s desire to eliminate ballistic missiles.  It also directed the Pentagon to provide 
recommendations to support an IBM-less strategy.854  Weinberger ignored this guidance 
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and instead argued “at the least it [was] unclear whether the Soviet Union [intended] to 
accept the US proposals” and as a result “our national security planning and military 
programming remain unaltered.”855  An attached study reiterated his standard line that the 
US would “have to address more realistically the Warsaw pact’s distinct advantage in 
nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional warfare capabilities.”856  Poindexter 
broadly agreed with Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs.  His own memo to Reagan stressed 
that “the differences in size of conventional forces” and other “military requirements” 
meant it was “very unlikely we could take the actions to improve our conventional 
forces” to a point that enabled the Reykjavik framework to succeed.857 
Opposition to Reykjavik extended well beyond the White House.  Richard Nixon 
and Henry Kissinger coauthored a National Review op-ed arguing the proposed deal 
threatened to reopen the “gap in deterrence.”858    Brent Scowcroft, the national security 
advisor to President Ford, felt the proposed deal would lead to “absolute disaster.”859  
Even decades later when Kissinger advocated for nuclear abolition, Scowcroft continued 
to insist the weapons were necessary.860  Opposition also came from the Democratic 
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Party.  Chair of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin believed it would take 
ten more divisions in Europe to establish an all-conventional deterrent.861   
European leaders dreaded the possibility of nuclear abolition.  After the summit, 
the USIA reported the proposals “amazed” continental news services.862  A memo from 
USIA Director Charles Wick to Poindexter argued Western Europe fears of “an America 
strategically decoupled from Europe have suddenly revived.”863  Even before the summit, 
the French expressed concern about the possibility of US concessions on INF.  They 
believed any agreement would further push the US from Europe, placing greater strain on 
France to make up the gap in deterrence.864  The summit concerned the West German 
government and complicated efforts to placate a population supportive of the Nuclear 
Freeze movement.  Kohl called Reykjavik “breathtaking” but feared its “far-reaching 
consequences,” most notably that it would leave a “conventional imbalance in Europe” 
still not “properly addressed” by NATO.865   
Reagan’s willingness to abolish nuclear weapons caught the British completely 
off-guard.  Writing to Reagan before the summit, Thatcher gave no indication that she 
expected a sweeping offer.  Instead, she felt that Reagan should “be sticking to the 
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essential elements of the negotiating position worked out with your Allies.”866  Thatcher 
would naturally “welcome an agreement based on an equal ceiling in Europe” for 
ballistic missiles, but did not envision a ceiling of zero.867  Shortly after the summit, Sir 
Anthony Acland, the British Ambassador to the US, sought to clarify the US position on 
nuclear weapons.  He met with Shultz on October 16 to discuss UK concerns.  Shultz 
held firm, indicating he believed “longer term” fears of Warsaw Pact superiority were not 
“wholly justified.”868  NATO would take advantage of the combined population and 
economic advantages of all its member states.  Acland remained unconvinced and 
retorted it was easier for a “totalitarian state to keep a huge force under arms than for 
western democracies.”869   In a later meeting, Poindexter assured the ambassador that 
Reagan did not seek to eliminate all nuclear weapons and remained committed to 
maintaining deterrence through bombers and cruise missiles.  He also emphasized that 
these areas were ones of strength for the alliance and referenced the development of 
stealth technology which “undoubtedly” put the US far ahead of the Soviets.870  Despite 
Poindexter’s efforts, Acland found it to be “an unsatisfactory discussion” that only 
offered “confused” and “contradictory” counterarguments to British concerns.871 
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Thatcher took her concerns directly to Reagan.  She cabled congratulating Reagan 
on coming close to an agreement and blamed Gorbachev for preventing a “historic 
achievement.”872 However, the initial reports about a “prospective agreement to eliminate 
all long-range nuclear missiles… caused [her] considerable concern.”873  She worried it 
reflected reluctance by the US to commit to NATO and could “cause even more 
difficulties for Western unity.874  The cable encouraged Reagan to negotiate “along the 
lines we have discussed in the past,” a sign of the Thatcher’s displeasure.875 
She also called Reagan the day after the summit.  The phone call echoed the language of 
the cable, beginning by praising Reagan’s for having “preformed marvelously” and then 
segueing into the “considerable concern” caused by the proposal.876  Thatcher “repeatedly 
stressed the importance of nuclear deterrence in the face of the imbalance of conventional 
forces in Europe,” to no effect.877  Reagan felt the US “could have a strategy” to address 
the issue.878  After the call, the British felt Reagan would not abandon the abolition and 
instead “showed considerable pride in it.”879 
Reagan clearly viewed the conventional environment in Europe differently from 
his advisors, supporters, and allies.  Even in the face of concerted, organized efforts to 
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sway him, he remained committed to his belief in the ability to deter the USSR 
conventionally.  While many advisors agreed with Reagan about the increased capability 
of US forces they still felt the US needed strategic weapons.  Reagan drew his distinct 
conclusion from an unconventional source that he revealed to Thatcher during their 
conversation.  In response, the British classified the transcript as “particularly sensitive” 
and limited its distribution.880  Thatcher and her advisors feared that others who viewed 
the transcript would feel it demonstrated Reagan’s “grasp of strategy must be pretty 
limited,” a view they rejected.881 
During the phone conversation, Reagan “strongly commended” Tom Clancy’s 
Red Storm Rising to Thatcher.882  He felt it “gave an excellent picture of the Soviet 
Union’s intentions and strategy” and “had clearly been much impressed by the book.”883  
Thatcher did not know what to make of the recommendation, and an advisor had to 
explain the reference.884  However, for Reagan with his penchant for using fiction as a 
creative space in developing policy, Clancy’s work provided an environment which 
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Red Storm Rising and the President 
 
 Thatcher was not the only one with whom Reagan discussed Clancy’s book.  
When the author visited the White House in March of 1985, the president demonstrated a 
strong interest in forthcoming novel after hearing it was about World War III.885  He 
queried Clancy about who win and enjoyed the response of “the good guys.”886  He read 
the book immediately after its August 1986 release, and claimed it prepared him for the 
summit.   
 Red Storm Rising is, as Clancy indicated in the Oval Office, about World War III.  
The author also kept his promise about “the good guys” winning the war.  It begins with a 
successful terrorist attack on a Soviet oil refinery, leading to an energy crisis for Moscow.  
Soviet leaders determine they must take Iranian oil fields and refinery facilities to prevent 
economic collapse.  They recognize aggressive military action could lead to a broader 
war and conclude they must “eliminate NATO as a political and military force.”887  They 
view NATO as “divided and soft” and express certainty it will crumble quickly.888  The 
USSR then stages a terrorist attack against a group of children visiting the Kremlin and 
use it as casus belli to invade West Germany. 
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 The Soviets immediately push deep into Germany and seize Iceland in a surprise 
amphibious invasion.  Losing the island threatens NATO’s supply lines and begins a 
period of fierce naval combat in the Atlantic.  NATO eventually establishes a stalemate 
on the continent and the recapture of Iceland returns control of air and sea lanes to the 
alliance.  The arrival of fresh troops and supplies in Europe places conventional victory 
out of reach for the USSR, leading to a coup in Moscow, the end of the war, and Clancy 
ends the book hinting about a non-communist Soviet Union. 
The favorable outcome alone was not enough to endear the work to Reagan.  Red 
Storm Rising was neither the first “techno-thriller” about a NATO-Warsaw Pact world 
war published, nor the first work of fiction that Reagan read on the subject.  The 1978 
book The Third World War: August 1985 by General Sir John Hackett provided a basic 
template for Clancy to work with.  Recently retired, the general worked with other retired 
flag officers seeking to raise alarm about the weakness of NATO.  His first draft of the 
book had the Soviets win the fictional war due to the “damage of the locust years” of the 
1970s.889  However, consultation with colleagues led Hackett to believe that the ending 
would “cause more harm than good,” and he changed the ending to a NATO victory.890 
The book became a bestseller as a paperback, debuting on The New York Times list in 
ninth place on June 1, 1980.891  Berkley Books published it, and the success of this first 
techno-thriller likely influenced their decision to purchase the paperback rights to The 
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Hunt for Red October.892  Hackett’s and Clancy’s books have much in common.  Both 
portray reestablishment of supply lines from North America as critical to the eventual 
NATO victory, show the importance of technology, and end in a Soviet coup.  On the 
surface, Hackett’s concluding argument that “if the crisis of 1985 had occurred in 1977” 
it would be “scarcely conceivable the Soviet plan…could have failed” and clear call for 
increased military spending would appeal to Reagan in a similar way to Clancy’s 
books.893  However, after including the work on a June 1984 list of books he was reading, 
Reagan never publicly referenced it again.894 
Partly, this was due to Clancy’s superior storytelling.  The Third World War lacks 
a central narrative and protagonist.  Hackett uses military jargon excessively and does not 
have Clancy’s ability to provide supporting context effectively.  Hackett’s depiction of a 
limited nuclear exchange negated its potential impact on Reagan as it embraced the logic 
of mutually assured destruction.  Hackett depicted the type of amoral decision-making 
Reagan found abhorrent.  In contrast, Red Storm Rising depicts the commander of the 
Red Army supporting a coup rather than employ tactical nuclear.  Clancy’s ending saw 
NATO prevail conventionally and ideologically, a perfect narrative for Reagan.   
Red Storm Rising channeled Reagan’s roadmap for “peace through strength.”  In his 1982 
address during the commencement exercises at Eureka College, Reagan described five 
points he believed a just peace would rest on.  Foremost among these was “a sound East-
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West military balance” that was “absolutely essential.”895  He also identified “economic 
security, regional stability, arms reductions, and dialogue” as the additional “means by 
which we can seek peace with the Soviet Union.”896  All five of these were central to the 
plot of Red Storm Rising.  The presence of these themes led Reagan to view the book as 
realistic, relevant, and a worthy reference. 
 
A Sound East-West Military Balance 
 
 Reagan emphasized conventional parity to support nuclear abolition.  A 
December 1985 National Security Council review highlighted this view and noted the 
movement towards “lower levels of nuclear forces” meant the need to plan on an 
“increasing contribution” from “primarily non-nuclear systems” to deter Soviet 
aggression.897  The US and NATO could not simply match the numbers of the Warsaw 
Pact.  While Reagan was fond of noting NATO enjoyed a greater combined GDP and 
population than the Warsaw Pact, that advantage was politically impossible to use in 
peacetime.898  US allies rightly feared large-scale, permanent mobilization.  They 
recognized garrison-states were unsustainable in a free society.  While discussing NATO 
spending with the British, Ken Adelman noted Bulgaria spent four times more than the 
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British on defense.  His counterpart quickly agreed this was true, but it was also true his 
country had no desire to live like the Bulgarians did.899  Instead, NATO would develop 
and rely on superior technological means to achieve parity.   
 Historian Odd Arne Westad argues “technology was a main reason for the 
durability of the Cold War as an international system.”900  Rapid advancements in 
military and other technologies following World War II allowed both the US and USSR 
to build and maintain influence globally. The advancements enabled the use of that power 
on a speed and scale impossible in previous eras.  However, by the Reagan presidency, 
the Soviets had fallen behind technologically in significant ways.  Westad points out that 
the consumerism of the capitalist world spurred better “ideas, designs and 
technologies.”901  The powerful demand for products like personal computers buttressed 
individual freedom through building support for open markets and increasing access to 
information.  Integration of many public and private sectors created technology with both 
military and civilian applications.  NATO weaponry quickly became more adaptable and 
advanced than Soviet equivalents.  It was also expensive, often prohibitively so for the 
USSR.  In the early 1980s, the US military alone had over twenty thousand computers 
and processors, more than the entire Soviet Union.  While the US entered the digital age, 
Soviet planners still relied on computing instruments from the 1950s to track 
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production.902  At Reykjavik Soviet leaders were well aware they “could not afford 
massive new investments in science and technology in order to catch up.”903 
 Contemporary US government assessments identified the divide.  A 1987 CIA 
report highlighted that over the previous decade, the Warsaw Pact maintained its 
quantitative advantage but had broadly failed in “pushing the state of the art in designing 
its weapons.” 904 They instead relied on an “evolutionary design process” of incremental 
improvements to older systems.905  The report concluded that by 1986 “only a small share 
of Soviet inventories” contained technologically advanced systems.906  In contrast, the 
US made “better use of emerging technologies” believing increased lethality and 
survivability mitigated the numeric disadvantage.907  NATO leveraged its economic 
strength to achieve this, spending forty percent more during the 1980 on defense than 
Warsaw Pact countries.908  The spending spree was a sharp reversal from the late 1970s, 
when Warsaw Pact expenditures outstripped NATO’s.909 
 Much of this increased funding went into developing and fielding new systems.  
During its first term, the Reagan administration expanded on Carter-era programs to 
begin construction of thirty-four new combat ships, field over four-thousand Abrams 
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tanks, and develop the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Light Amphibious Vehicle.910  In 
addition, the administration increased support for the Apache attack helicopter, 
Blackhawk support helicopter, and F-117 stealth fighter.911  These new systems, paired 
with investments in advanced munitions led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to unanimously 
conclude that by 1985, the US military was more ready for combat “by every measure of 
common sense” than it had been in 1980.912  General Vessey also highlighted the US 
“lead in high technology” during a 1984 NSC meeting, noting it could mitigate the 
Soviet’s “greater military and industrial base.”913  
 Red Storm Rising let Reagan see these improvements in action.  A New York 
Times review of the book entitled “Virtuous Men and Perfect Weapons” found Red Storm 
Rising was “particularly good news… for Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.”914  The 
reviewer highlighted how “American technology works- spy satellites, stealth aircraft, 
advanced tanks and sonar, the lot.”915  It was “an oddly comforting version of World War 
III,” free of nuclear or chemical weapons.  Though written on a “Victorian boys’ book 
level” with “undistinguished prose” it filled the same niche as Horatio Hornblower 
novels.  Red Storm Rising offered “good men in tight spots” with “lots of action” to 
provide what was a “rattling good yarn.”916 
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 All of these aspects of Red Storm Rising made it the perfect book for Reagan.  
The “comforting certainty that our side will win” was a throwback to the adventure 
novels of Reagan’s youth.917  The novel offered a narrative version of the information 
Reagan received from the NSC and DoD about the successful turnaround of America’s 
military.  The close parallels between Clancy’s fiction and the NSC’s policy documents 
made the two nearly interchangeable to Reagan.  However, fiction was more immersive 
and entertaining and spoke to Reagan directly. 
 Clancy placed the technological superiority of NATO on display in Red Storm 
Rising.  The advanced technology of the alliance wins the war.  In the direst moments of 
the novel, a new system provides NATO the exact edge it needs to win.  Though the 
program was still classified, the F-117 stealth fighter appears in the novel.  US pilots use 
the stealth technology to strike Soviet supply lines and radar sites causing chaos and 
confusion in Soviet ranks.  In contrast, NATO enjoys near perfect tactical intelligence in 
the book thanks to its use of the airborne EWCS platform.  The advanced sensors quickly 
relayed information such that throughout the novel, NATO forces know exactly when 
and where Soviet forces intend to strike. 
 The intelligence sharing increased the effectiveness of Clancy’s ground forces.  It 
allows Abrams tanks to provide NATO with a decisive edge in ground battle.  An early 
engagement between ten Abrams with dismounted infantry in support and two full 
strength Soviet tank regiments with over one hundred T-72s ended in a decisive victory 




for the US.  In the fight, the better technology of the Abrams combined with the ability to 
call in air support from A-10 Warthogs destroyed one-third of the Soviet force, with 
minimal damage to US formations.918  Soviets refer to the aircraft as the “devil’s cross” 
since “from an angle, the American fighter did look like a stylize Russian Orthodox 
crucifix.”919  Throughout the book, Soviet commanders assume they face much larger 
formations and lament “murderous” cost NATO imposed on their forces.920 
 Red Storm Rising effectively portrayed the new NATO doctrine of AirLand Battle 
which sought to make use of NATO’s technological edge.921  The doctrine relied on the 
ability to use technology to identify command and control units, key supply locations, 
and disrupt logistics routes.  The intent was for EWACs to provide intelligence on targets 
that air assets could strike, which would in turn create opportunities for ground forces to 
take advantage of chaos in enemy formations to conduct effective counter-attacks.  This 
complicated integration works perfectly in Clancy’s novel.  Throughout the book, Soviet 
military leadership express frustration as superior western radar technology effectively 
tracks individual vehicles on the ground, despite their efforts at concealment.922  Worse 
still for the Warsaw Pact, stealth technology allows NATO to destroy bridges, decimate 
critical supply lines, and kill senior commanders at will.923   
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Enemy leadership were often torn between awe and frustration at the vastly 
superior capabilities of NATO, and in the final negotiations they noted that if not for 
“those damned invisible bombers” the war would end differently.924  Red Storm Rising 
argued that not only was AirLand Battle a feasible doctrine but also NATO could already 
execute it.  Clancy and his co-author, Larry Bond, consciously included the doctrine, 
increasing the appeal of the book to military professionals.925  However, they chose not to 
include the doctrine’s use of nuclear and chemical weapons.  They shared Reagan’s 
abhorrence of such weapons and believed they were no longer necessary.926  The 
overarching message of the book for Reagan was the US could execute AirLand Battle 
without doctrinal use of weapons of mass destruction. 
 While at the Air Force Academy, Reagan spoke to the importance of technology.  
He noted that over the previous century “the pace of change, once orderly and 
evolutionary, became frantic and revolutionary.”927  Technology like personal computers, 
transistors, and fiber optics were part of a “cataclysmic rush” that helped to advance 
civilization in innumerable ways.928  He drew upon the mythos of the American frontier 
and his own love of the 1870s west by equating it to the modern space age.  Encouraging 
the graduating class to “accept the challenge of space,” Reagan argued that just as “the 
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brave men and women of the West” did not “let the unknowns and dangers overwhelm 
them,” only the “own courage and imagination” limited modern Americans.929  Reagan’s 
tendency to link American technological prowess with the ideology of American 
exceptionalism is critical to understanding his strategic approach.  He believed the 
boundless creativity of a free people would overcome any obstacle.   Shultz believed this 
was due to Reagan’s “instinctive vision of the future.”930  Technology and freedom 
formed a mutually beneficial relationship, where advances in one spurred the other 
forward.  Reagan told the Air Force cadets “technology plus freedom, [equaled] 
opportunity and progress.”931   
 Red Storm Rising’s mix of high technology and virtuous leaders captured 
Reagan’s dynamic perfectly.  Clancy’s narrative, though more optimistic than official 
assessments, provided a plausible version of World War III.  Reagan believed it 
compellingly argued that the US and NATO could equal the Warsaw Pact without use of 
weapons of mass destruction.  Official briefings reinforced this.  After a 1987 meeting 
with the Joint Chiefs, Reagan gushed in his diary.  He described a fascinating day, with 
“the real kicker a report on new weaponry.”932 The report excited Reagan by showing 
how even though “we can’t match the Soviets tank for tank,” the US could use its 
“technology and come up with a weapon that nullifies their superior numbers.”933  
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 Reagan also learned of new aircraft and other classified programs that would 
allow outnumbered US forces to prevail.  The report built upon Reagan’s belief that the 
US had overcome the numerical and logistical challenges to conventional containment. 
Even if the view was overly optimistic in 1986 and 87, Reagan felt developments over 
the next decade would make it reality.  This period matched the proposed implementation 
of the Reykjavik framework, and gave the US time to ensure the way Reagan viewed the 
conventional balance became reality.  Though the plan assumed peace in Europe over the 
next decade, neither Reagan or his advisors expected a war.934  They felt “Soviet 
leadership was smart, intelligent, and not crazy,” and therefore, despite its ideological 
failings, was not seeking to destroy the world.935 
 Reagan’s belief in the stability of Europe and more optimistic view of American 
power created a unique window in the negotiations at Reykjavik.  Secretary of State 
Shultz argued that Reagan went as far as he did in the summit in part because of the need 
“to reel the Soviets in” due to the concessions they were making.936  Gorbachev himself 
would later express frustration at Reagan’s tendency to simply “pocket concessions” and 
move on to the next issue without moving on.937  This dynamic occurred because each 
side felt they held the stronger position.  It would be unlikely that the Soviets would offer 
as much if they saw themselves behind conventionally.    Red Storm Rising helped 
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Reagan identify what he believed was a narrow window of time between his belief in 
NATO’s conventional advantage and Soviet recognition of it.  He wanted to exploit a 
strategic advantage his opponent was unaware of.  As a negotiator, he sought to use this 
to maximum advantage and pursue a lifelong vision.   
 
Know Your Enemy: The People vs the System 
  
In January of 1984, Reagan sought to calm the citizens of the US and the rest of 
the world after a year of tension between the US and USSR.  The previous year saw 
numerous events that made US-Soviet relations more acrimonious.  In March, Reagan 
referred to the USSR as an “evil empire” in his speech to the National Association of 
Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida.  Soviet leadership viewed this as part of an 
“uncompromising ideological offensive.”938  It lent credence to Andropov’s view that 
Reagan was “unpredictable” and the Soviets should “expect anything from him.”939  In a 
June meeting with Averell Harriman, Andropov told the envoy he “had no confidence in 
the present administration” and since “mistrust and enmity have heated up” the prospect 
of war was increasingly likely.940  Shortly after the “Evil Empire” speech, Reagan 
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announced the Strategic Defense Initiative.  The proposed defensive system played to 
Soviet fears that Reagan sought an arms race in space.941   
Over the summer, Soviets increasingly worried over the prospect of an American 
first strike.  They sent “urgent and detailed instructions” to KGB residents to collect 
evidence of US preparations for war.942  The alert coincided with the deployment of 
Pershing II missiles to Europe, and despite the deployment’s announcement in 1979 their 
presence added to tensions in Europe.  During this period, NATO also prepared for its 
annual exercises, Autumn Forge and Reforger, as well as a command post exercise, Able 
Archer.  In preparation the US deployed 16,000 additional troops to Europe.943  The extra 
deployments increased the US footprint on the continent and showed “US resolve and 
ability to defend Europe.”944  Soviet officers viewed this as a “most dangerous” 
provocation as they realistically simulated mobilization for war.945 
The Soviets shared responsibility for the escalating tensions.  In September, their 
forces shot down a civilian airliner.  The crash of Korean Airlines Flight 007 killed 269 
people, including an American congressman.  Soviet efforts to cover up involvement 
failed after US Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick presented audio 
recordings of the incident.  The tapes revealed Soviet pilots had visual contact with the 
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aircraft for over twenty minutes, did not fire any warning shots, and made no effort to 
communicate with the plane before shooting it down.946  The actions displayed “shocking 
disregard for human life and international norms” and demonstrated “violence and lies 
[were] regular instruments of Soviet policy.”947 
Reagan employed similarly harsh language.  He argued there was no way to 
mistake the profile of KAL 007 and it was the second time the Soviets had shot down an 
airliner. According to Reagan, Americans should not “be surprised by the inhuman 
brutality” displayed by the Soviets.  He reminded listeners of the Prague Spring, 
Hungarian Uprising, and recent Soviet actions in Poland and Afghanistan.  The speech 
implied that the Soviets intentionally used massacres as a tool of national policy.948 
By November 1983, both the Soviets and Americans felt the other’s recent behavior 
demonstrated increased aggression and willingness to use violence to achieve their goals.  
NATO’s command post exercise ABLE ARCHER occurred during this period of 
heightened tension.  During the exercise, the KGB reported the US had gone on nuclear 
alert and Soviet early warning satellites erroneously detected a launch of five nuclear 
missiles.949  Stanislav Petrov, a Soviet officer, recognized a first-strike would likely 
encompass a greater number of missiles and waited for confirmation from other systems 
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before alerting Moscow.950  While the incident ended peacefully, an accidental nuclear 
exchange was possible.  The rhetoric and actions of both the US and USSR created an 
environment where such an event was feasible. 
Following Able Archer, US intelligence agencies were unsure about the 
seriousness of Soviet war fears.  However, in 1990 the US government concluded that the 
USSR had “a genuine belief” the US was preparing to attack them in the fall of 1983.951  
Reagan became convinced much sooner.  In 1984, he wrote in his diary that “maybe they 
are scared of us and think we are a threat.”952  He went further in his 1990 memoir, noting 
that after three years on the job he had learned that “many people at the top of the Soviet 
hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans.”953  This was an important 
realization, and he increasingly empathized with the challenges faced by individual 
Russians while maintaining his enmity of the Soviet system. 
Reagan’s 1984 speech reaffirmed US commitment to peace in the wake of the 
past year’s tension.954  He acknowledged recent harsh rhetoric “led some to speak of 
heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict.”955  Reagan admitted this 
view was “understandable,” but argued it was “profoundly mistaken.”956  He rejected the 
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assertion that his administration made the world more dangerous, a common claim of 
critics.  Instead, improvements to US defense led to “less danger” because the USSR 
would not “underestimate [US] strength or question [US] resolve.”957  The argument 
ignored that the Soviets might view US strength as a threat to their own security.  Reagan 
noted both nations shared the goal and responsibility “to avoid war and reduce the level 
of arms.”958  Given the large American investment in defense over the past three years, 
those watching could be forgiven for doubting his sincerity.  The opening rhetoric fit 
Reagan’s past comments on the Cold War and did not suggest a change in viewpoint.  
However, the middle sections of the speech strike a more conciliatory tone. 
Reagan acknowledged a “gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy” 
that prevented each side from understanding the other.959  He called for both governments 
to jointly examine steps to display good intentions and find ways to achieve cooperation 
and understanding.  “Strength and dialogue” must go hand in hand, and Reagan felt the 
obvious mutual distaste for the other’s ideology should not prevent negotiations.960 
Reagan’s closing particularly stood out.  He imagined married couples from the US and 
USSR taking shelter from a storm with the language barrier magically removed.  Reagan 
felt the two couples would not pass the time discussing “differences in governmental 
structure and philosophy.”961  Instead, they would talk of “common interests” that “have 








to do with the things of everyday life.”962  The conversation would “probably have 
touched on ambitions and hobbies, and what they wanted for their children,” and all 
would depart as friends.963  Reagan concluded “people don’t make wars,” instead they 
just want the freedom “to raise their children in a world without fear and without war,” to 
work in a field of their choice and engage in something that “gives them satisfaction and 
a sense of worth.”964  He believed these interests transcended borders and both the US 
and USSR could do more to guarantee their citizens the chance to live freely.  Reagan 
added the story to the speech personally.965  He intended the passage to show 
commonality between American and Soviet people and that the differences between the 
two governments were surmountable.966  The anecdote demonstrated Reagan’s proclivity 
for parable.  The story was short, memorable, and gave listeners a clear understanding of 
how Reagan viewed common people.  
  However, it was less conciliatory to the Soviet government than it seemed at first 
blush.  Reagan often noted that the USSR denied its citizens the “common interests” that 
he mentioned in the Anya and Ivan parable.  One of Reagan’s favorite jokes highlighted 
this.  He liked to tell of a businessman traveling from New York to Moscow.  In each 
city, he takes a cab driven by a young college student.  The businessman asks each driver 
their plans upon graduation and neither knows.  The American has not decided, but the 
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Soviet is unsure because his government has not told him yet.  The joke captured what 
Reagan viewed as a key difference between the two nations, the ability for an individual 
to “work at some trade, craft, or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of 
worth.”967  Even when Reagan spoke of average Soviets it still attacked the ideology and 
government of the USSR. 
The speech closed with another attack on the Soviet Union.  Reagan argued that 
“if the Soviet government wants peace, then there will be peace.”968  The line, though 
somewhat conciliatory, also marked a clear accusation that the USSR was solely 
responsible for the fraught world environment, and Moscow would need to be the first to 
move towards a healthier relationship.  The speech did not break with Reagan’s pattern of 
attacking the Soviet Union on issues of militarism, human rights and ideology, it did 
demonstrate nuance in Reagan’s Cold War vision.  He portrayed the Soviet couple 
sympathetically, demonstrating a regard for the Russian people at odds with his anti-
Soviet rhetoric.  He demonstrated that he saw the Soviet government and Russian people 
as distinct entities.969  The Russian people were victims.  Reagan sought to save them and 
people everywhere from the freedom-denying ideology of communism. 
Jack Matlock, a long-time foreign service officer and the NSC Senior Director for 
East European and Soviet Affairs shared Reagan’s view.970  He felt the need to use his 
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role on the NSC to build upon the President’s positive inclination toward Russians and to 
humanize them.  One way he did this was to provide Reagan with a fictional 
memorandum between Gorbachev and Anatoly Chernyaev, one the Soviet leader’s key 
foreign policy advisors.  The memo highlighted the need for Gorbachev to achieve 
something tangible in the realm of arms control so that he could maintain domestic 
support for reform.971  Knowing his audience, Matlock filled the missive with “jokes and 
anecdotes,” framing the issue in a way Reagan found familiar and memorable.972 
Additionally, Matlock brought in academics and writers from outside the 
administration to offer new voices.  Suzanne Massie had a particularly large impact on 
Reagan.  She met the President for the first time the day after the Ivan and Anya speech, 
and he sought to further his understanding of Russians.  Reagan asked how deeply Soviet 
leaders believed in communism, before shifting to the topic of religion.  He expressed 
interest when Massie spoke of the continued importance of the Orthodox Church to 
Russian identity.973  In a later meeting, she continued to emphasize religion and presented 
Reagan with a painted Russian Easter Egg.  The egg showed Mary with an infant Jesus 
and a written message that “we will not permit the world to be blown up.”974  Massie 
gave it as a “talisman” for Reagan’s upcoming summit with Gorbachev and to remind 
him of the spirituality of the Russian people.975  The religious message appealed to 
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Reagan, who believed that faith could provide a common ground and offer  evidence of 
the dissatisfaction of the Soviet people with their government. 
Massie’s book Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia also assisted in the 
preparation for the summit.  Reagan read it in September of 1985 and thought it a 
compelling history of Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution.  It included details on 
common Russians that appealed to the President.976  During one pre-summit session, 
Reagan interrupted Shultz to ask what happened to 19th century St Petersburg merchants 
of the book.977  Reagan’s clear interest, and sympathy, for the religious views of Russians 
and desire to know more about the people’s history displayed an empathy that 
contributed to his willingness to negotiate peace.  Reagan’s willingness to separate the 
people from ideology provided opportunity to compromise and connect on a personal 
level. 
Although Massie deepened Reagan’s understanding of the Russian people and 
their history he did not draw the attention of the public to her work.  He rarely spoke 
publicly about the histories that he read, even though he often read biographies and other 
historical works.  There are likely political reasons for Reagan’s decision not to reference 
scholarly works as he did with movies and other popular culture.  Doing so might 
undermine the carefully cultivated “everyman” image of Reagan.  Despite his reluctance 
                                                 




to publicly discuss how reading increased his empathy, books strongly influenced how he 
approached the Soviet Union during his second term. 
Red Storm Rising portrayed a vast difference between the Soviet people and their 
government.  As they were writing the book, Clancy and co-author Larry Bond 
intentionally sought to portray the average Russian in a positive light.978  They largely 
agreed with Reagan’s sense of Soviet citizens as victims of their government, who if 
given the opportunity would favor Western ideals.  The two main Soviet characters 
frequently express revulsion for the callousness and immortality of their government.  
They prevent the politburo from using nuclear weapons and lead a coup in Moscow.  
When faced with an ultimatum, Clancy’s ideal Russian chose humanity over ideology. 
The book offers a starkly negative portrayal of Soviet society.  References to death 
sentences, gulags, and human rights abuses abound.  However, these are shown as 
occurring at the impetus of the state rather than individuals.  The main exception is the 
brutal gang rape of a pregnant Icelandic women by Soviet paratroopers.  An American 
Air Force officer rescues the women and extra-judiciously executes the rapists.  
However, the scene was intended to draw attention to the systematic abuse of populations 
subjugated by the Soviet system, rather than indict individual Russians.979 
The clear distinction between Russian and Soviet identities is most evident in the 
use of Russian culture.  Early in the book, American intelligence analysts examine the 
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showing of the film Battleship Potemkin on Soviet state broadcasting.  Analysts note how 
frequently the film used the word Russia or Russian, which they had thought the Soviets 
were “trying to get away from.”980  The discussion highlighted the difference between 
Soviet and Russian identity and that the Soviet government often tried to suppress the 
latter.  Supreme Allied Commander of European Forces (SACEUR), General Robinson, 
to further illustrates the difference.  While discussing a cease-fire with his Soviet 
counterpart, Robinson reveals he is fluent in Russian. The American explains he learned 
the language to better understand Anton Chekov, a Russian writer and playwright.981  
Checkov’s works engaged with questions of Russian identity and his final play “The 
Cherry Orchard” explored the conflict between Russian values and Marxism.982  While 
the Soviet leader believed the American general read the literature to “better know your 
enemy,” Robinson seemed legitimately interested in the art. Rather than using Soviet 
literature such as Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago, Clancy and Bond chose to use a 
quintessentially Russian voice  to further the sense that Americans should look deeper 
into Russia’s past to empathize with the modern people. 
Red Storm Rising provided Reagan with an account that portrayed Russians in the 
same way he thought about them.  While both Reagan’s and Clancy’s view failed to 
recognize that Russians were not the only people in the USSR with a distinct history and 
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culture, the nuance in distinguishing the population and governmental system of the 
Soviet Union was important.  Such portrayals were uncommon in popular culture, and 
largely unreflective of the way Americans thought about the Soviet Union.  The distrust 
dated back to the earliest days of the Cold War, and the government-sanctioned belief 
that all Russians were communists and all communists were dangerous ideologues bent 
on destroying everything that made America free. Even as popular culture shifted 
narratives in the 1960s, the prevailing themes were not of peace-loving Soviets.  Instead, 
works by Graham Greene, Kurt Vonnegut, and John Le Carre argued that the US was not 
a moral paragon.  For these authors, America often eagerly employed the immoral, 
coercive, and violent actions of its rival.  They saw the two superpowers as morally 
equivalent and equally deserving of scorn. 
Reagan’s Ivan and Anya speech sought to change the way Americans talked about 
the Russian people.  Red Storm Rising was only one work that helped with this as 
Hollywood also adopted the theme.  The brutal Russian soldiers of Red Dawn gave way 
to Rocky winning over a hostile crowd in Moscow.  Reagan’s obvious rapport with 
Gorbachev aided the shift.  If someone with Reagan’s history of staunch anticommunism 
could establish a relationship with a Soviet leader then it would be hard for an average 
American to truly view the Russian people as the enemy of the US.  The Reagan-
Gorbachev resembled Nixon’s trip to China.  Reagan’s biography, like Nixon’s, made a 
drastic shift in relations broadly palatable.  While defense hawks strongly objected in 
both cases, most Americans embraced the moves and promise of peace.  
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Gorbachev’s celebrity in the US shows how drastically American views changed. He 
received a rapturous reception in 1987 waded into a delirious Washington crowd. His 
popularity stood in stark contrast to the muted reception of Khrushchev in 1959 and 
Brezhnev in 1973.  It compares favorably to the popularity of China’s Deng Xiaoping, 
whose willingness to show a human side on his 1979 visit to the US greatly improved his 
country’s standing in the eyes of many Americans.983  This effect was not entirely the 
result of Reagan’s speech and popular culture, but both contributed significantly.   
Importantly, the appearance of a more nuanced view of Russians in a book that Reagan 
viewed as realistic in many other areas helped reinforce the President’s confidence in his 
own view of the Soviet Union and his belief that they did not want war.  He identified 
with Russian characters in the work who shared his own convictions.  The empathetic 
portrayal of the characters faced between loyalty to the system and their people 
reinforced Reagan’s sense that the Soviet system was at fault, and that Soviets as 
individuals shared a great deal in common with Americans.   
Reagan displayed this empathy during his address to students at Moscow State 
University in 1988.  Throughout his remarks, Reagan highlighted “the growth of 
democracy” and freedom across the world.984  He painted freedom as something that 
takes place at the community level, noting how it impacts local media, schools, courts, 
and small businesses.  Reagan referenced a Soviet song, “Do the Russians want war?” as 
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evidence of his audience’s peaceful intentions.  The song spoke of the silence hanging 
over the trees planted on soldier’s graves as proof that none want war.  Reagan 
emphasized that Americans shared this sense, and that he wanted nothing more than the 
two country’s diplomats “grappling with the problem of trade disputes between America 
and a growing, exuberant, exporting Soviet Union.”985  He closed by referencing a 
different burial site.  Reagan hoped that individual freedom would blossom in the USSR 
like the “fresh green sapling planted over Tolstoy’s grave.”986  The reference to a Russian 
whose work received global acclaim and celebration, showed Reagan’s recognition of the 
nation’s past contribution to the arts and the hope that individual freedom would enable 
the Russian people to do so again.987 
 
Friends in Need 
 
Reagan’s plan for peace required the close cooperation of allies in Western 
Europe.  He believed in conventional deterrence because the combined population and 
GDP of NATO nations exceeded that of the Warsaw Pact.  The administration also 
doubted the devotion of Soviet Bloc nations to the alliance and engaged in open 
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speculation about whether members would fight alongside Soviet formations.988  Jack 
Matlock felt the Red Army would be careful about the placement of their allies, as they 
would effectively be choosing whether they would face betrayal on the flank or from the 
rear.989  The absence of reliable allies complicated Soviet formations already unlikely to 
coordinate effectively due to conscription and lack of a common language in units.   
However, the ability to capitalize on the perceived advantage required steadfastness 
among American allies.  The Reagan administration initially feared there was little 
support for NATO or the US among member states.  Even as late as 1984, the National 
Security Council worried about the risk of “political and economic retrenchment” in 
Western Europe.990  Mass demonstrations against the deployment of the Pershing II 
missiles and the general popularity of the Nuclear Freeze Movement underpinned these 
concerns.  The NSC urged Reagan to combat “Europessimism” through policies that 
would restore the will of Europeans to fight the Cold War.991 
Thatcher’s ascension to Prime Minister in the United Kingdom in 1979, the year 
before Reagan’s election, and Kohl’s assumption of the Chancellorship of West Germany 
in 1982 helped bring the alliance closer together.  In each, Reagan found a strong partner 
that largely supported his hardline stance.  Reagan clearly valued his relationship with 
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both and believed personal rapport between leaders could bring nations together.  It was 
Thatcher who first gave Reagan a sense that Gorbachev was a different sort of Soviet 
leader.  She met with Gorbachev in 1984, before he came to power and came away 
convinced they could “do business together.”992 Reagan valued her opinion and it shaped 
his view of Gorbachev.  While Thatcher and Reagan did not always see eye to eye, 
particularly on the issues of Star Wars and Grenada, these disagreements never 
undermined their relationship.993 
 Reagan took political risks to support his allies.  The most prominent example 
occurred when Reagan visited Germany in 1985.  In the planning for the trip, Kohl 
requested that Reagan visit a cemetery in Bitburg to commemorate the fortieth 
anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe.  The President readily 
accepted the request, hoping to celebrate “40 years of peace between erstwhile 
enemies.”994  However, the proposed site contained several graves honoring members of 
the Waffen-SS, notorious for their enthusiastic participation in the Holocaust.  The 
revelation of the graves prompted a domestic political crisis for Reagan.  While receiving 
the Congressional Gold Medal, Noble Prize winner and Holocaust Survivor Elie Wiesel 
chastised Reagan for planning to attend the ceremony.  Wiesel told him that Bitburg “is 
not your place,” instead he should stand with “with the victims of the SS.”995  For Wiesel, 
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the issue was clear, and he put it in terms Reagan often used by arguing the issue was 
“not politics, but good and evil.”996  Despite the emotional plea, Reagan noted that 
continuing with the ceremony was the “morally right thing” before leaving.997  
 Afterwards, he felt “even more sure.”998  The visit did celebrate forty years of 
peace, and between the stops in Bitburg and Bergen-Belsen, Reagan reflected on the 
legacy of evil left by the Nazis.  More importantly, his steadfastness strengthened his 
relationship with Kohl.  Reagan felt the visit returned a favor to Kohl, who endured 
domestic backlash for supporting the deployment of Pershing II missiles.  Reagan viewed 
Kohl as “a good friend and solid ally,” and wanted to support the German when he 
could.999 
The decision to accept political fallout to support an ally underlined the 
importance Reagan and his administration placed on NATO.  They believed that the 
Alliance would play a critical role in returning the Cold War to an environment favorable 
to the US.  If Reagan was to make good on his desire to contain and defeat communism, 
Western Europe would need to play an active and potentially decisive role.  The 
administration needed support not only in military matters, but also economic ones.  
NATO allies would need to avoid helping to “subsidize the Soviet economy” by 
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transferring technology cheaply or making relying on the USSR for energy.1000  They 
would also have to present a unified front in diplomatic efforts throughout the world. 
Red Storm Rising clearly depicted the importance of allies.  Throughout the book the US 
coordinates with NATO to blunt Soviet advances.  At a critical point in the main land 
battle, German fighter aircraft force Soviet attack helicopters to break off their attack.  
The allied air support allows the Americans to leverage their superior tanks and defeat a 
larger enemy formation.1001  German infantry also coordinate closely with their US 
counterparts to prevent the Soviets from flanking the Americans.1002 
In the battle for the Atlantic, the combined British and American fleets reopen 
shipping lanes and prove crucial in retaking Iceland.  The US uses cruise missiles to 
destroy the Soviet bombers which had conducted devastating attacks against an American 
carrier group, however, they are only able to do so because British and Norwegian radar 
sites track Soviet aircraft.1003  The first NATO elements to return to Iceland are British 
SAS.1004  They link up with remaining American forces and coordinate the landings that 
lead to the island’s recapture.  In contrast, the Soviet’s allies are either unhelpful or 
actively hurt the war effort.  Even before the war begins, Clancy shows tension between 
the Soviets and their client states.  Members of the Military Liaison Mission, a group of 
NATO officers stationed in Potsdam watch Red Army forces conducting a training 
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exercise.  The Soviet formation takes a wrong term, and an attached East German does 
not redirect the convoy.1005  NATO observers note it was common for Soviet units to get 
lost in East Germany given the language barrier, but the refusal of their allies to assist 
stands out, showing tension between the DDR and USSR. 
During the first stages of the war, a DDR senior general reviews the scenarios of 
what would happen if the Soviets employed chemical weapons.  The report places a floor 
of ten million deaths among German civilians.  During an ensuing conversation with the 
DDR’s leader, he bitterly notes that the Russians would view “even a united, socialist 
Germany” as a strategic threat.1006  The scale of potential casualties from employing 
chemical weapons leads the DDR to term their potential use a “matter of gravest national 
concern” and an act of war against the DDR by the Soviets.1007  A debate in the Soviet 
politburo follows the missive and concludes the “slaughter of civilians with gas” would 
incur a political cost that was “simply too high.”1008  Clancy and Bond used the debate to 
underline their belief that the Soviet system saw its client states as resources rather than 
socialist brothers.  Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces are absent from Red Storm Rising’s 
descriptions of combat.  Even in the final days of war, the Soviets draw on new 
formations from the USSR rather than call upon the DDR or other allies.  The need to 
draw soldiers from Kazan and the far eastern reaches of the Soviet Union creates a supply 
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line problem that is equally, if not more, challenging that the one that NATO faced and 
eliminates one of the key advantages of the Warsaw Pact highlighted in the CIA and 
NATO assessments of their forces.  
Clancy and Bond consciously included the detrimental relationship between the 
Soviet Union and its allies in Red Storm Rising.1009  They depicted the alliance as 
unproductive and unstable.  Somewhat ironically, the authors viewed the Warsaw Pact in 
the same way their Soviet characters viewed NATO.  The version of the relationship 
between the Soviets and their clients portrayed in the book matched the more optimistic 
views of Reagan administration officials.1010  Red Storm Rising consistently gave the 
benefit of the doubt to the US.  Throughout, their technology works perfectly, its people 
are exactly where they need to be, and their opponents make just enough mistakes for the 
US to win.  Reagan viewed these narrative choices as a feature that made the book 
memorable and useful.  Though a war in Europe would not unfold nearly as favorably for 
NATO as it did in the book, it was not sheer fantasy.  Clancy and Bond devoted 
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Warfare in Miniature 
  
 When Clancy met Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in 1985, Lehman confided 
in the author that his reaction to The Hunt for Red October was to ask, “who the hell 
cleared this?”1011  Technical detail was a hallmark of Clancy’s writing.  His books often 
featured paragraphs long summaries on how military hardware worked. Clancy wrote this 
way because of the importance of technology in his narratives.  He sought to prevent 
experts from questioning the backbone of his plot.1012  The detail contributed to the sense 
of realism in the books and made them more useful for government officials. 
 The specific technical details led many to accuse Clancy of drawing from 
classified sources for his novels.  Clancy admitted he inferred “secrets about operational 
capabilities of certain weapon systems such as the stealth bomber,” which appeared in 
Red Storm Rising two years before it was officially declassified.1013  He argued revealing 
capabilities in this manner actually helped deterrence, as “if everything we do is secret 
they [the Soviets] won’t know enough to be afraid” of the US.1014  The Pentagon did not 
disagree, and Secretary Lehman even argued Clancy’s work helped show the damage that 
spies had done and the danger of selling technology to the Soviets.1015 
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 The success of Hunt for Red October opened doors for Clancy.  In February of 
1985 he attended a luncheon in the Pentagon and the opportunity to speak with several 
admirals, including the vice-CNO for undersea operations, the Navy’s chief 
submariner.1016  Clancy visited the CIA’s headquarters in Langley to discuss writing and 
conveying “complex technical matters to the lay reader.”1017 The deputy director of the 
agency attended the talk, as did future Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.1018 
 Clancy and Bond received access to military installations and equipment as they 
wrote Red Storm Rising.  They travelled to Norfolk, Virginia, and discussed joint 
operations with NATO personnel stationed at Supreme Allied Command Atlantic 
(SACLANT).  Clancy recalled his interactions with the director of public affairs there 
fondly, and particularly enjoyed speaking with British officers, who talked about tactics 
“a little more freely” than their American counterparts.1019  The writers also spoke with 
Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko about the USSR.  Shevchenko defected to the US 
while serving as the UN undersecretary general, and Clancy found his book Breaking 
with Moscow to be “pure dynamite” for the starkly negative way it portrayed Soviet 
leadership.1020  Shevchenko’s experience and views strongly inflormed the Politburo of 
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Red Storm Rising.1021  Clancy also spent a week on a Navy frigate, rode on a submarine, 
drove an M1 tank, and worked with a variety of other military systems.1022 
Senior Pentagon leadership recognized the value that Clancy’s wildly popular 
narrative could have in building public opinion and became invested in his success.  Flag 
officers sought to uphold and enhance his credibility even when Clancy did not toe the 
official line.  During the 1990 National Defense Authorization Act, Representative 
Norman Sisisky questioned Vice Admiral Daniel Cooper, the assistant-CNO for 
Undersea Warfare, about recent statements made by Clancy.  In an article, the author 
argued the US was training submarine officers who were too risk-adverse and that the 
British training model produced superior officers.  Sisisky noted that Clancy had “a big 
following as a big naval expert” and wanted the Admiral to respond to the allegations.1023 
Cooper disagreed with Clancy’s view and reaffirmed his support of the way the 
US Navy trained its submarine captains. However, even as he disagreed with the author, 
Cooper praised him as a “fine individual” and a “real patriot.”1024  It was because he 
“love[d] Tom Clancy” and that the author “did a lot for the submarine force” that made 
the criticism hurt.1025  During Cooper’s response, Representative Duncan Hunter 
interjected that Clancy helped “the Navy immensely,” drawing rapid agreement from the 
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admiral.1026  Cooper critiqued Clancy obliquely.  He did not attack the author in his 
comments, or directly refute the allegation of conservatism.  Instead, he highlighted how 
the Navy’s “strict process” led to selection of the “smartest people” they could “possibly 
find.”1027  The Navy was careful to not undermine the perception of Clancy as an expert. 
However, the appeal of Clancy’s work to Reagan and other stemmed from more than the 
author’s ability to discuss arcane technical matters in an approachable way.  The books 
demonstrated the systems in action, providing context beyond simple description of 
capabilities.   
Even when writing implausible events, Clancy made sure that they were 
technically possible.  While working on The Hunt for Red October, Clancy wrote himself 
into a corner and was unsure how to end the book.1028  The titular submarine had less than 
a skeleton crew but needed to defeat a Soviet Alfa class attack sub, the Konovalov.  The 
Red October could not engage the Konovalov with its weapons or seek aid from other 
ships.  The solution came as Clancy looked at scale models of the two submarines.  He 
recognized as a Typhoon class, the Red October was significantly larger than the Alfa it 
faced.  This would allow it to ram the opposing submarine and survive the impact, while 
consigning the Konovalov to a watery grave.1029  Such a maneuver would certainly be 
unorthodox, but technically feasible.  The invasion of Iceland in Red Storm Rising 
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presented a similar situation.  Clancy and Bond needed a way to get a Soviet regiment to 
the island without drawing NATO suspicion.  A fully loaded troop transport, or convoy 
of Soviet ships, would be unlikely to escape notice.  Instead, the authors used a civilian 
container ship, the MV Julius Fucik, to transport the unit and serve as base of operations 
for an amphibious assault.  Clancy and Bond used its real-world measurements to 
determine the ship could serve as a launch pad for an airborne regiment.1030  While few 
plans call for the clandestine use of a civilian container ship, the effort to ensure workable 
plans aided in the overall realistic feel of the novel. 
 War gaming played a major role in developing the combat of Red Storm Rising.  
While serving in the Navy, Bond grew dissatisfied with the way the service conducted 
war games on its ships.  The game used classified mechanics, which meant officers could 
only play it under limited circumstances.  The difficulty in utilizing the official version 
led him to develop his own.  He released the game, Harpoon, through Dungeon and 
Dragons co-founder Dave Arneson’s Adventure Games and Clancy purchased a copy 
while working on The Hunt for Red October.1031  After Clancy sent Bond a letter praising 
the game, the two met, played a few times, and agreed to collaborate on Clancy’s second 
novel.1032  The two used Harpoon to fact check the naval combat sequences in Red Storm 
Rising.  They used it most prominently to verify the structure of the air and sea battle in 
the chapter “The Dance of the Vampires” could happen.  The wargame did not dictate the 
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plot, as the book needed the US fleet to face a significant setback but did ensure that 
defeat of the Americans was not a deus-ex-machina. 
 Red Storm Rising also drew on official war games.  After leaving the Navy, Bond 
worked for the Center for Naval Analyses, a federally funded research and development 
center.  While at CNA, he assisted in the development and execution of war games, many 
of which focused on how to maintain open shipping lanes in the event of war.1033  These 
war games addressed the most significant challenge to NATO’s ability to fight 
conventionally in Europe, access to American troops and material.  Bond developed this 
into an expansion for Harpoon called Convoy.  When he told Clancy of the project, the 
author told him “that would make a good book,” providing the impetus for Red Storm 
Rising.1034  Peter Perla, a long time wargamer at CNA, argues that part of the appeal of 
the book was that it was took the core findings of wargames the think tank and others 
conducted, and packaged it as a narrative digestible by all.1035  The scope of Red Storm 
Rising far exceeded anything done by either the CNA or Harpoon, but the realistic 
examination of a critical strategic issue enhanced the credibility of the book. 
 Wargaming does not identify what will happen in a conflict; rather, its primary 
benefit is to provide a range of possibilities to analyze.  From these possibilities, military 
planners can adjust plans, add resources, and look for ways to exploit success and react to 
failure.  They reduce the chance of surprise, something that is invaluable in developing a 
                                                 
1033 Ibid. 
1034 Bond, email exchange with author 9 Jun 15. 
1035 Peter Perla, interview by author, notes, October 23, 2014, Arlington, Virginia. Perla still works with 
the CNA and is referred to there as the “Peyton Manning of war gaming.” 
274 
 
strategy.  Additionally, Perla argues war games can exercise outsized influence on 
planning because they carry a “greater emotional impact” than simply discussing a 
plan.1036  Those involved become more personally invested as their decisions directly 
impact the scenario.  They are more likely to remember their choices and the results 
because of this personal involvement and investment.   
Novels and other narratives have similar potential.  A well-written story forces the 
reader to become emotionally involved and identify with the protagonist.  The resulting 
emotional connection is more memorable.  Reagan capitalized on the power of narrative 
in his political rise, and used stories in the same way he wanted his audience to.  In the 
case of Red Storm Rising, Reagan found a realistic portrayal of World War III that served 
the same purpose as a wargame.  He used it to think about the strategic position of the US 
and USSR and draw a radically different conclusion than many of his closest advisors.  
Reagan was not the only one in government to use Red Storm Rising to inform ideas 
about the ability of NATO to defeat the Warsaw Pact. 
 
Proof of Concept 
 
 Red Storm Rising became a part of the national security conversation in Congress 
immediately upon release and remained part of it until the end of the Cold War.  
Congressmen touted Clancy’s portrayal of their pet systems as proof of their importance. 
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Red Storm Rising’s portrayal of anti-satellite technology drew significant interest.  In the 
book, Major Nakamura, the only female combatant in the novel, shoots down two 
reconnaissance satellites from her F-15.1037  She does this despite shoddy construction 
and poor maintenance. Before her first mission, a technician notes that the missiles were 
stored improperly and implies no one cared about the program.1038  Since the program 
lacked support the US only has three missiles to use in the war.  Fortunately, this does not 
haunt the Americans, as MAJ Nakamura’s successful attacks cause the Soviets to forego 
satellite tracking rather than lose a third expensive platform.1039  ASAT provides NATO 
with a critical strategic advantage at small cost, and Clancy’s clear implication was the 
US needed to make the program a higher priority. 
 Republicans in Congress seized on this message.  Just one week after the release 
of Red Storm Rising, future-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich referenced the book in 
a floor debate on the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act.  He argued the book 
provided “the best single illustration of how a major conflict would work in the real 
world.”1040  Gingrich used it “to make the point that [he thought] opposition to anti-
satellite technology may well be the most irrational position on the left this week.”1041  
He quoted Clancy’s description of Soviet satellite technology and stated Democrat 
opposition to funding ASAT showed the “peculiarly twisted logic on the left” that 
                                                 
1037 Red Storm Rising, 484 
1038 Ibid, 418. 
1039 Ibid, 484. 
1040 Newt Gingrich, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987,” Congressional Record 




“killing 800 pounds of electronics is terrible but shooting down an airplane to save 
20,000 lives is acceptable.”1042  He continued the partisan attack, implying those opposed 
to ASAT were in league with the Soviets and willing to “put at risk 20,000 or 30,000 
lives.”1043   
 Thomas Downey, a Democrat from New York, objected to Gingrich’s remarks, 
calling them a “remarkable argument, based on fiction.”1044  He was not sure if it was 
“life imitating art or fiction imitating reality,” but he was certain that there was no 
“clearer example” of how arms control had helped the US than with ASAT.1045  Downey 
believed the limited capability of the US ASAT program provided incentive for the 
Soviets to forego efforts to militarize space.  Since the US relied more on its satellites, 
this development favored US interests in the event of war.  He and his caucus believed 
funding the technology in the manner suggested by Gingrich would touch off an arms 
race in space and put a strategic advantage of the US at risk.1046  Both Congressmen 
accepted Clancy’s portrayal of ASAT.  For Gingrich this was tantamount to treason, 
while Downey believed it showed how the US could leverage its technological advantage 
to gain concessions.  The use of Red Storm Rising underlined its importance as a serious 
and realistic contribution to the broader discourse on US strategy.   
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 Senators also made use of the book.  During a 1987 debate on funding of ASAT, 
Senator Dan Quayle held a copy of the book and asked his colleagues if they had read it.  
He argued that if they had, they would realize “ASAT technology is what wins the 
war.”1047  After his addition to the 1988 Republican ticket as vice-president, Democratic 
staffers leaked the exchange to discredit the candidate.  An unnamed aide noted Quayle 
using the book meant “at least… we know he can read.”1048  However, Quayle continued 
to use the book as a resource.  During a September 1988 campaign stop, he deviated from 
prepared remarks and referenced the novel to support ASAT.1049  His advisors expressed 
concern as they had not expected him to stray from his prepared remarks.  However, 
Quayle stood by his interpretation and felt that his version was more exciting.1050  The 
use of Red Storm Rising by Quayle both in the Senate and on the campaign trail 
demonstrated how he used the book as shorthand for strategic issues.   
 Red Storm Rising was more than a vehicle for partisan attacks for Gingrich as 
well.  Following its publication, he invited Clancy and Bond to lunch at the Capitol.  
Throughout the lunch, the co-authors engaged in discussions of defense policy with 
Congressmen.  Larry Bond was surprised Representative Dick Cheney studiously took 
notes as he responded to a question about the capabilities of the Soviet Navy.1051  The 
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event convinced Bond that many on Capitol Hill took his work seriously.  It also 
demonstrated how wide-spread the use of narrative in policy discussion was.  While 
interactions like Bond’s were common, as discussion of books, movies, and other media 
occurred daily, they are also largely forgotten.  However, this does not make them 
unimportant.  Rather it underlines how commonplace exchanges and light entertainment 
can play a large, often unacknowledged, role in shaping strategic perception.  They create 
what political scientists Paul Musgrave and J Furman Daniel term “synthetic 
experiences.”1052  Popular culture can “encode information in ways that affect 
judgement” because they “prompt the inward experience of a fictional reality.”1053  
 The military treated Red Storm Rising as a serious contribution.  In addition to 
publicly lavishing praise upon Clancy during Congressional testimony, the Navy used the 
author’s work in its professional military education.  Officers attending the Prospective 
Command Course, which identified and trained future submarine commanders, received a 
copy of The Hunt for Red October upon beginning the course.1054  The Naval War 
College immediately added Red Storm Rising to its curriculum in a course that consisted 
primarily of senior officers in both American and allied navies.  The syllabus identified 
Red Storm Rising as a war game and asserted it was a “very true to life story.”1055  The 
book’s value to the course was in its depiction of the coordination between different 
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military branches, close relationships between NATO allies, the essential role of 
technology, and the employment of politics and diplomacy in ending the war.1056  These 
reasons closely mirror Reagan’s own for valuing the book.   
The purpose of the course was to introduce “officers to various maritime, 
national, and alliance strategies,” showcase the importance of “joint and combined 
operations,” and finally to “evaluate military decisions.”1057  Using Clancy’s work to 
support these objectives demonstrated that the course planners at the Naval War College 
viewed it as both realistic and relevant.  It also likely helped skirt issues of foreign 
disclosure.  Red Storm Rising was unclassified and American officers could gloss over 
any of the classified material as fictional speculation by the author.  It is possible 
Clancy’s book could offer a more realistic depiction of American capabilities than a 
government produced scenario which would be subject to security review.  The 
accessibility of the novel made it an ideal tool for use in a joint schoolhouse. 
Red Storm Rising was a commercial success as well.  After release, it debuted in 
the second place on The New York Times best seller’s list, behind Danielle Steele’s 
Wanderlust.1058  Clancy shortly overtook Steele, and Red Storm Rising sold over a half 
million copies in its first month of release.1059  By the end of the year, only Stephen 
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King’s It sold more copies.1060  For the remainder of the decade, a new Clancy thriller 
would finish in the one of the top two positions in sales for the year.1061  The success of 
the novel lead HBO, a satellite and cable television channel, to seek to adapt it into a 
mini-series.  However, the projected cost proved too high, and they abandoned the 
project.1062  Other media projects were more successful.  Micropose adapted Red Storm 
Rising into a commercially-successful computer game.  Sid Meier, better known for 
creating the Civilization series of games, led the effort.1063  The success of the venture 
later led to the birth of Red Storm Entertainment, a company Clancy to produce video 
games based on his written work and other original ideas.1064  The expansion to digital 
media and later success of films based on The Hunt for Red October, Patriot Games, and 
Clear and Present Danger expanded Clancy’s reach well beyond the reading public.  
Vice-Admiral Cooper’s testimony on the NDAA demonstrated that the military was 




 Red Storm Rising was not the reason why Reagan and Gorbachev almost 
abolished nuclear weapons at Reykjavik in 1986.  Many factors contributed to the near-
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agreement.  Gorbachev wanted to reach an agreement due to the significant drain on the 
economy caused by the escalating arms race.  Just before the summit, he told Chernyaev, 
the economic drain meant the US had an interest in “keeping the negotiations machine 
running idle,” it was therefore essential to offer concessions in order to get the process 
moving again.1065  Soviet leadership feared the potential economic cost of researching 
and developing a program similar to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative and distrusted 
Reagan’s promise to share the technology.1066  Soviet fears and Gorbachev’s desire to 
pursue sweeping economic reform meant that the USSR came to Reykjavik prepared to 
offer more than at previous summits. 
Advisors close to Reagan felt that the time was right for a monumental agreement.  
Shultz believed that given the pace of concessions both before and during the summit, 
Reagan should move quickly to “reel the Soviets in.”1067 Reagan’s first term strategy of 
“Peace Through Strength” created an environment allowing for serious and sweeping 
arms control agreements without jeopardizing US interests.1068  NSC member Jack 
Matlock felt that the Soviets were serious about their proposals, and “felt optimistic that 
US-Soviet relations might be on the verge of a sudden turn for the better.”1069   
The popularity of the Nuclear Freeze Movement provided strong evidence that global 
populations were tired of Mutually Assured Destruction.  Diplomatic efforts by the 
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Vatican and other groups furthered this narrative.  Popular culture also added to the 
growing anti-nuclear narrative.  Hollywood movies like WarGames showed the danger of 
a misunderstanding or accident leading to war and The Day After revealed the aftermath 
of such a conflict.  Eliminating nuclear weapons provided the basis for the plot of the 
much-maligned Superman IV: The Quest for Peace.  The consistent, starkly anti-nuclear 
view of Hollywood productions, even as other films embraced the nationalistic tone of 
the Reagan administration, showed the commercial appeal of arms control. 
The developments in Soviet attitudes, US conventional strength, and popular 
attitudes, would have meant little if Reagan believed in nuclear weapons.  However, his 
long-standing abhorrence of the weapons created a desire to seek out sweeping 
reductions, a shift from past talks which focused on limiting their expansion.  The 
primary reason that Reagan did not pursue this actively in his first term was the belief 
that the US remained dangerously behind the USSR militarily.  Red Storm Rising’s key 
contribution to Reykjavik was in helping Reagan draw the conclusion that the US had 
reversed this imbalance, particularly with regards to conventional units.  Reagan used the 
book as a personal war-game, and it led him to believe the US and its NATO allies could 
defeat the Warsaw Pact dangerous and apocalyptic weapons.   
Only Reagan’s refusal to confine research on the Strategic Defense Initiative to 
the laboratory prevented the initial agreement.  The program was far more than a 
bargaining chip to him. It represented a guarantee that whatever the state of relations was 
between major powers, their populations would not have to live under the threat of near-
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instantaneous annihilation.  SDI was not tradeable for Reagan, because he thought it 
would guarantee individual freedom in an uncertain world.  His attachment to the 





















Chapter 6 Pebbles from Space: SDI, Cultural Division, and Strategic Success 
 
 In March of 1983, Reagan spoke to the nation about the topic of defense and 
national security.  Most of the speech was boilerplate Reagan.  The President lamented 
that the US and its allies allowed the Soviets to build up military strength uncontested 
over the previous decade and argued that continuing to fix the decay would take 
significant funding over a period of years.  Even though calls to cut the defense budget 
“came in nice simple arithmetic,” doing so would be a dereliction of duty and one that 
echoed the decision of France and Britain to “neglect their defenses in the 1930s.”1070  
Reagan attacked the aggressive actions of the Soviets and the Cubans, who were 
supporting communist forces in Grenada, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Ethiopia 
and Angola.  The President also highlighted the ongoing war in Afghanistan and Soviet 
complicity in the establishment of martial law in Poland.1071  He argued that while the US 
had made great strides in the first two years of his administration, it still needed to do 
more to ensure that it had the will and the means to both resist and deter such aggressive 
behavior. None of these points were new to the American people, and those watching the 
speech could be forgiven if they expressed confusion as to why it was broadcast 
nationally during prime time. 
                                                 





  Reagan saved the important part for the end.  He sought to share “a vision of the 
future” with his fellow citizens.1072  In it, “free people could live secure in the knowledge 
that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet 
attack.”1073  Instead, the US could respond defensively and destroy incoming missiles.  
Reagan wanted Americans to put faith in technology, which combined with the 
individual ingenuity of a free people, could render “nuclear weapons impotent and 
obsolete.”1074  This belief in the combined power of technology and the American people 
was one Reagan spoke to often.  It reflected his faith that individual liberty would foster 
innovation, which would in turn protect and spread that same liberty.  With the address, 
Reagan sought to eliminate the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction, the principle that 
the strategic defense of the US had rested on for decades.  He had long disdained the 
concept, believing it immoral.1075  Reagan now sought public support to repudiate MAD 
and permanently change the global strategic environment.  He hoped that the Strategic 
Defense Initiative would fulfill his dream of a world where every day Americans no 
longer need fear nuclear war. 
 The concept drew immediate criticism.  Even before publicly proposing the idea, 
Reagan faced concerted opposition in his own administration.  The day before the speech 
McFarlane sent National Security Advisor Bill Clark a draft memo highlighting that 
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many on the NSC “expressed their most extreme concern” about the likely reception of 
the initiative by American allies and the public at large.1076  McFarlane further suggested 
that Reagan speak with Weinberger and Vessey “to solicit their views” on the 
program.1077  Clark rejected the memo and did not forward it to Reagan.  Many of his 
closest advisors sought to kill the concept.  Secretary Shultz only learned of the proposal 
two days before, when Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger informed him that 
the President was planning to announce the high-tech initiative on the basis of advice 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.1078  Eagleburger had misread the interest of the Pentagon, 
which feared the technology was not advanced enough and that more research would take 
away from offensive capabilities.1079  Despite the military’s reluctance, Reagan sought to 
make the program a centerpiece of his goal of “Peace Through Strength.”  Shultz and 
Eagleburger feared that this “revolution in our strategic doctrine” would undermine 
relationships with key allies by signaling strategic disconnect.1080  The State Department 
also expressed concern that SDI risked increasing tensions with the Soviets over 
technologically infeasible idea.1081   
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 The lack of coordination about SDI’s inclusion into the address hurt its reception 
internal to the administration.  Reagan decided to add the language less than a week 
before delivering the speech originally intended to defend continued high levels of 
defense spending.1082  Officials in the Pentagon and at Foggy Bottom both felt they were 
not properly consulted on an issue that would fundamentally change core strategic 
principles.  As a result, they responded in a fashion that future National Security Advisor 
John Poindexter characterized as “very negative.”1083  The opposition left Reagan 
undeterred.   He chose to trust his own instincts and National Security Advisor Bill Clark 
on the issue.  Reagan’s willingness to buck his closest advisors demonstrated how 
important SDI was to his strategic vision.  Over the remainder of his presidency, he 
would unflinchingly support it and refused to consider any restrictions or limitations to 
SDI. 
 Reagan’s speech received a starkly negative reaction.  Time suggested that “in the 
nuclear age it may be safer when each side has only spears.”1084  The magazine felt that 
Reagan’s “faith in technology as the solution to the country’s military problems” was 
“both forgetful about the past and shortsighted toward the future.”1085  After all, the 
Soviets had demonstrated an ability to overcome technological gaps before. An effective 
missile defense could provoke a Soviet first strike.  The USSR would have an incentive 
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to attack before the shield came online or risk leaving “itself permanently at the 
America’s mercy.”1086   
Newsweek termed SDI “nuclear heresy,” and argued that Reagan should instead 
accept the recent recommendations of a commission chaired by President Ford’s National 
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.1087  The Commission on Strategic Forces 
recommended continuing the deployment of MX missiles in the short-term but gradually 
replacing them with Midgetman missiles, each of which contained a single warhead 
rather than the ten on the MIRV-enabled MX.1088  Scowcroft believed these moves would 
enhance the ability of the US to deter the Soviets in the short term, while creating a more 
survivable second-strike capability.  Newsweek argued this would mean that “Americans 
may feel somewhat more secure without making Moscow feel less so.”1089  In contrast, 
Reagan’s proposal would “require enormous diplomatic skill” to prevent a new arms 
race, a skill the publication found lacking in Reagan.1090 
 Concerns about SDI’s feasibility dominated the discussion.  An editorial in the 
New York Times accused Reagan of acting without firm “scientific basis and political 
examination,” and expressed doubt that physics of the project were theoretically 
sound.1091  The Office of Technology Assessment concluded that the prospects of 
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successfully employing advanced missile defense technology were remote.1092  Many 
accused Reagan of drawing on science fiction rather than science fact.  Newsweek 
equated the proposed technology with the shields of the starship Enterprise from Star 
Trek.1093  The New York Times editorial carried the headline “Nuclear Facts, Science 
Fictions,” and referred to SDI as a “pipe dream,” that was little more than “a projection of 
fantasy into policy.”1094  Most famously, Senator Edward Kennedy referred to the speech 
as “misleading Red-scare tactics and reckless Star Wars schemes.”1095  The reference to 
the popular films stuck, and Star Wars quickly became a shorthand for discussing the 
program. 
 While Reagan intensely disliked the name, noting in a letter that he would “bristle 
every time our media friends (?) call it “Star Wars,” his fondness for science fiction did 
contribute to his embrace of SDI.1096  Edmund Moore, Reagan’s official biographer, 
argued that the President’s childhood reading of John Carter’s adventures helped Reagan 
accept the core concept of SDI.1097  This overstates the importance of Burroughs directly 
on SDI, but Reagan’s reading did affect the way he looked at the future.  He frequently 
marveled at the pace of technological developments in his lifetime and recognized that 
many ideas he first encountered in science fiction were now normal.  In his 1984 address 
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to the graduating class at the Air Force Academy, Reagan reflected while only 52 years 
separated his days at Eureka College from the cadets, it seemed more like 520.1098  He 
noted that the US had gone from “space fiction to space shuttles” and over that half 
century, “a new future was discovered and quickly rediscovered” thanks to the 
“cataclysmic rush” of technological prowess.1099   
The rush made it seem only natural to Reagan to take inspiration from imagined 
futures and reject naysayers of the present.  His faith in technology and the capabilities of 
Americans reverberated well beyond Washington DC.  It lent legitimacy in previously 
closed debates to a wide variety of actors and began to shape the genre that he took 
inspiration from.  During the SDI debate, science fiction did more than create a provide a 
general spark for the idea, it became a cultural battleground.  Legends of the genre 
engaged in fierce advocacy on the issue and publicly inserted themselves into the debate.  
Policymakers both welcomed and actively encouraged this, accepting the authors as 
experts in large part because of their ability to translate arcane detail into powerful 
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 Shortly after Reagan’s election in 1980, a group of scientists, writers, military 
personnel, and others interested in space began meeting at the California home of Larry 
Niven, a science-fiction writer.  They called themselves the Citizens Advisory Council on 
National Space Policy, and were the brainchild of another sci-fi author, Jerry Pournelle. 
Convinced that Reagan would win the election, Pournelle organized the group with the 
hope using his connections to the future president’s close advisors.1100  During the 1970s, 
Pournelle had collaborated on a non-fiction book entitled Strategy of Technology with 
Stefan Possony, a fellow at the Hoover Institution.  Possony was a mentor to Richard 
Allen, Reagan’s first National Security Advisor, during Allen’s own time at Hoover in 
the late 1960s, and eventually introduced Allen to Pournelle.  The two men then worked 
together on some foreign policy issues.1101 
 Pournelle began his career working in the aerospace industry for Boeing in the 
1950s, working on the development of Project Thor.  The program proposed using 
tungsten rods launched from satellites to destroy targets on the ground.  Kinetic energy 
released from the impact would have power equivalent to a small-yield nuclear 
device.1102 However, since it was a conventional weapon it could be deployed without 
violating the strictures of the ABM or Outer Space Treaties.  Pournelle’s work on this 
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project led him work with Edward Teller and Possony on space defense.  At the same 
time, he became active in the Republican Party, and served as the San Bernardino county 
chairman for Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign.  In this capacity, he invited 
Reagan to give a speech at a rally and dined with the future president.1103  Beginning in 
the late 1960s, he began writing science fiction, publishing his first book in 1969 and 
served as president of the Science Fiction and Fantasy Writers of America, the guild for 
genre writers.   
 The political, academic, and writing connections of Pournelle, allowed him to 
assemble an eclectic group to the first meeting of the Citizen’s Advisory Council.  Niven 
acted as host due to the size of his house, and wife’s cooking talents.1104  Other attendees 
included Lowell Wood, who attended on behalf of Nobel-laureate Edward Teller, Buzz 
Aldrin, noted science fiction authors Robert Heinlein and Poul Anderson, and a number 
of senior military officers.1105  The group sought to outline a new direction for US space 
policy, and over the course of three meetings before Reagan’s inauguration produced a 
two hundred page document covering a wide array of space issues.   
Strategic Defense was the centerpiece of the project.  Finding consensus was 
challenging, as over several decades a wide variety of concepts for missile defense 
emerged.  It became commonplace for supporters of one concept to the technological 
underpinnings of another.  The net effect was to diminish the perceived possibility of the 
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entire concept.  An early compromise between the proponents, termed the “Treaty of 
Tarzana” allowed the group to advocate for SDI in a general sense without delving too 
deeply into technical issues.1106  The name stemmed from the location of the meetings in 
the LA suburb of Tarzana, named for the Edgar Rice Burroughs character.   
 Heinlein, Pournelle, Niven, and Anderson largely abstained from the in-depth 
discussions as they lacked expertise.  However, they played an essential role in the 
production of final document.  Their work as science-fiction authors allowed them to 
translate the heavy jargon of the scientists and present the material in a way that “made it 
more interesting.”1107  Their efforts paid off, as Reagan reportedly read the entire 
document rather than just the executive summary.  The positive reception from the 
President led Allen to ask the Council to provide periodic recommendations on a variety 
of space issues.1108 
 The group also influenced the announcement of SDI to the public.  Reagan 
speechwriter, Dana Rohrabacher, noted that as he worked on the speech he was in contact 
with the science fiction community, and a “lot of creativity” was available to the 
administration on space issues.1109  Some of the language from the group’s original report 
also made it into the speech.  Reagan’s question asking Americans “wouldn’t it be better 
to save lives than to avenge them” came directly from the report’s text.1110  After the 
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announcement, the Citizen’s Council also sought to demonstrate broad public support for 
SDI.  They turned to Bjo Trimble, who had organized the letter-writing campaign which 
led NBC to renew Star Trek for a third season, to similarly flood the White House with 
letters supporting SDI.1111  The letters offered a counter to the largely negative reception 
the idea received outside of the Oval Office. 
 Reagan’s speech sparked a crisis within the science fiction community.  Pournelle 
recalled that it “damn near split Science Fiction in America in half.”1112  Debate over 
whether SDI would lead to the militarization of space, was technologically post, cost-
effective, or could provoke the Soviets into attacking raged in genre magazines, op-eds, 
and novels.  Authors actively responded to Reagan’s idea and incorporated it into their 
new stories.  Pournelle was the most prominent voice in favor, authoring a book Mutual 
Assured Survival that was essentially a fictionalized version of the Advisory Council’s 
initial report.1113  The cover featured the tag line “ICBMs Will Soon Be Obsolete” and a 
blurb from Reagan praising the work of the Citizen’s Advisory Council.1114  Reagan’s 
letter praised the group for “addressing with verve and vision the challenges to peace and 
to our national security,” highlighting the positive effect the prose of the sci-fi writers had 
on the overall report.1115 
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 Pournelle and Niven also collaborated on Footfall in 1985, which reached the top 
sport on The New York Times best-sellers list.1116  The book features a plotline in which 
science fiction writers advise the president on how to respond to an alien invasion.  The 
writers are thinly disguised stand-ins for actual authors and included characters for 
Pournelle, Niven, and Heinlein.1117  Pournelle admitted that his work on the council 
influenced the novel.1118  Footfall embraced the militarization of space and relied on the 
extraterrestrial deployment of nuclear weapons to defend the planet.  The New York 
Times positively reviewed the work, though did decry that the inclusion of the writers 
only served to allow “the authors to score some points against fuzzy-minded liberals.”1119  
This was by design, as Pournelle and Niven explicitly intended to build support for a 
more robust military role in space.  For the authors it was impossible to separate personal 
beliefs from his writing, Niven noted that part of being a sci-fi writer was that “we teach, 
we can’t help it.”1120   
The debate also ensnared the authors commonly regarded as the “Big Three” of 
science fiction publishing: Robert Heinlein, Arthur Clarke, and Isaac Asimov.  Clarke, 
author of 2001: A Space Odyssey, wrote a short story that appeared in the Pentagon’s 
Defense Science Board Newsletter, entitled “On Golden Seas.”1121 The story features a 
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female President Kennedy facing a substantial national debt crisis.  She then surprises her 
own staff with a “Budget Defense Initiative” unveiled during an address to the nation.  
Clarke’s fictional president is a “great reader of historical fiction” and came across a 
book which discusses the ability to remove gold from seawater.  The proposal infuriates 
the Soviet Union, who Kennedy seeks to calm by offering to share the technology, 
though “nobody believed her.”1122  The story also identified a host of international 
relations questions about ownership of the sea and concludes with the implication of a 
pending arms race between the US and USSR to drain the world’s oceans as quickly as 
possible.1123 
 It is unlikely that Reagan read “On Golden Seas,” and Clarke’s decision to name 
the stand in for the president Kennedy would likely not have sat well, but the newsletter 
and story did circulate through the Pentagon and White House.  It contained an explicit 
acknowledgement of the ability of fiction to influence policy makers, which likely also 
indicated why Clarke chose to write a short story with little prospect of commercial 
success.  The short length, just three pages, and clear allusions to SDI, Reagan, and 
administration officials show Clarke’s intent to use the story in a manner like Reagan’s 
own use of stories in speeches and public comments.  It was a short, memorable parable 
intended to influence popular opinion on policy. 
                                                 




Clarke also testified against SDI before Congress.  In his testimony, he referred to 
the program as a “technological obscenity” and called for more cooperation with the 
Soviet Union. These themes largely matched Clarke’s novels, which often centered on 
utopian societies and the optimistic side of exploration.  Technology was of central 
importance in much of Clarke’s work, and he most commonly used it to elevate a society 
and its citizens.  Clarke’s testimony drew the ire of Heinlein, who confronted the British 
author at a 1985 meeting of the Citizen’s Advisory Council at Niven’s house.  Heinlein 
questioned why Clarke felt that he had a right to discuss US policy as a foreigner.   He 
also viewed the moral doubts Clarke had about weaponizing space as “outrageously 
misplaced” since the technology would make nuclear war impossible.1124  The outburst 
“really was vicious” in Clarke’s eyes, and left the author deeply hurt.1125  Clarke did 
reassess his views on SDI and while he did not fully support it, later acknowledged that 
there were “certain aspects of SDI that made sense.”1126  However, the argument lingered 
and the two never completely reconciled before Heinlein’s death in 1988. 
Heinlein also found himself on the opposite side of the issue from Asimov. As 
with Clarke, the debate over SDI would effectively end their long-time, though already 
strained friendship.  The two men worked together at the Naval Air Experimental Station 
in Philadelphia during the Second World War, after Heinlein secured Asimov a position 
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there.1127  Asimov recalled that Heinlein had a difficult manner and would seek to badger 
him about viewpoints.  Their differences of opinion were exacerbated by what Asimov 
saw as Heinlein’s shift from “flaming liberal” during the war to a “far-right conservative 
immediately afterward.”1128  In his 1995 memoir, Asimov tied the shift to Heinlein’s 
marriage to his second wife, Virginia, and compares it to Reagan’s own shift which 
Asimov inaccurately blamed on Nancy Reagan.  Asimov goes on to refer to Reagan as 
“brainless” before somewhat disingenuously claiming that he could not “explain Heinlein 
in that way at all.”1129  The juxtaposition of the two so closely in the memoir implied 
strongly that Asimov viewed both men as intellectually feeble and disingenuous.  Asimov 
concluded his reminiscence of Heinlein by noting that the posthumously published 
Grumbles from the Grave revealed a “meanness of spirit” in Heinlein. 
Asimov opposed SDI on the basis that he felt it was both not technically feasible 
and too expensive.  In a letter for the advocacy group Americans for Democratic Action, 
he argued that the program was “only Hollywood science fiction, and like almost all 
Hollywood science fiction, it is bad science fiction.”1130  Asimov also employed the 
rhetoric of the westerns, equating SDI to “a John Wayne standoff,” as he believed that the 
program would bankrupt both the USSR and the US.1131  This somewhat ironically 
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echoed Reagan’s own language about the concept SDI was supposed to render obsolete, 
Mutually Assured Destruction.  He also wrote against the program in the genre magazine, 
The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction, taking his case for the program’s futility 
directly to his fans.1132  Asimov opened an essay entitled “Out of the Everywhere,” which 
was ostensibly about cosmic rays, with an attack against Reagan and supporters of SDI.  
The author lambasted the program as “the wish fulfillment dream of a shallow-mind” that 
was both technologically and politically impossible.1133  He then told the story of 
encountering another author who was of “far-right persuasion” and a “well-known 
apostle of the righteousness of violence.”1134  Asimov described fearing for his physical 
safety and offered it as proof that supporters of the program had lost their sanity.   
There were efforts to use Sci-Fi magazines to support the administration’s 
initiative as well.  Pournelle and publisher Jim Baen established a new science fiction 
magazine, in part to combat what they saw as a left-ward shift in the genre and a 
movement away from what they viewed as traditional military science fiction.1135  The 
new journal, entitled Far Frontiers, only lasted seven volumes, but frequently featured 
op-eds in favor of SDI.  Michael Ashley notes in Science Fiction Rebels: The Story of the 
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Science-Fiction Magazine from 1981-1990 that the journal’s fiction also showed clear 
signs of the influence of SDI.1136 
Heinlein was outspoken in his support of SDI.  His advocacy worked its way into 
his fiction books.  Heinlein’s penultimate novel, The Cat Who Walked Through Walls, 
was dedicated to his fellow members of the Citizen’s Advisory Council.  The dedication 
listed Pournelle, Niven, and seven other authors involved in the group, and called them 
“men to have at your back.”1137  Beyond his active participation in the Citizen’s Advisory 
Council, he collaborated with LTG Daniel Graham.   
Graham was one of the leading advocates for missile defense, through a program 
dubbed High Frontier. Heinlein donated over forty thousand dollars to High Frontier-
centric advocacy groups.1138  He also wrote the introduction for Graham’s 1983 book 
High Frontier, the subtitle of which promised Americans that “there is a defense against 
nuclear war.”1139  In the introduction, Heinlein stated that High Frontier offered him the 
“best news I have heard since V-J Day.”1140  He went on to argue that the program’s 
reliance on non-nuclear systems made it something that everyone who opposed nuclear 
weapons should get behind, and that as it could not kill anyone it was “as non-aggressive 
as a bulletproof vest.”1141  Heinlein responded to claims about the high costs of SDI by 
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noting High Frontier advocates expected it to reduce net defense expenditures.  However, 
Heinlein felt he “was not in a position to judge this,” but did not “give a damn” since “[a] 
man with a burst appendix can’t afford to dicker over the cost of surgery.”1142 Heinlein 
concluded his introduction by referencing his time as a research and development 
engineer to assert that any technical issues would prove surmountable. Pournelle’s 
preface to the High Frontier similarly referenced his past as a scientist to lend credibility 
to arguments about the feasibility of the program.1143   
Though both authors cast their support for High Frontier in scientific terms, it is 
unlikely that Graham sought their input because of their technical expertise.  Both men 
were decades removed from conducting formal research, and best known as science 
fiction authors.  Heinlein’s introduction and Pournelle’s preface were intended to lend 
Graham their celebrity and help influence genre-fans to support the program.  The choice 
of publisher further indicated this desire.  TOR books published the mass market version 
of High Frontier.  The publishing house, both historically and in the present, focused 
heavily on science-fiction and fantasy, rarely venturing beyond those genres.  The 
decision to publish Graham’s work indicates that both the general and the publisher felt 
that the science-fiction community would readily receive and embrace the ideas of High 
Frontier, offering a potentially valuable way to build support for SDI. 
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The science-fiction community was omni-present in the debate over SDI.  
Journalists sought out prominent authors and quoted them as authoritatively as Nobel 
Prize winning physicists, military leadership, and policy makers.  A profile of Graham, 
who advised Reagan during his 1976 campaign and afterwards, listed former Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Thomas Moore, Edward Teller, Buzz Aldrin, and Heinlein as 
supporters of High Frontier.1144  The article implied that the support of each was equally 
valuable and all four men position as “nationally prominent figures in the military and 
scientific community” made them suitable advocates.1145   
Politicians also sought out the authors.  Newt Gingrich developed a long-lasting 
friendship with Pournelle, which led Pournelle to write the introduction for Gingrich’s 
first book Window of Opportunity.  Gingrich co-wrote the book with Marianne Gingrich, 
his second wife, and noted science-fiction author David Drake.  The book offered policy 
prescriptions for the US and argued that further space exploration was essential to 
creating an “opportunity society.”1146  Its cover art was more reflective of a science 
fiction novel than political tract, featuring an Earth dwarfed by a bald eagle in space and 
a shuttle flying towards the reader.  Gingrich met the authors and sci-fi publisher Jim 
Baen at the 1983 World Science Fiction Convention in Atlanta.1147  He maintained a 
close relationship with both Baen and Pournelle and embarked on a science fiction 
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project with the two, though Pournelle would later drop out.  The result was the 1995 
book, 1945, an alternate history of World War II featuring a timeline in which the US and 
Germany never went to war.  A planned sequel never materialized, but Gingrich did 
continue to write alternate histories and pursue other fictional projects. 
The inclusion of figures like Heinlein, Asimov, and Clarke into a debate on 
national policy reflects the significant strides science fiction made from its origins in pulp 
magazines like John Campbell’s Astounding Science Fiction and the novels of 
Burroughs.  Part of this acceptance stemmed from their audience growing up and seeing 
technology from childhood imaginations become reality.  Reagan’s remarks at the Air 
Force Academy reflected the amazement of many over the movement from “space fiction 
to the space shuttle.”1148  The increased prominence of authors in policy also stemmed 
from their value as translators.  Pournelle, Niven, Heinlein and other’s role on the Citizen 
Advisory Council showed the value of storytellers in selling a vision. 
Controversy over SDI in the science fiction community also demonstrated the 
way policy makers could influence culture.  Reagan’s enthusiastic embrace of the 
concept made it one that many authors felt they had to reckon with, and “damn near split 
science fiction in America in half.”1149  The issue exposed deep divisions in the 
community, many of which persist into the present day.1150  While these controversies 
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may have come to light without SDI, the policy choice of Reagan set the community on a 
collision course for a literary civil war. 
 
Conclave of the Kremlin 
 
 Reagan appreciated the public support of authors like Heinlein and Pournelle.  
The President responded to Graham’s dedication of High Frontier with a letter praising 
“the important work that [Graham] and [his] colleagues have done to prepare the way for 
a more secure America.”1151  Reagan particularly appreciated the “efforts to help us build 
a national consensus” on the issue of SDI.1152  He also wrote to the Citizen’s Advisory 
Council and praised the “verve and vision” of the writers. 1153  Reagan’s explicit praise 
for the consensus building of Graham and the language of the writers showed the 
tremendous value he placed on the inclusion of SDI  into narratives, both fictional and 
otherwise.  That the authors presented his policy in an approachable manner made them 
significant assets for the administration. 
Science fiction writers were not the only ones who took inspiration from Reagan 
and included SDI into their work.  Clancy also embraced the theme of missile defense for 
his fourth novel, The Cardinal of the Kremlin.  Published in 1988, Cardinal was the last 
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of the Jack Ryan books published during the Reagan administration and Clancy opted to 
make missile defense the primary technology featured in the work.  A 1988 New York 
Times Magazine profile portrayed Clancy as a “champion… of Ronald Reagan’s 
Strategic Defense Initiative program,” and quoted the author as believing that if the US 
did not “go forward with it, we’re stupid.”1154  Clancy felt that “it can work” and that 
clearly the Russian “think it can work,” provided the strongest evidence that program had 
value.1155 
 The Cardinal of the Kremlin focuses on a competition between the US and USSR 
to develop effective missile defense.  It begins with the scuttling of the Red October, 
allowing Jack Ryan, now working on arms control, to reflect on nuclear weapons.  The 
analyst recalls his reaction to seeing the submarine’s missiles and recoils at the 
recollection of the “ghastly things.”1156  He later rejects the utility of arms reductions, 
noting that even a reduction of fifty percent still leaves the basic framework of Mutually 
Assured Destruction intact.  Ryan concludes that the US needs to “eliminate that damned 
things or figure out something to keep them from working” and argues that the US “had 
to do the latter before [it] can attempt the former.”1157  Within the first forty pages of the 
novel, Clancy endorsed Reagan’s Reykjavik stance and argued that SDI not a roadblock 
to a deal, but rather the guarantor of abolition.  In the final chapter, Ryan delivers the 
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message directly to the Soviet General Secretary, a clear Gorbachev stand in.  The Soviet 
leader wryly notes that Ryan sounds like the president, which Ryan quickly agrees with, 
adding “he’s right.”1158  This was Clancy’s central premise for the novel, that Reagan was 
completely right on SDI. 
 Clancy’s narrative is structurally like his previous novels.  The American 
characters are unambiguously virtuous and capable.  The lead US researcher for SDI, 
MAJ Alan Gregory, is an army officer who was top of his class at West Point, then 
earned several PhDs, and “was already being talked about in the same breath as 
Cambridge’s Stephen Hawking or Princeton’s Freeman Dyson.”1159  Soviet characters are 
used as foils to expose the flaws in the Soviet system.  The titular character, the Cardinal, 
is a long-time US mole at the highest level of the Soviet military establishment.  Despite 
having three decorations as a Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Filitov spies for the US.  
He does so because the system betrayed the sacrifices made in the Great Patriotic War 
and, like Ramius from Hunt for Red October, the regime was responsible for the death of 
Filitov’s wife.  The colonel’s sons both died in military service, one in a tank during the 
1956 Hungarian Revolt.1160  Clancy’s characterizations continued the efforts of Hunt for 
Red October and Red Storm Rising to advance the Reagan themes of gallant US service 
members and the distinction between the Russian people and the Soviet system. 
                                                 
1158 Ibid, 536 
1159 Ibid, 51. 
1160 Ibid, 211. 
307 
 
 Both nations achieve significant progress in developing missile defense in the 
book, but Clancy shows the Soviets as more advanced.  After a US reconnaissance plane 
accidentally observes a test at a Soviet facility, the American general in charge of the 
program comments that the Russians were “at least three years ahead of us.”1161  
However, the sins of the USSR eventually undermine their progress.  A former math 
teacher, driven to join the Mujahedeen after the Soviets kill his wife and daughter in a jet 
attack and kidnap his son, destroys much of the Bright Star research facility in a raid 
supported by the CIA.1162  A Soviet officer on the scene assesses that it would take over 
eighteen months to repair, which will allow the US to regain the lead in SDI tech thanks 
to intelligence given to them by Filitov.1163  Clancy’s use of fear of Soviet technological 
prowess as a driving force in the plot matched the template established in The Hunt for 
Red October.  Cardinal’s depiction of the inhuman nature of the Soviet system leading to 
disgruntlement and American opportunity also matches his first novel and lends to a 
reading of the work as a call to action for Americans concerned about falling behind in 
the Cold War. 
 There were concerns about Soviet missile defense efforts within the Reagan 
administration.  Kenneth deGraffenreid, the National Security Council Director for 
Intelligence Programs from 1981 to 1987, thought during the transition that previous 
administrations “had not given enough attention to what the Soviets were doing in 
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Strategic Defense.”1164  This included missile defense and efforts to disrupt US command 
and control.  Studies conducted in the wake of the 1983 Able Archer exercise revealed a 
number of vulnerabilities with the system, and the NSC expressed concern that the 
Soviets had gained access to networks intended to control the targeting and launch of 
nuclear weapons.1165  Reagan had expressed similar concerns after watching the 1983 
film WarGames, which features a young hacker gaining access to US strategic systems 
and nearly launching nuclear weapons.1166  Shortly after viewing the movie, Reagan 
asked the Joint Chiefs if what the movie showed was possible, they were unable to give a 
response and promised to look into.  After investigating, they told the President that the 
problem was “worse than you could possibly imagine,” and began to work on a 
solution.1167 
 Reagan believed the Soviets were actively seeking missile defense technology 
similar to the one he proposed in his 1983 speech.  This also led him to believe that the 
USSR did not actually practice MAD.  Instead, they sought to upend the very strategic 
balance they claimed the ABM Treaty upheld.1168  Intelligence reports did provide 
evidence of Soviet research into missile defense.  In October of 1985, Secretaries Shultz 
and Weinberger jointly released a report entitled “Soviet Strategic Defense Programs” 
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which provided a declassified look at USSR programs.  It listed a four part “Soviet 
Approach” to strategic defense.  First, the document alleged that the USSR sought the 
“destruction and disruption of the West’s nuclear associated command, control and 
communications.”1169 The Soviets would then seek to destroy weapons before launch and 
attempt the “interception and destruction of surviving weapons” while in flight.1170  
Finally, they sought the protection of key personnel and infrastructure.   
The bulk of the report focused on the third objective, the interception and 
destruction of in-flight missiles.  It identified research sites in Pechora, located in 
northern Russia, Krasnoyarks, Siberia, and in Sary Shagan, located in present-day 
Kazakhstan.  Research centers in these cities focused on radar to track missiles and 
directed energy weapons for the interdiction and destruction of satellites and eventually 
missiles.1171  By 1989, the Soviets laser research at Sary Shagan was still only viable for 
tracking satellites and American physicists doubted the ability to convert them into 
effective ABM weapons.1172  Another location in Tyuratuam, (also located in 
Kazakhstan) tested interceptor missiles which already had the capacity to interdict 
satellites. The report alleged they could interdict ballistic missiles in the future.1173  
Shultz and Weinberger cast US efforts in SDI as a way to balance Soviet capabilities with 
those of the US and accused the USSR of blatant hypocrisy in their reaction to the US 
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program.1174  Reagan echoed these conclusions a week later in a radio address.  He 
highlighted that the Soviets employed over ten thousand scientists and engineers in 
support of their strategic defense research.  Based on this and the intelligence presented 
in the report, Reagan believed that Americans should “realize that our SDI research 
program is crucial to maintain the military balance and protect the liberty and freedom of 
the West.”1175  Reagan also took pains to argue that the US would “welcome the day 
when the Soviet Union can shoot down any incoming missile.”1176  However, he 
predicated this welcome on the ability of the US to do the same.  In his vision, SDI would 
replace MAD with a “balance of safety” that was “not only morally preferable [but] may 
result in getting rid of nuclear weapons altogether.”1177  
That the administration released the report and Reagan gave the address a month 
before the President’s first meeting with Gorbachev indicated a clear expectation that the 
issue would be a significant one at Geneva.  The two reflected an effort to shape the 
conversation prior to the summit.  The topic did come up frequently and was one of the 
main points of conversation in plenary sessions and private meetings between the two 
leaders.  Gorbachev flatly denied that the USSR was involved in SDI research, though 
hedged by noting that “both of us do research in space of course.”1178  However, he 
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argued that Soviet research was for peaceful purposes, ironically echoing the claims of 
Reagan about US SDI research.  In both official settings and private meetings, Gorbachev 
admitted that he understood Reagan’s desire for SDI “on a human level,” but “could not 
possibly agree” as the leader of a major power.1179  The Soviet leader’s officially stated 
concern was that the program would start an arms race for space. 
During the Reykjavik Summit in 1986, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei 
Akhromeyev framed the issue differently.  When confronted by National Security 
Advisor John Poindexter about Soviet research centers in Kazakhstan, he did not deny the 
research efforts.  Instead, Akhromeyev noted that he and Soviet leadership “had such 
high regard for US technology and research and development” that they believed if the 
US put resources behind the project they would have far more success with the 
development than the Soviets did.1180  The exchange convinced Poindexter that Soviet 
objections were not based on the ABM treaty, but rather that American money and 
ingenuity would yield a breakthrough unmatchable by the Soviet Union.1181 
Soviet opposition held firm even with American pledges to share the technology 
with them.  During discussions at Reykjavik, Reagan offered “to share the benefits of 
SDI” with the Soviets, hoping it would “ensure that the Soviets understood [the US was] 
not interested in a 1st strike capability.1182  He told Gorbachev that the US “would share 
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the fruits of our research” and sought to demonstrate it would be in the self-interest of the 
US to do so.1183  Regan believed if “everyone had access to the relevant technology it 
would be a threat to no one” and there would be no incentive to launch a first strike 
destined to fail.1184  
Poindexter later reflected that it was likely “the Soviets didn’t believe us” and felt 
it was to risky to conceded on the point when they “couldn’t really be assured that [the 
US] would share the technology with them.1185  Reagan was genuine in his desire to share 
and wanted to include language in arms control treaties which would “simply make all 
the information available about each other’s systems.”1186  He viewed SDI as essential to 
making arms control work as it would render nuclear weapons ineffective.  During a 
National Security Planning Group meeting in 1987, he expressed frustration at the slow 
pace of abolition.  Reagan believed that “some day people are going to ask why we didn’t 
do something now about getting rid of nuclear weapons” and noted he had “been reading 
my Bible and the description of Armageddon talks about destruction… of many 
cities.”1187  Reagan viewed nuclear weapons as the weapon that would destroy the world 
and felt SDI had the potential to literally avert Armageddon. 
This belief is partly why Reagan did not call on the Soviets to end their own space 
defense program.  During the final session at Reykjavik, he noted to Gorbachev that 
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while he believed the Soviets routinely violated the ABM treaty, “he did not talk about it 
much.”1188  Even though the Soviet program disregarded the agreement, Reagan did not 
expect them to “tear it down” and instead wanted the Soviets to acknowledge the US had 
the same rights to research and test defenses.1189  However, for Gorbachev “it was not an 
acceptable request” arguing that allowing the development and deployment of a new 
system would run counter to the narrative that the two sides were about to “start 
reductions.”1190 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger remained concerned about the prospect 
of a Russian SDI long after the Cold War ended.  Frustrated by what he viewed as the 
decay of US military capability under the Clinton administration, Reagan’s Secretary of 
Defense turned to fiction. Writing to Margaret Thatcher asking her to write the forward to 
his forthcoming book, he noted the project came about because the U.S. let its “defense 
stagnate.”1191   Working with Hoover Institution scholar Peter Schweizer, Weinberger 
wrote The Next War, a series of fictional vignettes designed to illustrate the threat to US 
national security with a weakened military.  He believed that the use of fiction would 
allow the reader to understand the “tough strategic decisions” faced by the US and 
understand the sweeping impact that technology could have on the battlefield.1192  
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Weinberger equated his fiction to the computerized wargames run in the 
Pentagon.  He hoped the stories “could lay bare some possible (and some unlikely) 
threats” to the US.1193  The wargames would expose the threats, American limitations, 
and show potential ways to avoid the dire scenarios portrayed by the authors.  Using 
fictional stories in this capacity, mirrored the way Reagan used works like Red Storm 
Rising as a narrative wargame.  Weinberger hoped the scenarios would be more 
memorable than a standard policy book and believed that fiction would allow him to 
better capture both the difficulty of the environment and “demonstrate the human and 
psychological dimensions of combat.”1194  However, Weinberger’s decision to forgo 
character development minimized the impact on the reader.1195 
The Next War shows that Reagan was not the only member of his administration 
who viewed fictional narratives as valuable tools for policy development.  Weinberger 
reviewed books for The San Francisco Chronicle for several decades.  He did so not in 
search of a paycheck, but rather because of the value he placed on books.  Reading 
Winston Churchill’s The World Crisis led Weinberger to attempt to join the Royal Air 
Force in 1940.  Though rejected due to poor depth perception, he would carry a copy of 
the book with him throughout his service in the US Army as a member of Douglass 
MacArthur’s staff.1196  While serving as Secretary of Defense, Weinberger continued to 
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take time to review books.  He glowingly reviewed Clancy’s The Hunt for Red October 
and Patriot Games for The Wall Street Journal, praising both books for their realism and 
treating them as important contributions to the national security debate.1197  Robert 
Ludlum’s The Bourne Supremacy received a savage review, largely due to its negative 
portrayal of the US government.1198  Weinberger aggressively sought to shape the 
cultural narrative of the Reagan administration’s policy.  Aware of Ludlum’s negative 
depiction of the intelligence community in The Bourne Identity, he reached out to The 
Wall Street Journal asking them to publish his review.1199 
Weinberger sought to amplify the works and authors he thought friendly to his 
politics.  He reviewed William Buckley’s Mongoose R.I.P. for The Wall Street Journal.  
Buckley, a conservative icon and the founder of The National Review, largely embraced 
the views of the Reagan White House on defense issues.  His book was an alternative 
history that imagined a world where the Soviet Union left its missiles in Cuba.  
Weinberger noted in his review that although Buckley did not depict the CIA of the 
1960s “in the best light” Weinberger justified this by noting that Buckley was dealing 
with history.1200   More importantly to Weinberger, Buckley treated the “critically 
important and frequently highly dangerous” work of the intelligence community “with 
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respect, quiet admiration, and with a full appreciation of its importance to our 
security.”1201  Weinberger expressed gratitude that Buckley “[was] no John Le Carre,” as 
the famed spy-novelist “always [seemed] to delight in the blunders and weaknesses” of 
the US and its allies.1202  The review delighted Buckley, who sent flowers to Weinberger 
to express his gratitude.1203  The review demonstrates how even after leaving the Reagan 
administration, Weinberger sought to shape the cultural narrative around defense issues. 
The Next War was an attempt to go from drawing attention to favorable voice to 
directly contributing to the discussion.  SDI played an important part of the novel and one 
of Weinberger’s scenarios drew heavily on the themes of both the Cardinal of the 
Kremlin and Weinberger’s concern that the Soviets were developing their own missile 
shield.  Set in 2006, Weinberger’s Russians expanded their ballistic missile defense 
launchers into a system called “Magic Chain.”  Blending fiction and reality, the book 
accurately notes that the ABM treaty had allowed for both the US and USSR to develop a 
system to protect a single target, which the Soviets employed in Moscow. The Next War 
then imagines that Soviet leaders in the 1980s expended significant resources to grow 
their defenses.  The Russian leaders of The Next War use the reductions of nuclear 
weapons due to the START and INF treaties to their advantage, scaling the Magic Chain 
to interdict the maximum possible US force.1204   
                                                 
1201 Ibid. 
1202 Ibid. 
1203 Caspar Weinberger to William Buckley, 21 January 1988, Part III: Box 43, The Caspar Weinberger 
Papers, The Library of Congress. 
1204 The Next War, 226. 
317 
 
The Russians launch a surprise invasion of Poland, and the US president then 
realizes that the successful, unilateral development of a Russian missile shield left the US 
“naked, unable to retaliate.”1205  The imbalance allows the Russians to invade the rest of 
Eastern Europe and reestablish the Iron Curtain.  They enjoy the ability to employ 
nuclear strikes at will when their forces face significant opposition.1206  As a result, the 
Russian conquer all of Europe and are able to extort annual payments from the US, UK, 
and Japan of one hundred billion dollars.1207  A crash US SDI program leads to the 
deployment of brilliant pebbles two years later, and Weinberger ends the chapter 
ominously as Russian leadership prepares a massive nuclear launch to SDI. 
The vignette was a naked attempt to scare the American public into supporting 
greater defense spending amid the cuts of the Clinton adminstration.  The Russian 
economy in the mid-90s could not support anywhere near the expenditures necessary to 
develop the technology, and, while the Soviet Union was developing ABM technology in 
the 1980s, they had even less success than the US.  Weinberger and Schweizer peppered 
the chapter with allusions to Reagan and Star Wars, frequently having characters lament 
that the US abandoned research in the area.  The result was an in-artful effort to emulate 
the success of Clancy in building support for an aggressive defense policy. 
Clancy provided the authors a model as they embarked on the project.  They also 
provided Clancy with an advanced reader’s copy, asking for an endorsement they could 
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use for the book.  Schweizer informed the novelist that they decided to save “the entire 
back of the dust jacket” for Clancy’s comments.1208  The two clearly hoped that Clancy 
would provide effusive praise.  The author did provide a brief blurb, stating it was “a well 
presented and thought-provoking look into an undetermined future.”1209  Weinberger also 
received blurbs from Henry Kissinger, who thought that “The Next War, through fiction, 
lays out some chilling but plausible scenarios,” and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
Jack Vessey, who called it “an exciting and eminently readable tale to give readers an 
important civics lesson.”1210  However, despite receiving favorable commentary from 
prominent and experienced national security voices, only Clancy’s praise appeared on the 
dust jacket.1211  This was because for many Americans, particularly ones likely to 
purchase a book by Weinberger, Clancy was now the leading writer on war. 
 The Cardinal of the Kremlin was another massive success for Clancy.  The book 
sold over 1.2 million copies in 1988 and was the best-selling hard cover work of the 
year.1212  Critics also embraced the novel in a way they had not with Clancy’s previous 
works.  Robert Lekachman, The New York Times reviewer of thriller novels, had 
criticized Clancy’s writing in his 1986 review of Red Storm Rising.  The reviewer argued 
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that it demonstrated “undistinguished prose” and characters on a “Victorian boys’ book 
level.”1213  Lekachman upgrades his description of Clancy’s writing to “workman-like” in 
the review of Cardinal of the Kremlin, but also confesses that he found the “unmasking 
of the title’s secret agent” to be “as sophisticated an exercise in the craft of espionage” as 
he had encountered.1214  The review also praised how Clancy kept “readers well abreast 
of current politics,” but criticized the uncritical and unflinching embrace of Star Wars.1215   
 In response, Daniel Graham wrote a letter to the editors complaining about 
Lekachman’s “deplorable bit of snide ax-grinding.”1216  Graham argued that Clancy made 
a “very clear and very persuasive case for SDI,” and that for the review to insinuate that 
Clancy believed “a leaky defense [was] worse than no defense” was tantamount to 
“censorship of the literati against all books that offend their politics.”1217  The central 
message of The Cardinal of the Kremlin was that “defense, not vengeance, [was] the 
proper function of the military.”1218  This statement consciously echoed Reagan’s 
language that it would be “better to save lives than to avenge them” from the 1983 
address introducing SDI.1219  In his response to Graham’s letter, Lekachman noted that he 
was “in excellent company of many eminent scientists who oppose the enterprise as a 
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dangerous and expensive scientific fantasy.”1220  The reviewer then noted that Clancy had 
received special access to the Pentagon to explain the “esoteric details of lasers, mirrors, 
satellites, software, and heaven knows what else.”1221  In doing so “they acted astutely,” 
as to Lekachman, the effort represented that even the Pentagon knew “the best defense of 
Star Wars [was] indeed fictional.”1222 
 Clancy did receive special access to the Pentagon while researching The Cardinal 
of the Kremlin.  A Newsweek article that coincided with the release of the book 
highlighted the official support Clancy received.  Clancy spent a rotation at the Army’s 
the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, spoke with sailors in Norfolk, 
Virginia, and visited the headquarters of the FBI and CIA.1223  A Pentagon spokesman 
went on record with the magazine and enthused that “everybody’s willing to talk to 
Clancy” since “he’s one of the good guys.”1224  The statement formally acknowledged the 
obvious truth that the defense establishment held Clancy in high esteem and valued his 
work. 
 The author also received classified information as part of the research.  Clancy 
obtained the precise coordinates of a Soviet ABM research facility, along with a 
description of the number and type of buildings on the site.  He then used this to order 
satellite imagery from a commercial vendor.1225  A Newsweek source identified the 
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information Clancy used as having clearly originated from intelligence that was Top 
Secret and part of a compartmentalized program.  When confronted about this, Clancy 
declined to identify his source and argued that by using a civilian company the 
information was public domain and therefore fair to use in his novel.1226 
 Jerry Pournelle traveled with Clancy on one of these research trips and 
acknowledged that both authors knew things that they were not officially supposed to 
know.1227  The two rarely talked about specific technological capabilities as a result, 
though it is likely that Pournelle influenced how Clancy described SDI in Cardinal.  
During these trips Clancy would frequent officer clubs on bases to converse with military 
officers and gain information about how they operated and what their systems could 
do.1228  He referred to these informal interactions as “The Great Chain,” which gave him 
access to sensitive information. Clancy could then use the information to determine the 
accuracy of open source reporting or, as in the case of the imagery, find a way to source 
the intelligence publicly.1229  These methods accounted for the detailed descriptions of 
Sary Shagan, the Soviet ABM test site, and the descriptions of US and Soviet ABM 
efforts with a level of detail that went beyond that publicly released by the Reagan 
administration.  Peter Zimmerman, a former arms-control official, argued in Newsweek 
that Clancy was “the authorized winked-at way to leak information that would help the 
                                                 
1226 Ibid. 





military-procurement budget.”1230  The active leaking to Clancy stands in stark contrast to 
the classification concerns that arose during the publication of The Hunt for Red October.  
The Naval Institute Press reached out to naval officers pre-publication to ensure there 
was no classified information in the work.  Despite this, after reading Clancy’s first book, 
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman asked, “who the hell cleared this,” showing concern 
about the potential of American secrets leaking though a thriller.  Just four years later, 
many in the Pentagon actively encouraged such leaks. 
 Clancy’s research for Cardinal also provided the US government with a way to 
advocate for unclassified systems.  US Information Agency director Charles Wick invited 
the author to tour his agency’s WorldNet facility.  The facility was a satellite television 
stations that sought to spread American viewpoints globally.  After touring the station, 
Clancy wrote to Wick stating that it had “the potential to remake the world,” and could 
represent the “most useful, most cost-effective tool of American diplomacy.”1231  Wick 
forwarded the letter to Reagan, who likely appreciated the Paine reference to remaking 
the world.1232  The author then included WorldNet in The Cardinal of the Kremlin.  Late 
in the novel, Jack Ryan asks if USIA still has that “global tv operation going,” prompting 
a response that identifies WorldNet as “one hell of a program.”1233  The scene in question 
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adds little to the plot and the characters quickly move on to other topics, suggesting that 
the inclusion was solely to highlight the USIA’s program. 
 The efforts of a variety of government agencies to place their projects into 
Clancy’s novel show an active effort to shape popular culture.  Reagan administration 
officials clearly felt that they could latch on to the popularity of Jack Ryan novels to build 
greater consensus for their policy.  This directly benefitted Clancy, who in addition to 
agreeing with the administration’s direction, received information and access impossible 
for most to achieve.  The result provided specific detail to lend his story a greater sense of 
realism and allowed the author to pass himself off as a serious voice in the realm of 
national security.  During his publicity tour for The Cardinal of the Kremlin, he hinted 
that he would soon be working in the Pentagon.  He was fond of mentioning that “there 
are people on the inside who say I belong there.”1234 However, Clancy would also add 
that if he did start working for the government, it “would have to be something useful,” 
leaving it to the reader to imagine what that would be.  It is unlikely that Clancy ever 
seriously considered giving up writing, and the millions it made for him, to work for the 
government.  However, the idea that he might and that he would be assigned a portfolio 
of significance served both himself and the Reagan administration. 
 Just as with Red Storm Rising, members of Congress looked to use Clancy’s 
views to assist in their advocacy for funding defense programs.  Representative Robert 
Dornan from California referenced Clancy in debate over the viability of SDI.  Upset that 




a forthcoming Office of Technology Assessment review was likely to claim it to be 
technically infeasible, Dornan used Clancy to counter the analysis of “MADcapped 
scientists” he felt were bent on keeping “the American people hostage to the threat of 
nuclear annihilation.”1235  Deriding the “ostrich-like attitude” of SDI opponents, Dornan 
exhorted his colleagues to consider a op-ed Clancy published in The Wall Street Journal 
earlier that day and take the time to “contemplate his analysis.”1236  The op-ed claimed 
that the members of the OTA and SDI opponents were the equivalent of the Luddites 
who rejected the technology of the Industrial Revolution.  Clancy inaccurately asserted in 
the piece that opposition to the program boiled down to a belief that “it can’t be done, 
because it hasn’t been done, and therefore we ought not even try doing it.”1237  Clancy’s 
simplification ignored specific technical concerns over SDI’s feasibility. While these 
concerns did not mean SDI critics were necessarily right, they show a sophistication far 
beyond the Luddite label that Clancy and Dornan sought to affix. 
  One criticism that the op-ed addressed directly was the issue of processing speed.   
Clancy believed the development of the Apple Macintosh showed that it would be 
possible to have computers with SDI-capable chips soon.  He also argued that complaints 
about the lack of a model to test SDI were inaccurate, as he “saw such a model last week” 
that would be used to test the concept in two months.  The article mirrored Clancy’s 
fiction in that it sought to blend personal observations on technology with special access 
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to advance a pet-issue of the Reagan administration.  It concluded with a brief note about 
the forthcoming The Cardinal of the Kremlin, which the editors helpfully noted was 
about SDI.1238 
The speed with which Dornan brought Clancy’s article to the House floor is 
telling.  The article had appeared in The Wall Street Journal the same day that Dornan 
entered it into the Congressional Record.  Dornan believed that the popularity of Clancy 
made it worthwhile to immediately point to the article in debate as a means of showing 
“expert” support and claim the popular mandate implied by the bestselling author’s 
support.  That Clancy had no scientific background, official access to the SDI program, 
or any specific counter to the issues the OTA was likely to raise did not matter.  What 
was important to Dornan was the ability of the novelist to shape the public narrative in a 
way favorable to his policy goals.  In doing so, Dornan played his part in a symbiotic 
relationship.  HIs use of Clancy as a valid voice on the SDI program gave the author 
credibility as a national security voice which in turn meant that Clancy’s advocacy was 
more effective. 
Reagan appreciated Clancy’s advocacy for SDI.  Though he never publicly 
commented on the book, Reagan did read it and kept a copy behind his desk in his post-
presidency office.1239  Clancy’s work was the only one of fiction among the forty-four in 
the office.  The others were a mix of biographies about Reagan and topics of personal 
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significance to the former president.  The Cardinal of the Kremlin and its naked advocacy 
for SDI place it in the latter category.  That the book remained in Reagan’s office for over 
a decade and a half after its publication suggests the importance the ex-president placed 
on it and Clancy’s work in general. 
The US never successfully researched and deployed the system of Reagan’s 
imagination.  However, labeling the program a failure would ignore what is a 
complicated legacy.  American research into an anti-missile shield both aided and 
hindered efforts to achieve nuclear abolition and peace with the Soviet Union.  Soviet 
records show a deep concern with the program, and some senior leaders of the USSR felt 
the program hastened the end of the Cold War.1240  Reagan’s announcement of the 
program in 1983 and US efforts over the next two years, shaped how Gorbachev viewed 
the need for peace.  As he took his place as leader of the USSR, Gorbachev feared that 
the program represented a technological innovation that the Soviets could not match and 
would require resources that would take away from his ability to undertake sweeping 
economic reform.1241  Biographer William Taubman argues that this led to the need for a 
“sharp improvement of relations with the United States.”1242  However, the issue also 
delayed serious arms control agreements, and potentially prevented the two superpowers 
from complete disarmament, though much could have happened in the decade after 
Reykjavik to derail even a signed treaty.   
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The Soviets also undertook efforts to speed the response time of their nuclear 
forces.1243  Reagan’s announcement came at a time when Soviet leadership perceived 
their vulnerability to a US first strike.  The deployment of Pershing II missiles meant that 
they would have approximately eight minutes to determine a response if the US launched 
first, a drastic and frightening reduction in the time available to make a decision that 
would determine the fate of millions.1244  This compressed timeline for response 
combined with the lack of resources to effectively compete with American research in 
SDI led Soviet leadership to invest in a system known as “The Dead Hand” which would 
automatically launch a massive nuclear response intended to overwhelm any US 
defense.1245 Soviet leadership considered building an entirely automated system that 
could order retaliatory strikes without human input.  However, they opted against giving 
complete control to computers, instead placing the decision in the hands of duty officers 
located in concrete bunkers buried deep underground and untouchable by nuclear 
missiles.1246  The officers provided a final failsafe, but once they issued the orders the 
entirety of the surviving Soviet arsenal would fire automatically at preselected targets.1247  
A successful test of the system took place in 1984, and was fully operational the next 
year.   
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SDI played a role in exposing Soviet vulnerabilities, both in terms defense 
capabilities and economic strength.  Gorbachev realized the Soviet Union could not 
match US efforts in the field which increased his willingness to negotiate arms 
reductions.  It underpinned a growing consensus among Soviet reformers about the need 
for change and helped support difficult decisions about maintaining Soviet proxies in 
Eastern Europe and the war in Afghanistan.  While not decisive and never operational, 
SDI was an important strategic success for the US.  Research in the program also 
advanced other technologies and led to the development of anti-missile, though not anti-
ICBM, technology.1248  The program was expensive, but this proved a feature rather than 
a flaw.  It is unlikely the Soviets would have responded as strongly to a minimally funded 
program.  The expense of SDI allowed the US to leverage its economic advantage and 
achieve important strategic concessions from the Soviet Union. 
In The Impossible Presidency, historian Jeremi Suri notes that SDI reflected how 
Reagan sought to lead through vision and promise rather than a focus on specific details.  
In effect Reagan “returned the presidency to mission over management” by “focusing 
executive leadership on a few simple, deeply-head, and widely shared aspirations.”1249  
The breadth of response to the program from individuals normally outside governmental 
debate reflects this.  Reagan’s ability to articulate his vision without specifics provided 
creative space for others to join in and reduced the barriers to significant political 
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dialogue.  Reagan’s speech in March of 1983 set off a creative frenzy, particularly among 
science-fiction authors, that focused foremost on visions of the near future and 
demonstrated the ability of political leadership to shape the narratives of popular culture. 
Gil Troy argues in Morning in America that “Reagan’s vision represented his 
keystone contribution to the 1980s.”1250  His presidency was a “cultural and political 
phenomenon” thanks to his “preference for story-telling over policy-making.”1251  
Presidential use of parables and story to promote political vision expanded the dialogue 
around public policy.  It removed the need to be a policy wonk and to wield command of 
arcane detail to influence national strategy.  Both supporters and opponents of Reagan’s 
views took advantage of this, and popular culture increasingly played an important role in 
shaping public opinion about strategic issues.  The democratization of the debates 
allowed for greater creativity and imagination, but also risked over-simplification of 
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Conclusion: Why Fiction Matters 
 
Tom Clancy’s Clear and Present Danger contained a surprising 
acknowledgement.  The author credited General Colin Powell with providing him the 
idea for the book.1252 Clancy and Powell met at a 1988 award ceremony in Nashville, 
while the general was still serving as Reagan’s National Security Advisor.  Powell 
remembered that the two “hit it off right away” since Clancy was “deeply involved in 
military affairs” and Powell respected what Clancy’s work represented for the 
military.1253  The two men developed a very close friendship which endured to Clancy’s 
death in 2013.1254  
Shortly after the Nashville ceremony, Clancy and Powell spoke “about the work 
the military was doing in South America to cut the flow of drugs.”1255  Powell talked 
about the challenges of the mission and identified some of the forces the US used to 
combat the cartels.1256  The brief discussion helped Clancy identify a new theme for his 
forthcoming novel, which expanded on an idea he initially outlined in 1983.1257  Clancy’s 
original concept centered on a Coast Guard cutter, the USS Panache, involved in the drug 
war.  The ship plays an important role in Clear and Present Danger, but the book’s 
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central focus on land-based special operations represented a shift from his nautical focus 
and showed clear signs of Powell’s influence. 
 Clear and Present Danger is more reflective than Clancy’s previous work.  In it, 
he clearly struggled with the legacy of the Iran-Contra scandal.  In the acknowledgement 
thanking Colin Powell, he also expressed gratitude for active duty military personnel who 
assisted.  The acknowledgement closed morosely wishing “that America serve [them] as 
faithfully as they serve her.”1258  In a review for The New York Times, David Wise noted 
“echoes of Iran-contra are clear and present” throughout the book, and Clancy raised 
issues about the military and the drug war that were concerning.1259  
 One of the book’s villains is Vice Admiral James Cutter, the who serves as the 
National Security Advisor.  Cutter uses the NSC to plan and control a secret war against 
Colombian drug cartels, while misleading the book’s president about the nature of the 
operation.  Once Jack Ryan threatens to expose the mission, Cutter reaches out to a 
Cuban working with the cartels, offering to provide the location of the US teams in 
exchange for a reduction in drugs sent to the US and periodic large busts.  Ryan travels to 
Colombia and with the help of CIA operative Mr. Clark rescues a group of soldiers and 
eliminates the primary drug lord.  Upon his return to the Washington, a CIA officer 
shows Cutter the taped confession of the Cuban and a photo of Cutter meeting with him.  
The agent notes he used to be in the Navy and warned Cutter about his imminent arrest, 
                                                 
1258 Clear and Present Danger 
1259 David Wise, “Clear and Present Danger,” The New York Times, 13 August 1989. 
332 
 
so the admiral could “handle things himself—for the good of the service.”1260  Cutter 
understands the intention and commits suicide by throwing himself in front of a bus while 
jogging. 
 Afterwards, Ryan goes to the White House with two members of Congress to 
confront the president.  He lectures the president about his poor management and 
criticizes him for allowing the illegal operation to take place.  Ryan is emotionally hurt 
by the president’s failure and internally ponders if it was possible for the president to “be 
connected with something like this… and not be corrupted by it.”1261 Clancy’s fictional 
president eventually accepts his responsibility and intentionally loses his reelection to 
save the nation from a scandal and protect people who thought they were operating 
lawfully.  Ryan concludes after the election that the president was “still a man of honor, 
whatever mistakes he’d made.”1262   
 The final oval office conversation in Clear and Present Danger was Clancy 
seeking to express his frustration, fears, and hurt to Reagan.  His fictional president in 
The Hunt for Red October, Cardinal of the Kremlin, and Clear and Present Danger was a 
clear stand in for Reagan, and Clancy add character traits based on his own interaction 
with Reagan in 1985. The president and his policies inspired much of Clancy’s work and 
an endorsement from the Oval Office helped ignite his career change from insurance 
agent to best-selling author.  Though hurt and surprised by the Iran-Contra scandal, 
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Clancy and many Americans forgave Reagan who left office with a 63% approval rating, 
the highest recorded by Gallup to that point.1263  H.W. Brands notes in Reagan: A Life 
that Reagan’s televised apology in the wake of the Tower Commission drove approval of 
his handling of foreign policy to 33 percent.1264  Reagan took solace in the positive 
reception of the speech, which his diary noted received more phone calls than any other 
and had a 93 percent favorable impression among Americans.1265  Like Jack Ryan, it 
appeared that most Americans concluded Reagan remained “a man of honor,” though not 
necessarily one to trust with power. 
 Clancy blamed Poindexter for Iran-Contra.  A 1990s luncheon at Annapolis found 
the two men seated together at a table.  Accurately recognizing Poindexter did not like 
him, Clancy disingenuously assured him that Poindexter was not the inspiration for 
Cutter.1266  However, Clancy’s penchant for drawing from real people and events and the 
synchronization of Poindexter real and Cutter’s fictional biography strongly suggest the 
Poindexter was the primary inspiration.  Cutter’s suicide in the book likely referred to 
Bud McFarlane, Poindexter’s predecessor as National Security Advisor.  McFarlane, a 
former Marine, driven by “a sense of having failed the country” attempted suicide by 
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overdosing on valium.1267  For his part, Poindexter was unimpressed by Clancy finding 
him to be arrogant and insecure.1268 
However, Poindexter remained in the minority and Clancy enjoyed great 
popularity in the White House of George H.W. Bush.  Like Reagan, Bush read and 
enjoyed Red Storm Rising and counted it among his favorite books.  He also developed a 
personal relationship with the author.  Speaking in Baltimore to commemorate the 175th 
anniversary of “The Star-Spangled Banner,” he expressed happiness that Clancy was 
present.  Bush referred to the author as his friend and celebrated “the marvelous 
contribution he’s made to our literary world and… the national security interests of the 
United States.”1269  Five months later Bush hosted Clancy at the White House. 
 In February of 1990, Bush personally called Jack Valenti, the head of the Motion 
Picture Association of America, to request an advance copy of the forthcoming movie 
The Hunt for Red October for a White House screening.1270  Even though the film’s 
producer, Mace Neufeld, felt it was not ready he sent a copy to the White House.1271  
Bush hosted the screening on February 19th, two weeks before the movie’s March 
opening.  Tom Clancy and James Earl Jones attended the screening along with a many 
high-ranking officials in the defense and intelligence establishment.  Brent Scowcroft, 
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Colin Powell, Robert Gates, and Bobby Inman all attended as did many naval officers 
and CIA employees.1272  The attendance of so many prominent defense and intelligence 
officials implies that the highest ranks of the Pentagon and Langley continued to view 
Clancy’s work as an important contribution to the broader strategic and public discourses.  
The author’s themes matched the way the administration portrayed American military 
capability.  Though Bush struggled with the “whole vision thing,” his White House did 
present Americans with a vision of war as a clean and surgical endeavor.1273  Rapid, 
nearly-bloodless success for the US in the First Iraq War promised a future of 
uncontested military interventions to assist the development of a new world order. 
 However, the narrative ignored the perils of outsourcing diplomatic and strategic 
planning to the military.  The decision of the Bush administration to allow military 
leadership in theater to dictate the terms that ended the war broke with the characteristic 
caution of the administration in foreign affairs.  General Norman Schwarzkopf and his 
staff negotiated a deal allowing Hussein to retain much of his military power, most 
notably helicopters the dictator quickly turned against his own people who rebelled in the 
vain hope of US aide.  It ensured a long-term US military presence in Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia to counter the still threatening Iraqi regime, led to a large-scale humanitarian 
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crisis within Iraq, and set the conditions for over a decade and a half of war in Iraq just 
twelve years later.  Bush failed to subordinate military preference to clearly defined 
political objectives.  Though not apparent in 1991, the end of the First Iraq War was the 
Bush administration’s most spectacular failure of vision and an embodiment of haphazard 
decision making, that marked a sharp contrast from the careful and deliberate way Bush 
approached eastern Europe. 
 Bush accepted a tempting and apparently easy peace in Iraq, underpinned by 
overwhelming US military power.  He resisted a similar peace in Europe.  Early in the 
administration, Bush and Baker greatly disappointed Gorbachev by not immediately 
embracing friendly Soviet overtures.  Instead, the administration undertook a deliberate 
review of US-Soviet policy that lasted several months.1274  The cautious approach to the 
collapsing Soviet Empire lasted throughout the Bush administration, even though it did 
adopt the Reagan-era approach to Gorbachev.  The reluctance to embrace calls for the 
immediate independence of the Soviet republics drew criticism domestically and abroad.  
In a 1991 speech before the Ukrainian Parliament, Bush warned “freedom is not the same 
as independence,” and promised his audience “Americans will not support those who 
seek independence in order to replace far-off tyranny with a local despotism.”1275  Critics 
labeled it Bush’s “chicken Kiev” speech, and assumed the president’s intention was to 
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support Gorbachev at the expense of those seeking democracy and freedom.1276  In his 
memoirs, A World Transformed, Bush defended his speech on the basis that he feared 
pushing too hard for Soviet republics to breakaway could lead to violence.1277  The 
caution exhibited by Bush’s words reflected the administration’s recognition of the 
delicate and dangerous situation created by the evident decline of the USSR.  In Iraq, the 
decisive violence of military operations and a lack of cultural understanding prevented 
recognition of the fragility of the Middle East. 
In the final chapter of Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said stridently criticized 
Operation Desert Storm.  While his characterization of the conflict as part of a “cultural 
war against Arabs” rings hollow, he does identify a crucial change of American cultural 
perception of its own power.1278  He criticizes the administration of George H.W. Bush 
for portraying the war “as a painless Nintendo exercise” and for propagating the “image 
of Americans as virtuous, clean warriors.”1279  Popular culture embraced these images.  
The war crossed into the cultural realm, as companies marketed the war with t-shirts, 
patriotic commercials, and even trading cards.1280  The short period of hostilities, small 
number of American casualties, and prominent public gratitude of Kuwait reinforced the 
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cultural themes that Reagan introduced during his presidency.  American technical 
superiority changed the conflict from a war into “a turkey-shoot.”1281  Images of miles of 
flaming wreckage of Iraqi tanks and trucks attested to the reemergence of American 
military power, and created a sense that interventions could be clean, quick, and decisive.   
In many ways the war was a Clancy novel come to life.  In addition to the obvious 
technical superiority, the media portrayed American service members, from Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell down to privates in the field, as representatives of the best 
America had to offer.  Melani McAlister notes in Epic Encounters, that the media 
identified the military as “a microcosm of the US population… drawn from small towns 
and communities around the nation.”  The military represented the “diversity of the 
United States.”1282  Such language mirrored Reagan’s answer to the query of Michener’s 
Admiral Tarrant who marveling at the sacrifice of his command asks, “Where did we get 
such men?”1283 Reagan responded as he presented the Medal of Honor to Master Sergeant 
Roy Benevidez that, “We find them where we've always found them, in our villages and 
towns, on our city streets, in our shops, and on our farms.”1284  The combination of 
military success and public support of Desert Storm marked the culmination of the 
policies started while Reagan was in the White House.  It also represents the ideal of the 
US military.  At its best, military service brings together people from all backgrounds in 
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America.  The potential for the military to embody the vast diversity of the United States 
is one of its greatest strengths.  It allows the military to tap into the variety of experiences 
and perspectives embodied by the American people and use them to develop creative and 
effective operations. 
Reagan’s language propagated the ideal throughout his tenure as president.  He 
portrayed US service members as “gallant and brave” and argued they represented the 
country’s best citizens.1285  His language helped shift American attitudes towards their 
military and was a welcome and necessary corrective at the beginning of his 
administration.  Reagan’s understanding of the need for broad support of the military to 
support his Cold War policy demonstrated a recognition of their influence and the 
importance of national will in achieving strategic success.  Such support was largely 
absent as he entered office, placing the US at a significant strategic disadvantage in the 
Cold War. 
However, while Reagan’s glowing rhetoric about the military helped reverse the 
strategic standing of the US and revitalized American hard power, it also incentivized 
simplistic discussion of the military for future leaders.  Reagan depicted service members 
as universally heroic and as a small final bastion against overwhelming forces of tyranny.  
His use of fiction and anecdote conveyed this message in a memorable, but unnuanced, 
way to the American public.  The resulting surge in support for the military made the 
institution a politically popular one to draw on to build electoral support, subverting the 
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civil-military relationship.  Politicians running for office almost universally sought to 
demonstrate that they supported the troops and expanded on Reagan’s effusive rhetoric 
without deepening the discussion. 
In The New American Militarism, Andrew Bacevich argues “no one did more to 
affirm [Reagan’s] military mythology and to perpetuate the use of soldiers as political 
props than did Bill Clinton.”1286  Clinton’s previous protestations about loving his 
country but hating the military and avoidance of service in Vietnam were significant 
liabilities during the 1992 election.  He actively sought worked to counter this legacy 
during the election and adopted many of Reagan’s rhetorical tendencies in his 1991 
proposal on “A New Covenant for American Security.”1287  Clinton affirmed his support 
for the robust use of military power in American statecraft and argued the candidate 
wanted to enhance the strength of the US armed forces.  He concluded the speech by 
sharing an anecdote about a parade honoring soldiers he organized in Little Rock.  
Clinton invited veterans of all wars to take part and spoke of his pride in seeing “Vietnam 
veterans finally being given the honor they deserved all along.”1288  Clinton felt 
compelled to praise the veterans of a war he despised and members of the military he 
disdained as a youth.  Any other language risked furthering a narrative about the 
weakness of Democrats on national security and would likely render Clinton unelectable 
for a broad swathe of the American public.  The politically safest course, and most 
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beneficial one, was to adopt the feel-good message about the men and women in the 
military, rather than engage in a serious discourse about their employment throughout the 
world. 
Clinton was a fan of Tom Clancy’s books as well.  A New York Times profile 
after the 1992 election highlighted the president-elect’s reading habits.  It praised his 
reading of biographies and works by Marcus Aurelius and Gabriel Garcia Marquez.  The 
article also dismissed Clinton’s fondness for both Clancy and Ludlum as partaking in 
“grocery store trash.”1289  Another favorite of Ronald Reagan received mention in the 
profile.  A week before the profile’s publication Clinton hosted a viewing of High Noon, 
marking the president-elect’s nineteenth viewing of the film.1290  In discussing popular 
culture, Clinton demonstrated a “memory for characters, actors, directors, situations and 
punchlines,” which he employed while campaigning.1291 
While Clinton shared Reagan’s love of Clancy and High Noon and employed 
cultural references and anecdotes to build rapport with voters, there is little evidence to 
suggest he used the stories in policy planning.  Clancy did not return Clinton’s support.  
The author described Clinton’s charm as something hit “like a physical force,” a 
remarkably like the way he described Reagan’s charisma.  However, the author strongly 
disagreed with both the defense and foreign policy of the administration and argued 
                                                 
1289 William Honan, “Books, Books, and More Books: Clinton an Omnivorous Reader,” The New York 





Clinton “shit on the military pretty comprehensively.”1292  The author’s distaste with the 
political environment likely contributed to the climax of 1994’s Debt of Honor, which 
elevated Jack Ryan to the presidency after a Japanese pilot crashed his airliner into the 
US Capitol Building, killing the president and most of Congress.1293  After the attacks of 
September 11th, commentators quickly noted the similarity between the terrorists use of 
airplanes and Clancy’s fiction. 
Throughout the 1990s, Clancy’s media presence expanded.  He continued to write 
novels, though at a slower pace than before, and saw his works adapted into successful 
movies and video games.  Patriot Games and Clear and Present Danger followed The 
Hunt for Red October into movie theaters, all with modest success.  Rainbow Six, a 1998 
novel that made Mr. Clark the leader of a multi-national anti-terrorist force, spawned a 
video game franchise with regular iterations into the present day.  “Tom Clancy’s” 
became a label affixed to products to promise high-tech military adventure.  In 2018, 
Clancy remains a significant media presence, though most are likely to encounter his 
work digitally.  
Years after death, Clancy remains relevant and is still used by policymakers to 
score partisan points.  In March of 2018 a House Intelligence Committee report sought to 
exonerate the Trump Campaign of collusion with Russia and counter an intelligence 
community conclusion of Russian involvement in the 2016 presidential election. The 
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report’s primary author, Representative K. Michael Conaway, claimed that “only Tom 
Clancy…could take this series of inadvertent contacts with each other, or meetings, 
whatever, and weave that into some sort of fictional page-turner spy thriller.”1294  Shortly 
afterward, the Russian Embassy in the US tweeted a declaration that “all Russia 
investigations” would “end [Conaway] brilliant concluded” and included images of the 
Russian covers of Clancy’s Rainbow Six and Debt of Honor.1295  Both Conaway and the 
Russian Embassy used Clancy in a way which intended to dismiss the notion that fiction 
was a valuable contribution to policy.  However, they both also recognized the 
prominence of the Clancy brand and intended to use it to subvert and minimize 
discussion about electoral interference.  The tension between the desire to minimize and 
capitalize on the importance of popular culture is part of the challenge in using it in a 
serious manner. 
Fiction is a potentially powerful tool in developing policy.  It affords policy 
makers with a way to gain experience with systems and scenarios they are unfamiliar 
with.  Effective narratives force those engaging with them to identify with the characters 
and challenges presented by the work.  This identification creates a personal and 
potentially permanent bond with the work, making it more memorable and useful for the 
intended audience.  These effects mirror the expected outcomes of wargames, which are 
generally regarded as an essential part of the development of strategy.  Like a wargame, 
                                                 
1294 Nicholas Fandos, “Despite Mueller’s Push, House Republicans Declare No Evidence of Collusion,” 
The New York Times, 12 March 2018. 
1295 @RusEMBUSA, Twitter.com, 12 March 2018 
344 
 
narratives can identify critical decision points and their immersive nature leads audiences 
to ask important questions about why events unfold as they do, how that will shape the 
future, and what choices could lead to better outcomes.  Narrative allows exploration of 
branches and sequels of a plan. 
Reagan’s use of Red Storm Rising fit this framework.  He used the book as a 
personal wargame.  The narrative tested the information he received in briefings and 
policy makers.  It allowed Reagan to simulate the Third World War in a contemporary or 
near-future environment.  The conclusions he derived from using the book as a creative 
space suggested the strategic success of “Peace through Strength,” leading to more 
aggressive negotiations and sweeping arms reduction proposals beyond any conducted by 
previous administrations.  Reagan found Red Storm Rising so compelling a scenario, that 
he recommended it to allied leaders and aides, expecting that if they read it they would 
gain the same synthetic experience and share his conclusions about NATO’s 
conventional readiness.  However, it was entirely possible those Reagan recommended 
the book to would draw entirely different conclusions than the president.  Elements 
Reagan found compelling, another may see as unrealistic or take a very different idea 
from.  Without clear communication of strategic intent and active review of policies the 
benefits of fiction, or any strategy, would be lost.  
A critical aspect of strategy is vision.  Leaders need to define what success looks 
like and why their goals are the right ones.  They must then communicate their vision in 
broadly in a compelling way.  Reagan’s strategic vision, and the boldness of that vision, 
345 
 
was the greatest strength of his administration.  The reestablishment of the Cold War as 
an existential moral struggle paired with a reinvigoration of the US military provided 
Americans with a narrative they largely understood and supported.  In contrast, Bush’s 
admission of struggles with the “vision-thing,” was particularly damning.  It indicated 
that despite the careful statecraft surrounding the end of the Cold War, the administration 
lacked a real sense of what it wanted to build and was unable to explain to the American 
people why their goals mattered. 
Envisioning, and selling, a national future requires imagination and creativity.  It 
also requires fiction.  A good strategy imagines an environment that does not yet exist 
and identifies ways to make that vision a reality.  The process of developing policy is 
effectively the creation and communication of a narrative.  Leaders should then include 
fictional sources in developing their strategy.  Reagan’s use of science fiction offers a 
powerful example of how the inclusion of fiction can benefit leaders.  His reading of the 
genre helped instill a love of technology and made him imagine what was possible with 
the pairing of advanced technology and a free people.  His vision of unlimited potential 
suffused both his rhetoric and the policy of the administration.  Additionally, the message 
resonated with the American people because Reagan communicated it through relatable 
and optimistic stories.  
Leveraging popular culture in the development and discussion of policy does 
come with risk.  It can lead to oversimplification or the use of bad assumptions in 
planning.  The resulting strategy could then not only be ineffective, but actually work 
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against policy goals.  Reagan’s use of High Noon and westerns demonstrates the risk.  He 
effectively used the moral rhetoric of the genre to build the will of Americans and US 
allies to wage the Cold War.  In Europe, the white hat versus black hat morality largely 
fit.  However, the administration’s attempts to apply the same rhetoric and policy in Latin 
America, the Middle East, and Africa were unsuccessful as it oversimplified the nature of 
conflicts in the region and ignored the largely negative legacies of western involvement.  
Reagan’s narrow reading interests and lack of intellectual curiosity about the much of the 
world undermined his administration and led to significant suffering.    
Reagan’s presidency demonstrates that leaders should read broadly and seek to 
challenge their assumptions through engagement with material that explicitly contradicts 
their world view.  At its best, such reading can engender empathy.  At its best, fiction can 
capture the humanity of groups that are ostensibly hostile.  It can also demonstrate the 
value of diversity of thought and experience.  The immersive nature of fiction can force a 
reader to consider the world from a radically different perspective and contribute to a 
more nuanced and compassionate view.  While reading broadly does not guarantee 
understanding and strategic success, it can facilitate a more adaptable strategy and 
superior recognition of the root cause of conflict. 
Reagan read broadly about the experience of Russians and eastern Europeans.  
The works of Koestler, Massie, and others helped humanize the populations of an empire 
Reagan regarded as inherently evil and bent on extinguishing freedom globally.  The lead 
to his recognition that the people of the USSR were victims of their government and that 
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they likely wanted many of the same things Americans did.  The empathy displayed in 
the Anya and Ivan speech offered a powerful recognition of the basic humanity of 
Soviets, and starkly contrasts past American propaganda which often explicitly 
dehumanized the nation’s enemies.  Depictions of Native Americans during the 
settlement of the west, Germans in the First World War, the Japanese in the Second 
World War, and Soviets in the 1950s all sought to instill a belief that America’s foes 
were uncivilized, barbaric, and subhuman.  Reagan’s explicit and public recognition of 
the difference between the Soviet government and people added nuance to his strategy 
and the public debate.   
The nuance was absent in Reagan’s view of the global Cold War.  He failed to 
understand the desires of non-white populations or recognize why many throughout the 
world did not see a moral distinction between the US and USSR and felt arguments about 
it were disingenuous at best.  This is partly due to Reagan’s reading of fiction as well.  He 
most frequently encountered Africa and the Middle East in the writings of Kipling, and 
Latin America in westerns.  Both sets of writings rarely depicted local populations in a 
positive light, often stripping their agency to support the civilizing mission of the 
narrative’s protagonist.  Reagan’s uncritical reading of the work, and the absence of 
countervailing narratives, reinforced bad assumptions, contributing to policy and 
leadership failures that could have brought down his presidency. 
Reagan is far from the only political figure to read narrowly.  In the decades since 
his administration the proliferation of media and popular culture sources due to the 
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internet allows individuals to ensconce themselves in comfortable narratives that do not 
challenge their world view.  The result is an environment that demonizes those with 
differing perspective and an often-toxic public discourse.  Political leaders increasingly 
use the plethora of sources to cherry-pick favorable ones and develop preferred 
narratives.  While this practice does resemble Reagan’s use of fiction and parable, the 
modern usage often has a remarkably different tone and purpose.  Reagan sought to use 
stories to unify the American people domestically and its allies abroad.  While many 
groups fairly felt excluded by Reagan’s rhetoric, it is difficult to argue this was his 
express intent.  The exclusion and tone-deafness on issues of race and sexuality by 
Reagan was the result of a lack of empathy and understanding rather than intentional 
malice.  While the absence of intent does not excuse poor policy, it does offer an 
important distinction from more modern political narratives which often actively seek to 
divide and factionalize Americans.  The tendency of modern political leaders to self-
aggrandize, openly attack unfavorable media, and openly disregard the views and 
interests of large portions of the population is cynical, exploitive, and emblematic of the 
style of politics Reagan explicitly rejected.  Engaging with a broader array of popular 
culture offers a potential fix.  Reagan used stories to build bridges, but the narrowness of 
his reading limited their effectiveness.  Expansive cultural engagement could help a new 
generation of leaders to develop a similarly optimistic vision to Reagan’s, but also one 
that is explicitly inclusive and therefore more compelling. 
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The rhetoric and actions of Reagan helped create the contemporary environment 
and he remains a prominent figure in political debate.  Somewhat ironically, Reagan’s 
legacy receives the same simplification and compression that Reagan used when telling 
stories.  Modern politicians are eager to cast him as a saint or demon and use caricatures 
of his views to highlight their own.  The continued prominence of Reagan in political 
discussion thirty years after his presidency highlights the historic importance of his time 
in office.  Reagan’s presidency was a successful one.  He entered office with the intent of 
improving the US position in the Cold War.  Rather than accepting the conflict as a 
permanent facet of geo-politics, Reagan wanted to set the US on a path that would lead to 
the defeat of the Soviet Union.  US victory in the Cold War came far sooner than Reagan 
envisioned, and its peaceful end is a near-miraculous event given the widespread violence 
of the twentieth century.  Reagan was not solely responsible for this.  The Cold War 
ended peacefully because of a remarkable confluence of far-sighted political leadership in 
both the US and USSR, courageous resistance by the people of Eastern Europe, and 
economic realities forcing Soviet retrenchment.  The Reagan administration played an 
important role in each of these areas and set conditions that hastened the end of the 
conflict. 
Reagan’s policies largely failed in the developing world.  Although much of 
modern Latin America embraces democratic norms, it is likely that this is despite 
Reagan’s efforts in the region, which empowered dictators, drug cartels, and other 
undemocratic actors.  While the US was not the only malign actor in the region, the 
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disregard for human rights by Cuba, the Sandinistas, and others does not excuse the 
violence and authoritarianism supported by the administration.  Reagan failed to 
recognize the problematic legacy of the US in the region and continued policies that 
perpetuated belief in US imperialism in the region.  While the failures in the developing 
world are a major part of Reagan’s legacy, they do not erase his more important 
successes in Europe.  The Cold War represented an existential threat to the US and 
Reagan’s visionary and nuanced plan was one of the most effective grand strategies 
employed by the nation. 
Fictional sources provided inspiration and validation for Reagan’s strategy.  
Narratives provided both synthetic experiences that aided his understanding of a variety 
of situations and creative spaces that allowed Reagan to imagine and anticipate how 
policies would play out in the near future.  Fiction contributed significantly to Reagan’s 
vision of an America made strong through the pairing of technology and freedom.  It also 
helped him communicate his vision in a powerful and seductive manner.  Though 
intentional and extensive use of fiction does carry risk, the Reagan administration’s use 
of narrative demonstrates the potential for popular culture to contribute to effective and 
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